Mapping Design Contributions in Information Systems Research: The Design Research Activity Framework

Despite growing interest in design science research in information systems, our understanding about what constitutes a design contribution and the range of research activities that can produce design contributions remains limited. We propose the design research activity (DRA) framework for classifying design contributions based on the type of statements researchers use to express knowledge contributions and the researcher role with respect to the artifact. These dimensions combine to produce a DRA framework that contains four quadrants: construction, manipulation, deployment, and elucidation. We use the framework in two ways. First, we classify design contributions that the Journal of the Association for Information Systems (JAIS) published from 2007 to 2019 and show that the journal published a broad range of design research across all four quadrants. Second, we show how one can use our framework to analyze the maturity of design-oriented knowledge in a specific field as reflected in the degree of activity across the different quadrants. The DRA framework contributes by showing that design research encompasses both design science research and design-oriented behavioral research. The framework can help authors and reviewers assess research with design implications and help researchers position and understand design research as a journey through the four quadrants

Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria of GSP Keyword Auction

Despite the tremendous commercial success of generalized second-price (GSP) keyword auctions, it still remains a big challenge for an advertiser to formulate an effective bidding strategy. In this paper, we strive to bridge this gap by proposing a framework for studying pure-strategy Nash equilibria in GSP auctions. We first analyze the equilibrium bidding behaviors by investigating the properties and distribution of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Our analysis shows that the set of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of a GSP auction can be partitioned into separate convex polyhedra based on the order of bids if the valuations of all advertisers are distinct. We further show that only the polyhedron that allocates slots efficiently is weakly stable, thus allowing all inefficient equilibria to be weeded out. We then propose a novel refinement method for identifying a set of equilibria named the stable Nash equilibrium set (STNE) and prove that STNE is either the same as or a proper subset of the set of the well-known symmetrical Nash equilibria. These findings free both auctioneers and advertisers from complicated strategic thinking. The revenue of a GSP auction on STNE is at least the same as that of the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and can be used as a benchmark for evaluating other mechanisms. At the same time, STNE provides advertisers a simple yet effective and stable bidding strategy