Designing Normative Theories for Ethical and Legal Reasoning: LogiKEy Framework, Methodology, and Tool Support

A framework and methodology---termed LogiKEy---for the design and engineering of ethical reasoners, normative theories and deontic logics is presented. The overall motivation is the development of suitable means for the control and governance of intelligent autonomous systems. LogiKEy's unifying formal framework is based on semantical embeddings of deontic logics, logic combinations and ethico-legal domain theories in expressive classic higher-order logic (HOL). This meta-logical approach enables the provision of powerful tool support in LogiKEy: off-the-shelf theorem provers and model finders for HOL are assisting the LogiKEy designer of ethical intelligent agents to flexibly experiment with underlying logics and their combinations, with ethico-legal domain theories, and with concrete examples---all at the same time. Continuous improvements of these off-the-shelf provers, without further ado, leverage the reasoning performance in LogiKEy. Case studies, in which the LogiKEy framework and methodology has been applied and tested, give evidence that HOL's undecidability often does not hinder efficient experimentation.Comment: 50 pages; 10 figure

Securing open multi-agent systems governed by electronic institutions

One way to build large-scale autonomous systems is to develop an open multi-agent system using peer-to-peer architectures in which agents are not pre-engineered to work together and in which agents themselves determine the social norms that govern collective behaviour. The social norms and the agent interaction models can be described by Electronic Institutions such as those expressed in the Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC), a compact executable specification language based on logic programming and pi-calculus. Open multi-agent systems have experienced growing popularity in the multi-agent community and are expected to have many applications in the near future as large scale distributed systems become more widespread, e.g. in emergency response, electronic commerce and cloud computing. A major practical limitation to such systems is security, because the very openness of such systems opens the doors to adversaries for exploit existing vulnerabilities. This thesis addresses the security of open multi-agent systems governed by electronic institutions. First, the main forms of attack on open multi-agent systems are introduced and classified in the proposed attack taxonomy. Then, various security techniques from the literature are surveyed and analysed. These techniques are categorised as either prevention or detection approaches. Appropriate countermeasures to each class of attack are also suggested. A fundamental limitation of conventional security mechanisms (e.g. access control and encryption) is the inability to prevent information from being propagated. Focusing on information leakage in choreography systems using LCC, we then suggest two frameworks to detect insecure information flows: conceptual modeling of interaction models and language-based information flow analysis. A novel security-typed LCC language is proposed to address the latter approach. Both static (design-time) and dynamic (run-time) security type checking are employed to guarantee no information leakage can occur in annotated LCC interaction models. The proposed security type system is then formally evaluated by proving its properties. A limitation of both conceptual modeling and language-based frameworks is difficulty of formalising realistic policies using annotations. Finally, the proposed security-typed LCC is applied to a cloud computing configuration case study, in which virtual machine migration is managed. The secrecy of LCC interaction models for virtual machine management is analysed and information leaks are discussed

Proving soundness of combinatorial Vickrey auctions and generating verified executable code

Using mechanised reasoning we prove that combinatorial Vickrey auctions are soundly specified in that they associate a unique outcome (allocation and transfers) to any valid input (bids). Having done so, we auto-generate verified executable code from the formally defined auction. This removes a source of error in implementing the auction design. We intend to use formal methods to verify new auction designs. Here, our contribution is to introduce and demonstrate the use of formal methods for auction verification in the familiar setting of a well-known auction

An Introduction to Mechanized Reasoning

Mechanized reasoning uses computers to verify proofs and to help discover new theorems. Computer scientists have applied mechanized reasoning to economic problems but -- to date -- this work has not yet been properly presented in economics journals. We introduce mechanized reasoning to economists in three ways. First, we introduce mechanized reasoning in general, describing both the techniques and their successful applications. Second, we explain how mechanized reasoning has been applied to economic problems, concentrating on the two domains that have attracted the most attention: social choice theory and auction theory. Finally, we present a detailed example of mechanized reasoning in practice by means of a proof of Vickrey's familiar theorem on second-price auctions