On The Deployment of Tweak-in-Plaintext Protection Against Differential Fault Analysis

In an article from HOST 2018, which appears in extended form in the Cryptology ePrint Archive, Baksi, Bhasin, Breier, Khairallah, and Peyrin proposed the tweak-in-plaintext method to protect block ciphers against a differential fault analysis (DFA). We argue that this method lacks existential motivation as neither of its two envisioned use cases, i.e., the electronic codebook (ECB) and the cipher block chaining (CBC) modes of operation, is competitive. Furthermore, in a variant of the method where nonces are generated using a linear-feedback shift register (LFSR), several security problems have not been anticipated for. Finally, we analyze the security level against a brute-force DFA more rigorously than in the original work

ISAP – Towards Side-Channel Secure Authenticated Encryption

Side-channel attacks and in particular differential power analysis (DPA) attacks pose a serious threat to cryptographic implementations. One approach to counteract such attacks are cryptographic schemes based on fresh re-keying. In settings of pre-shared secret keys, such schemes render DPA attacks infeasible by deriving session keys and by ensuring that the attacker cannot collect side-channel leakage on the session key during cryptographic operations with different inputs. While these schemes can be applied to secure standard communication settings, current re-keying approaches are unable to provide protection in settings where the same input needs to be processed multiple times. In this work, we therefore adapt the re-keying approach and present a symmetric authenticated encryption scheme that is secure against DPA attacks and that does not have such a usage restriction. This means that our scheme fully complies with the requirements given in the CAESAR call and hence, can be used like other noncebased authenticated encryption schemes without loss of side-channel protection. Its resistance against side-channel analysis is highly relevant for several applications in practice, like bulk storage settings in general and the protection of FPGA bitfiles and firmware images in particular

SoK : On DFA Vulnerabilities of Substitution-Permutation Networks

Recently, the NIST launched a competition for lightweight cryptography and a large number of ciphers are expected to be studied and analyzed under this competition. Apart from the classical security, the candidates are desired to be analyzed against physical attacks. Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) is an invasive physical attack method for recovering key information from cipher implementations. Up to date, almost all the block ciphers have been shown to be vulnerable against DFA, while following similar attack patterns. However, so far researchers mostly focused on particular ciphers rather than cipher families, resulting in works that reuse the same idea for different ciphers. In this article, we aim at bridging this gap, by providing a generic DFA attack method targeting Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) based families of symmetric block ciphers. We provide an overview of the state-of-the-art of the fault attacks on SPNs, followed by generalized conditions that hold on all the ciphers of this design family. We show that for any SPN, as long as the fault mask injected before a non-linear layer in the last round follows a non-uniform distribution, the key search space can always be reduced. This shows that it is not possible to design an SPN-based cipher that is completely secure against DFA, without randomization. Furthermore, we propose a novel approach to find good fault masks that can leak the key with a small number of instances. We then developed a tool, called Joint Difference Distribution Table (JDDT) for pre-computing the solutions for the fault equations, which allows us to recover the last round key with a very small number of pairs of faulty and non-faulty ciphertexts. We evaluate our methodology on various block ciphers, including PRESENT-80, PRESENT-128, GIFT-64, GIFT-128, AES-128, LED-64, LED-128, Skinny-64-64, Skinny-128-128, PRIDE and PRINCE. The developed technique would allow automated DFA analysis of several candidates in the NIST competition

To Infect Or Not To Infect: A Critical Analysis Of Infective Countermeasures In Fault Attacks

As fault based cryptanalysis is becoming more and more of a practical threat, it is imperative to make efforts to devise suitable countermeasures. In this regard, the so-called ``infective countermeasures\u27\u27 have garnered particular attention from the community due to its ability in inhibiting differential fault attacks without explicitly detecting the fault. We observe that despite being adopted over a decade ago, a systematic study of infective countermeasures is missing from the literature. Moreover, there seems to be a lack of proper security analysis of the schemes proposed, as quite a few of them have been broken promptly. Our first contribution comes in the form of a generalization of infective schemes which aids us with a better insight into the vulnerabilities, scopes for cost reduction and possible improvements. This way, we are able to propose lightweight alternatives of two existing schemes. Further we analyze shortcomings of LatinCrypt\u2712 and CHES\u2714 schemes and propose a simple patch for the former

Securing Memory Encryption and Authentication Against Side-Channel Attacks Using Unprotected Primitives

Memory encryption is used in many devices to protect memory content from attackers with physical access to a device. However, many current memory encryption schemes can be broken using Differential Power Analysis (DPA). In this work, we present MEAS---the first Memory Encryption and Authentication Scheme providing security against DPA attacks. The scheme combines ideas from fresh re-keying and authentication trees by storing encryption keys in a tree structure to thwart first-order DPA without the need for DPA-protected cryptographic primitives. Therefore, the design strictly limits the use of every key to encrypt at most two different plaintext values. MEAS prevents higher-order DPA without changes to the cipher implementation by using masking of the plaintext values. MEAS is applicable to all kinds of memory, e.g., NVM and RAM, and has memory overhead comparable to existing memory authentication techniques without DPA protection, e.g., 7.3% for a block size fitting standard disk sectors

Security protocols suite for machine-to-machine systems

Nowadays, the great diffusion of advanced devices, such as smart-phones, has shown that there is a growing trend to rely on new technologies to generate and/or support progress; the society is clearly ready to trust on next-generation communication systems to face today’s concerns on economic and social fields. The reason for this sociological change is represented by the fact that the technologies have been open to all users, even if the latter do not necessarily have a specific knowledge in this field, and therefore the introduction of new user-friendly applications has now appeared as a business opportunity and a key factor to increase the general cohesion among all citizens. Within the actors of this technological evolution, wireless machine-to-machine (M2M) networks are becoming of great importance. These wireless networks are made up of interconnected low-power devices that are able to provide a great variety of services with little or even no user intervention. Examples of these services can be fleet management, fire detection, utilities consumption (water and energy distribution, etc.) or patients monitoring. However, since any arising technology goes together with its security threats, which have to be faced, further studies are necessary to secure wireless M2M technology. In this context, main threats are those related to attacks to the services availability and to the privacy of both the subscribers’ and the services providers’ data. Taking into account the often limited resources of the M2M devices at the hardware level, ensuring the availability and privacy requirements in the range of M2M applications while minimizing the waste of valuable resources is even more challenging. Based on the above facts, this Ph. D. thesis is aimed at providing efficient security solutions for wireless M2M networks that effectively reduce energy consumption of the network while not affecting the overall security services of the system. With this goal, we first propose a coherent taxonomy of M2M network that allows us to identify which security topics deserve special attention and which entities or specific services are particularly threatened. Second, we define an efficient, secure-data aggregation scheme that is able to increase the network lifetime by optimizing the energy consumption of the devices. Third, we propose a novel physical authenticator or frame checker that minimizes the communication costs in wireless channels and that successfully faces exhaustion attacks. Fourth, we study specific aspects of typical key management schemes to provide a novel protocol which ensures the distribution of secret keys for all the cryptographic methods used in this system. Fifth, we describe the collaboration with the WAVE2M community in order to define a proper frame format actually able to support the necessary security services, including the ones that we have already proposed; WAVE2M was funded to promote the global use of an emerging wireless communication technology for ultra-low and long-range services. And finally sixth, we provide with an accurate analysis of privacy solutions that actually fit M2M-networks services’ requirements. All the analyses along this thesis are corroborated by simulations that confirm significant improvements in terms of efficiency while supporting the necessary security requirements for M2M networks

Circuit-Variant Moving Target Defense for Side-Channel Attacks on Reconfigurable Hardware

With the emergence of side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks, bits of a secret key may be derived by correlating key values with physical properties of cryptographic process execution. Power and Electromagnetic (EM) analysis attacks are based on the principle that current flow within a cryptographic device is key-dependent and therefore, the resulting power consumption and EM emanations during encryption and/or decryption can be correlated to secret key values. These side-channel attacks require several measurements of the target process in order to amplify the signal of interest, filter out noise, and derive the secret key through statistical analysis methods. Differential power and EM analysis attacks rely on correlating actual side-channel measurements to hypothetical models. This research proposes increasing resistance to differential power and EM analysis attacks through structural and spatial randomization of an implementation. By introducing randomly located circuit variants of encryption components, the proposed moving target defense aims to disrupt side-channel collection and correlation needed to successfully implement an attac

Digital Design of New Chaotic Ciphers for Ethernet Traffic

Durante los últimos años, ha habido un gran desarrollo en el campo de la criptografía, y muchos algoritmos de encriptado así como otras funciones criptográficas han sido propuestos.Sin embargo, a pesar de este desarrollo, hoy en día todavía existe un gran interés en crear nuevas primitivas criptográficas o mejorar las ya existentes. Algunas de las razones son las siguientes:• Primero, debido el desarrollo de las tecnologías de la comunicación, la cantidad de información que se transmite está constantemente incrementándose. En este contexto, existen numerosas aplicaciones que requieren encriptar una gran cantidad de datos en tiempo real o en un intervalo de tiempo muy reducido. Un ejemplo de ello puede ser el encriptado de videos de alta resolución en tiempo real. Desafortunadamente, la mayoría de los algoritmos de encriptado usados hoy en día no son capaces de encriptar una gran cantidad de datos a alta velocidad mientras mantienen altos estándares de seguridad.• Debido al gran aumento de la potencia de cálculo de los ordenadores, muchos algoritmos que tradicionalmente se consideraban seguros, actualmente pueden ser atacados por métodos de “fuerza bruta” en una cantidad de tiempo razonable. Por ejemplo, cuando el algoritmo de encriptado DES (Data Encryption Standard) fue lanzado por primera vez, el tamaño de la clave era sólo de 56 bits mientras que, hoy en día, el NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) recomienda que los algoritmos de encriptado simétricos tengan una clave de, al menos, 112 bits. Por otro lado, actualmente se está investigando y logrando avances significativos en el campo de la computación cuántica y se espera que, en el futuro, se desarrollen ordenadores cuánticos a gran escala. De ser así, se ha demostrado que algunos algoritmos que se usan actualmente como el RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman) podrían ser atacados con éxito.• Junto al desarrollo en el campo de la criptografía, también ha habido un gran desarrollo en el campo del criptoanálisis. Por tanto, se están encontrando nuevas vulnerabilidades y proponiendo nuevos ataques constantemente. Por consiguiente, es necesario buscar nuevos algoritmos que sean robustos frente a todos los ataques conocidos para sustituir a los algoritmos en los que se han encontrado vulnerabilidades. En este aspecto, cabe destacar que algunos algoritmos como el RSA y ElGamal están basados en la suposición de que algunos problemas como la factorización del producto de dos números primos o el cálculo de logaritmos discretos son difíciles de resolver. Sin embargo, no se ha descartado que, en el futuro, se puedan desarrollar algoritmos que resuelvan estos problemas de manera rápida (en tiempo polinomial).• Idealmente, las claves usadas para encriptar los datos deberían ser generadas de manera aleatoria para ser completamente impredecibles. Dado que las secuencias generadas por generadores pseudoaleatorios, PRNGs (Pseudo Random Number Generators) son predecibles, son potencialmente vulnerables al criptoanálisis. Por tanto, las claves suelen ser generadas usando generadores de números aleatorios verdaderos, TRNGs (True Random Number Generators). Desafortunadamente, los TRNGs normalmente generan los bits a menor velocidad que los PRNGs y, además, las secuencias generadas suelen tener peores propiedades estadísticas, lo que hace necesario que pasen por una etapa de post-procesado. El usar un TRNG de baja calidad para generar claves, puede comprometer la seguridad de todo el sistema de encriptado, como ya ha ocurrido en algunas ocasiones. Por tanto, el diseño de nuevos TRNGs con buenas propiedades estadísticas es un tema de gran interés.En resumen, es claro que existen numerosas líneas de investigación en el ámbito de la criptografía de gran importancia. Dado que el campo de la criptografía es muy amplio, esta tesis se ha centra en tres líneas de investigación: el diseño de nuevos TRNGs, el diseño de nuevos cifradores de flujo caóticos rápidos y seguros y, finalmente, la implementación de nuevos criptosistemas para comunicaciones ópticas Gigabit Ethernet a velocidades de 1 Gbps y 10 Gbps. Dichos criptosistemas han estado basados en los algoritmos caóticos propuestos, pero se han adaptado para poder realizar el encriptado en la capa física, manteniendo el formato de la codificación. De esta forma, se ha logrado que estos sistemas sean capaces no sólo de encriptar los datos sino que, además, un atacante no pueda saber si se está produciendo una comunicación o no. Los principales aspectos cubiertos en esta tesis son los siguientes:• Estudio del estado del arte, incluyendo los algoritmos de encriptado que se usan actualmente. En esta parte se analizan los principales problemas que presentan los algoritmos de encriptado standard actuales y qué soluciones han sido propuestas. Este estudio es necesario para poder diseñar nuevos algoritmos que resuelvan estos problemas.• Propuesta de nuevos TRNGs adecuados para la generación de claves. Se exploran dos diferentes posibilidades: el uso del ruido generado por un acelerómetro MEMS (Microelectromechanical Systems) y el ruido generado por DNOs (Digital Nonlinear Oscillators). Ambos casos se analizan en detalle realizando varios análisis estadísticos a secuencias obtenidas a distintas frecuencias de muestreo. También se propone y se implementa un algoritmo de post-procesado simple para mejorar la aleatoriedad de las secuencias generadas. Finalmente, se discute la posibilidad de usar estos TRNGs como generadores de claves. • Se proponen nuevos algoritmos de encriptado que son rápidos, seguros y que pueden implementarse usando una cantidad reducida de recursos. De entre todas las posibilidades, esta tesis se centra en los sistemas caóticos ya que, gracias a sus propiedades intrínsecas como la ergodicidad o su comportamiento similar al comportamiento aleatorio, pueden ser una buena alternativa a los sistemas de encriptado clásicos. Para superar los problemas que surgen cuando estos sistemas son digitalizados, se proponen y estudian diversas estrategias: usar un sistema de multi-encriptado, cambiar los parámetros de control de los sistemas caóticos y perturbar las órbitas caóticas.• Se implementan los algoritmos propuestos. Para ello, se usa una FPGA Virtex 7. Las distintas implementaciones son analizadas y comparadas, teniendo en cuenta diversos aspectos tales como el consumo de potencia, uso de área, velocidad de encriptado y nivel de seguridad obtenido. Uno de estos diseños, se elige para ser implementado en un ASIC (Application Specific Integrate Circuit) usando una tecnología de 0,18 um. En cualquier caso, las soluciones propuestas pueden ser también implementadas en otras plataformas y otras tecnologías.• Finalmente, los algoritmos propuestos se adaptan y aplican a comunicaciones ópticas Gigabit Ethernet. En particular, se implementan criptosistemas que realizan el encriptado al nivel de la capa física para velocidades de 1 Gbps y 10 Gbps. Para realizar el encriptado en la capa física, los algoritmos propuestos en las secciones anteriores se adaptan para que preserven el formato de la codificación, 8b/10b en el caso de 1 Gb Ethernet y 64b/10b en el caso de 10 Gb Ethernet. En ambos casos, los criptosistemas se implementan en una FPGA Virtex 7 y se diseña un set experimental, que incluye dos módulos SFP (Small Form-factor Pluggable) capaces de transmitir a una velocidad de hasta 10.3125 Gbps sobre una fibra multimodo de 850 nm. Con este set experimental, se comprueba que los sistemas de encriptado funcionan correctamente y de manera síncrona. Además, se comprueba que el encriptado es bueno (pasa todos los test de seguridad) y que el patrón del tráfico de datos está oculto.<br /

Survey on Lightweight Primitives and Protocols for RFID in Wireless Sensor Networks

The use of radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies is becoming widespread in all kind of wireless network-based applications. As expected, applications based on sensor networks, ad-hoc or mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) can be highly benefited from the adoption of RFID solutions. There is a strong need to employ lightweight cryptographic primitives for many security applications because of the tight cost and constrained resource requirement of sensor based networks. This paper mainly focuses on the security analysis of lightweight protocols and algorithms proposed for the security of RFID systems. A large number of research solutions have been proposed to implement lightweight cryptographic primitives and protocols in sensor and RFID integration based resource constraint networks. In this work, an overview of the currently discussed lightweight primitives and their attributes has been done. These primitives and protocols have been compared based on gate equivalents (GEs), power, technology, strengths, weaknesses and attacks. Further, an integration of primitives and protocols is compared with the possibilities of their applications in practical scenarios

DEFAULT : cipher level resistance against differential fault attack

Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) is a well known cryptanalytic tech- nique that exploits faulty outputs of an encryption device. Despite its popularity and similarity with the classical Differential Analysis (DA), a thorough analysis explaining DFA from a designer’s point-of-view is missing in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, no DFA immune block cipher at an algorithmic level has been proposed so far. Furthermore, all known DFA countermeasures somehow depend on the device/protocol or on the implementation such as duplication/comparison. As all of these are outside the scope of the cipher designer, we focus on designing a primitive which can protect from DFA on its own. We present the first concept of cipher level DFA resistance which does not rely on any device/protocol related assumption, nor does it depend on any form of duplication. Our construction is simple, software/hardware friendly and DFA security scales up with the state size. It can be plugged before and/or after (almost) any symmetric key cipher and will ensure a non-trivial search complexity against DFA. One key component in our DFA protection layer is an SBox with linear structures. Such SBoxes have never been used in cipher design as they generally perform poorly against differential attacks. We argue that they in fact represent an interesting trade-off between good cryptographic properties and DFA resistance. As a proof of concept, we construct a DFA protecting layer, named DEFAULT-LAYER, as well as a full-fledged block cipher DEFAULT. Our solutions compare favorably to the state-of-the-art, offering advantages over the sophisticated duplication based solutions like impeccable circuits/CRAFT or infective countermeasures