Eliciting taxpayer preferences increases tax compliance

Two experiments show that eliciting taxpayer preferences on government spending—providing taxpayer agency--increases tax compliance. We first create an income and taxation environment in a laboratory setting to test for compliance with a lab tax. Allowing a treatment group to express nonbinding preferences over tax spending priorities, leads to a 16% increase in tax compliance. A followup online study tests this treatment with a simulation of paying US federal taxes. Allowing taxpayers to signal their preferences on the distribution of government spending, results in a 15% reduction in the stated take-up rate of a questionable tax loophole. Providing taxpayer agency recouples tax payments with the public services obtained in return, reduces general anti-tax sentiment, and holds satisfaction with tax payment stable despite increased compliance with tax dues. With tax noncompliance costing the US government $385billion annually, providing taxpayer agency could have meaningful economic impact. At the same time, giving taxpayers a voice may act as a two-way "nudge," transforming tax payment from a passive experience to a channel of communication between taxpayers and government

Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility

Society’s demands for individual and corporate social responsibility as an alternative response to market and distributive failures are becoming increasingly prominent. We first draw on recent developments in the “psychology and economics” of prosocial behavior to shed light on this trend, which reflects a complex interplay of genuine altruism, social or self image concerns, and material incentives. We then link individual concerns to corporate social responsibility, contrasting three possible understandings of the term: the adoption of a more long-term perspective by firms, the delegated exercise of prosocial behavior on behalf of stakeholders, and insider-initiated corporate philanthropy. For both individuals and firms we discuss the benefits, costs and limits of socially responsible behavior as a means to further societal goals.Corporate Social Responsibility, Socially Responsible Investment, Image Concerns, Shareholder Value

Are more equal societies happier?: Subjective well-being, income inequality, and redistribution

Using four waves of the European Social Survey, we analyze the association of income inequality and redistribution with subjective well-being. Our results provide evidence that people in Europe are negatively affected by income inequality, while reduction of inequality has a positive effect on well-being. Since we simultaneously estimate the effects of inequality and its reduction, our results indicate that not only the perceived income inequality what influences subjective well-being, but also the process, the extent of redistribution, what lead to that state. These impacts are different in Eastern and Western Europe. Inequality aversion and the positive effect of redistribution seem to be stronger also for less affluent members of the societies and left-wing oriented individuals

Polluters and Abaters

To comply with laws, regulations and social demands, polluting firms increasingly purchase the needed means from specialized suppliers. This paper analyzes this relatively recent phenomenon. We show how environmental regulation, the size of the output market, the elasticity of demand for abatement goods and services, and the fact that in-house and outsourced abatement expenses are substitutes or complements can influence a polluter’s make-or-buy decision. Specific features of abatement outsourcing are highlighted, qualifications and refinements of the theory of vertical integration are then proposed, and some consequences for environmental policy are briefly discussed.Eco-industry, Make-or-buy Decision, Outsourcing, Vertical Integration

Negative Reciprocity and the Interaction of Emotions and Fairness Norms

This experimental study investigates how behavior changes after punishment for an unkind action. It also studies how fairness perceptions affect the reaction to punishment and whether this effect is consistent across repeated play and role experiences. A repeated version of the power-to-take game is used. In this game, the proposer can make a claim on the resources of a responder. Then, the responder can destroy any part of her own resources. The focus is on how proposers adjust their behavior depending on their fairness perceptions, their experienced emotions, and their interaction with responders. We find that fairness plays an important role in the behavior of proposers. Specifically, deviations from a perceived fairness norm trigger feelings of shame and guilt, which induce proposers to lower their claims. However, we also find that the perceived fairness norm varies considerably between individuals. Therefore, it is not the case that proposers who considered they were acting fairly were particularly nice to responders. Our results also show that the different types of individuals predicted by models of social preferences, can be traced among the subjects that played the same role in both periods, but fail to describe the behavior of subjects who switched from one role to the other.

Marketing and the Tragedy of the Commons: A Synthesis, Commentary, and Analysis for Action

The authors contend that solutions to the most pressing environmental challenges will result from understanding and solving social traps such as the commons dilemma. They propose a synthesis for analysis and action to suggest that marketing\u27s stakeholders can cooperate to contribute solutions and ultimately develop programs that help ameliorate the tragedy of the commons

Are Fairness Perceptions Related to Moral Licensing Behavior? Evidence from Tax Compliance

This study investigates how the presence, and subsequent repeal, of a tax incentive for a prosocial behavior influences fairness perceptions and tax compliance for those who are and are not eligible for the incentive. Results of a multi-round experiment with 309 U.S. taxpayers show that individuals who engage in the prosocial behavior of making a charitable donation do not exhibit moral licensing behavior. Instead, those who give, versus do not give, engage in higher levels of tax compliance. In fact, we even observe consistency for those with the most motivation to morally license—those who donate to charity but also perceive the tax system as unfair. In addition, tax system fairness perceptions only influence the compliance decisions of individuals who do not engage in the prosocial incentivized behavior. Finally, we also show that a tax incentive for charitable giving is effective. Those who are eligible for a charitable-giving related tax incentive are more likely to give to charity than individuals who are ineligible for such an incentive; additionally, these incentivized activities decrease by one-third when the incentive is repealed. The study results add to the literature on moral licensing, charitable giving, and tax fairness and have several policy implications. We confirm that tax incentives are, on the margin, effective at encouraging prosocial behavior and that perceiving the tax system as unfair can reduce the tax compliance for some individuals. In particular, our results suggest that focusing scarce audit resources on non-donators may be an efficient way to detect non-compliance

Willingness to pay more health taxes? The relevance of personality traits and situational effects

The main aim of this paper is to investigate the micro and macro predictors of Portuguese willingness to pay (WTP) more taxes to bolster funds channelled to the National Health Service (NHS). An online questionnaire was used to collect data from 584 Portuguese citizens. The statistical analysis was performed through the application of logistic regressions. The research shows that willingness to support increasing taxes depended on socioeconomic, behavioural, and psychological factors. The WTP more taxes to finance the NHS were associated with younger ages, life satisfaction and dispositional optimism, satisfaction with the NHS performance, current perceived risk exposure, and risk orientation. Identifying and understanding the main influencing factors associated with WTP more taxes for NHS is essential to assist policy-makers in developing healthcare reforms. Decision-makers may take this opportunity to improve the NHS since those who ultimately benefit from the measures can provide an additional source of health financing