Relational Symbolic Execution

Symbolic execution is a classical program analysis technique used to show that programs satisfy or violate given specifications. In this work we generalize symbolic execution to support program analysis for relational specifications in the form of relational properties - these are properties about two runs of two programs on related inputs, or about two executions of a single program on related inputs. Relational properties are useful to formalize notions in security and privacy, and to reason about program optimizations. We design a relational symbolic execution engine, named RelSym which supports interactive refutation, as well as proving of relational properties for programs written in a language with arrays and for-like loops

Differential Privacy for Relational Algebra: Improving the Sensitivity Bounds via Constraint Systems

Differential privacy is a modern approach in privacy-preserving data analysis to control the amount of information that can be inferred about an individual by querying a database. The most common techniques are based on the introduction of probabilistic noise, often defined as a Laplacian parametric on the sensitivity of the query. In order to maximize the utility of the query, it is crucial to estimate the sensitivity as precisely as possible. In this paper we consider relational algebra, the classical language for queries in relational databases, and we propose a method for computing a bound on the sensitivity of queries in an intuitive and compositional way. We use constraint-based techniques to accumulate the information on the possible values for attributes provided by the various components of the query, thus making it possible to compute tight bounds on the sensitivity.Comment: In Proceedings QAPL 2012, arXiv:1207.055

Proving Differential Privacy with Shadow Execution

Recent work on formal verification of differential privacy shows a trend toward usability and expressiveness -- generating a correctness proof of sophisticated algorithm while minimizing the annotation burden on programmers. Sometimes, combining those two requires substantial changes to program logics: one recent paper is able to verify Report Noisy Max automatically, but it involves a complex verification system using customized program logics and verifiers. In this paper, we propose a new proof technique, called shadow execution, and embed it into a language called ShadowDP. ShadowDP uses shadow execution to generate proofs of differential privacy with very few programmer annotations and without relying on customized logics and verifiers. In addition to verifying Report Noisy Max, we show that it can verify a new variant of Sparse Vector that reports the gap between some noisy query answers and the noisy threshold. Moreover, ShadowDP reduces the complexity of verification: for all of the algorithms we have evaluated, type checking and verification in total takes at most 3 seconds, while prior work takes minutes on the same algorithms.Comment: 23 pages, 12 figures, PLDI'1

Computer-aided verification in mechanism design

In mechanism design, the gold standard solution concepts are dominant strategy incentive compatibility and Bayesian incentive compatibility. These solution concepts relieve the (possibly unsophisticated) bidders from the need to engage in complicated strategizing. While incentive properties are simple to state, their proofs are specific to the mechanism and can be quite complex. This raises two concerns. From a practical perspective, checking a complex proof can be a tedious process, often requiring experts knowledgeable in mechanism design. Furthermore, from a modeling perspective, if unsophisticated agents are unconvinced of incentive properties, they may strategize in unpredictable ways. To address both concerns, we explore techniques from computer-aided verification to construct formal proofs of incentive properties. Because formal proofs can be automatically checked, agents do not need to manually check the properties, or even understand the proof. To demonstrate, we present the verification of a sophisticated mechanism: the generic reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to algorithm design given by Hartline, Kleinberg, and Malekian. This mechanism presents new challenges for formal verification, including essential use of randomness from both the execution of the mechanism and from the prior type distributions. As an immediate consequence, our work also formalizes Bayesian incentive compatibility for the entire family of mechanisms derived via this reduction. Finally, as an intermediate step in our formalization, we provide the first formal verification of incentive compatibility for the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

Advanced Probabilistic Couplings for Differential Privacy

Differential privacy is a promising formal approach to data privacy, which provides a quantitative bound on the privacy cost of an algorithm that operates on sensitive information. Several tools have been developed for the formal verification of differentially private algorithms, including program logics and type systems. However, these tools do not capture fundamental techniques that have emerged in recent years, and cannot be used for reasoning about cutting-edge differentially private algorithms. Existing techniques fail to handle three broad classes of algorithms: 1) algorithms where privacy depends accuracy guarantees, 2) algorithms that are analyzed with the advanced composition theorem, which shows slower growth in the privacy cost, 3) algorithms that interactively accept adaptive inputs. We address these limitations with a new formalism extending apRHL, a relational program logic that has been used for proving differential privacy of non-interactive algorithms, and incorporating aHL, a (non-relational) program logic for accuracy properties. We illustrate our approach through a single running example, which exemplifies the three classes of algorithms and explores new variants of the Sparse Vector technique, a well-studied algorithm from the privacy literature. We implement our logic in EasyCrypt, and formally verify privacy. We also introduce a novel coupling technique called \emph{optimal subset coupling} that may be of independent interest