Domestic Outsourcing, Rent Seeking, and Increasing Inequality

An increasing share of the economy is organized around financial capitalism, where, in contrast to the past, capital market actors actively assert and manage their claims on wealth creation and distribution. These new actors challenge prior assumptions of managerial capitalism about the goals and governance of firms. The focus on shareholder value is credited with increasing firm efficiency and shareholder returns. This lecture analyzes the changes in organizational behavior and value extraction under financial capitalism

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING MEASUREMENT: INSTRUMENTATION AND CALIBRATION

In its Conceptual Framework (CF), the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has not identified the observable phenomena and was not able to identify a single measurement property in financial accounting. While identifying aspects of the observable phenomena in financial accounting, the FASB has indicated that there are five measurement attributes which are used in financial accounting and the result is a mixed-attributes model. Lacking a critical underlying theory, the FASB’s Conceptual Framework is feeble at best in providing guidance for accounting measurement. Devoid of the critical theory, the FASB focuses on prediction rather than explanation and, thereby, has adopted an ‘information perspective’ as opposed to a ‘measurement perspective’ for financial accounting standards. This condition has induced a very serious concern for legislative action on the part of the US Congress. In this paper, investments constitute the observable phenomena in financial accounting and recoverable cost, which is grounded in measurement and not prediction, is the measurement property. This measurement property, which is linked to investments and explicated by the capital budgeting model, provides the logical explanation of the apparent diverse rules in financial accounting and establishes a single attribute model.Conceptual framework; transaction costs; organizational activity; measurement attribute; present value; realizable value; lower of cost and market value; organizational efficiency; bank-centric financial system;

Market completeness: how options affect hedging and investments in the electricity sector.

The high volatility of electricity markets gives producers and retailers an incentive to hedge their exposure to electricity prices by buying and selling derivatives. This paper studies how welfare and investment incentives are affected when an increasing number of derivatives are introduced. It develops an equilibrium model of the electricity market with risk averse firms and a set of traded financial products, more specifically: a forward contract and an increasing number of options. We first show that aggregate welfare (the sum of individual firms' utility) increases with the number of derivatives offered, although most of the benefits are captured with one to three options. Secondly, power plant investments typically increase because additional derivatives enable better hedging of investments. However, the availability of derivatives sometimes leads to ‘crowding-out’ of physical investments because capital is being used more profitably to speculate on financial markets. Finally, we illustrate that players basing their investment decisions on risk-free probabilities inferred from market prices, may significantly overinvest when markets are not sufficiently complete.

Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers

The paper questions the common view that share price increases of firms involved in hostile takeovers measure efficiency gains from acquisitions. Even if such gains exist, most of the increase in the combined value of the target and the acquirer is likely to come from stakeholder wealth losses, such as declines in value of subcontractors' firm-specific capital or employees' human capital. The use of event studies to gauge wealth creation in takeovers is unjustified. The paper also suggests a theory of managerial behavior, in which hiring and entrenching trustworthy managers enables shareholders to commit to upholding implicit contracts with stakeholders. Hostile takeovers are an innovation allowing shareholders to renege on such contracts ex post, against managers' will. On this view, shareholder gains are redistributions from stakeholders, and can in the long run result in deterioration of trust necessary for the functioning of the corporation.

Time Sharing at Leisure Facility Centres: Analysis of Sales Performance Indicators

The changing cultural paradigms in Latin America have influenced variety of leisure activities and significant implications for development of leisure services. Leisure spending behaviour prompts sequential relationship among customers intending to perform family celebrations in a different environment and gaining higher satisfaction through the customized services, recreational attractions and brand value. This study focuses qualitative dimensions associated with the sales people and managerial efforts made to augment the outcome performance in sales in reference to the time sharing proposals at leisure facility centres in Mexico. The leisure facility centres are used by individual and institutional customers for organizing leisure events, parties and family gatherings. The study reveals that the leisure facility centre developer firms function with team sales strategy and the performance of sale teams is linked with their contributions to the profit of the firm.Team sales, customer satisfaction, sales performance, leisure property, brand image, returns on assets

Reform of the Electricity Supply Industry

Electricity markets around the world are becoming more competitive, partly in response to technological changes. Successful restructuring requires an understanding of the sources of monopoly power in the industry, and separation of competitive from natural monopoly elements. Competitive wholesale electricity markets require transparent regulatory and cross-subsidy mechanisms. Such changes in turn make public ownership less relevant for protecting consumers. Competitive markets are also more risky for owners, and governments are not ideally suited to financing large and very risky business ventures. The arguments are illustrated by reference to the reforms undertaken in Australia in the last decade.

Review of Economic Theories of Regulation

This paper reviews the economic theories of regulation. It discusses the public and private interest theories of regulation, as the criticisms that have been leveled at them. The extent to which these theories are also able to account for privatization and deregulation is evaluated and policies involving re-regulation are discussed. The paper thus reviews rate of return regulation, price-cap regulation, yardstick regulation, interconnection and access regulation, and franchising or bidding processes. The primary aim of those instruments is to improve the operating efficiency of the regulated firms. Huge investments will be needed in the regulated network sectors. The question is brought up if regulatory instruments and institutions primarily designed to improve operating efficiency are equally well-placed to promote the necessary investments and to balance the resulting conflicting interests between for example consumers and investors.Regulation, Deregulation, Public Interest Theories, Private Interest Theories, Interest Groups, Public Choice, Market Failures, Price-cap Regulation, Rate of Return Regulation, Yardstick Competition, Franchise Bidding, Access Regulation.