46,315 research outputs found
When Mobile Blockchain Meets Edge Computing
Blockchain, as the backbone technology of the current popular Bitcoin digital
currency, has become a promising decentralized data management framework.
Although blockchain has been widely adopted in many applications, e.g.,
finance, healthcare, and logistics, its application in mobile services is still
limited. This is due to the fact that blockchain users need to solve preset
proof-of-work puzzles to add new data, i.e., a block, to the blockchain.
Solving the proof-of-work, however, consumes substantial resources in terms of
CPU time and energy, which is not suitable for resource-limited mobile devices.
To facilitate blockchain applications in future mobile Internet of Things
systems, multiple access mobile edge computing appears to be an auspicious
solution to solve the proof-of-work puzzles for mobile users. We first
introduce a novel concept of edge computing for mobile blockchain. Then, we
introduce an economic approach for edge computing resource management.
Moreover, a prototype of mobile edge computing enabled blockchain systems is
presented with experimental results to justify the proposed concept.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Magazin
Cloud/fog computing resource management and pricing for blockchain networks
The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle,
which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high
computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time,
consider edge computing as an enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we
study edge computing resource management and pricing to support mobile
blockchain applications in which the mining process of miners can be offloaded
to an edge computing service provider. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg
game to jointly maximize the profit of the edge computing service provider and
the individual utilities of the miners. In the first stage, the service
provider sets the price of edge computing nodes. In the second stage, the
miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed prices.
We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in
each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For the uniform
pricing where the same price is applied to all miners, the existence and
uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best
response strategies of the miners. For the discriminatory pricing where the
different prices are applied to different miners, the Stackelberg equilibrium
is proved to exist and be unique by capitalizing on the Variational Inequality
theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our
proposed model.Comment: 16 pages, double-column version, accepted by IEEE Internet of Things
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