Prosecutors and Professional Regulation

Prosecutors often express mistrust of professional regulators, their rules and their processes. This may have been more understandable twenty years ago, when prosecutors perceived that the organized bar had been captured by defense lawyers seeking to use professional regulation as a means of imposing limits on criminal investigative authority that the law did not otherwise recognize. Although that criticism no longer has much basis in reality, it has persisted in the rhetoric prosecutors employ in advocacy regarding their professional conduct. This article explores prosecutors’ public attitude toward professional regulation, beginning with a brief account of their responses two decades ago, then considering three recent examples: the NDAA’s opposition to a broad reading of Model Rule 3.8(d)’s disclosure obligation; some prosecutors’ opposition to states’ adoption of the post-conviction obligations of Model Rules 3.8(g) and (h); and the Queens County, NY, district attorney’s opposition to a trial court’s consideration of the ethical propriety of his office’s post-arrest interrogation practices. The article argues that prosecutors’ anti-regulatory rhetoric undermines the culture of prosecutors’ offices and is contrary to the public interest in other ways

Deregulation of conveyancing markets in England and Wales

There has been much concern in recent years with whether the ‘privilege’ of self- regulation accorded to the professions works for or against the public interest (Federal Trade Commission, 1984; Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1970, 1976a and 1976b; Department of Trade and Industry, 1989; Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990). Ogus (1993) argues that ‘Self-regulation has had a bad press’ and that ‘most of this criticism is well-founded in relation to some forms of self- regulation’. Economists have been, traditionally, highly critical of many aspects of professional self-regulation.2 More recently, there has been a greater awareness of the informational asymmetry inherent in professional markets which demands some protection for the (infrequent) consumer of personal professional services (see, for example, Dingwall and Fenn (1987)). Commentators have identified three principal instruments of such selfregulators which work against the public interest: (1) restrictions on entry; (2) restrictions on fee competition; and (3) restrictions on advertising and other means of promoting a competitive process within the profession.

Does Domestic Regulation Promote Globally Competitive Filipino Professionals and Educational Services?

Almost every country has its own set of domestic regulations that determine how easy or difficult it is to pursue a freer movement in the trade of services. In the Philippine setting, how do the functions and powers of the country's two major regulatory bodies for professional and educational services affect the movement of these services as well as the quality of global competitiveness of Philippine higher education and professionals? This Notes discusses more on this.professional services, domestic regulation, educational services, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), Commission on Higher Education (CHED)

‘The Lighthouse Invites the Storm’ – Professional Regulation of Nursing in England and Wales – Under Threat

This paper explores current issues related to the professional regulation of nursing in England and Wales and considers whether self-regulation is currently under threat. In modern times there have been a significant number of serious incidents and scandals in health and social care and these have attracted adverse publicity in the media and exercised the mind of Government in the direction of public protection. Mental health practice has not escaped the critical gaze and recent homicide inquiries continue to cast a long shadow over the provision of mental health services. Recently, the Government has questioned the effectiveness of the nurses' professional body, the Nursing and Midwifery Council, and has spelt out the pressing need for tighter regulation of nursing practice. Recent policy documents aimed at ‘modernising’ nursing careers may actually circumscribe professional autonomy and subtly control the development of nursing practice and nurse education. On 1st April 2009 a new regulatory body, the Care Quality Commission will come into being and its advent will herald significant changes for health and social care. Lost in the changes will be the Mental Health Act Commission, as a stand alone visiting body

Professional Learning in Massive Open Online Courses

This study explores the role of Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) in supporting and enabling professional learning, or learning for work. The research examines how professionals self-regulate their learning in MOOCs. The study is informed by contemporary theories of professional learning, that argue that conventional forms of learning are no longer effective in knowledge intensive domains. As work roles evolve and learning for work becomes continual and personalised, self-regulation is becoming a critical element of professional learning. Yet, established forms of professional learning generally have not taken advantage of the affordances of social, semantic technologies to support self-regulated learning. MOOCs present a potentially useful approach to professional learning that may be designed to encourage self-regulated learning. The study is contextualised within ‘Fundamentals of clinical trials', a MOOC for health professionals designed and run by the Harvard Medical School, Harvard School of Public Health, and Harvard Catalyst, the Harvard Clinical and Translational Science Center, and offered by edX. The research design builds on the authors' previous studies in the areas of Technology Enhanced Learning and Professional Learning and in particular, research which explored the learning behaviours of education professionals in the Change 11 MOOC. The previous studies demonstrated a link between individual learners SRL profile and their goal setting behaviour in the Change 11 MOOC as well as uncovering other factors which influenced their engagement with the MOOC environment. The present study extends the original study by further focusing on specific aspects of self-regulation identified by the Change11 studies and our parallel studies of self-regulated learning in knowledge workers. The analysis of learner behaviour in the Fundamentals of Clinical Trials is complemented by additional exploration of the design considerations of the MOOC, to determine the extent to which course design can support or inhibit self-regulation of learning. The study poses three research questions: How are Massive Open Online Courses currently designed to support self-regulated learning? What self-regulated learning strategies and behaviours do professionals adopt? and How can MOOCs be designed to encourage professionals to self-regulate their learning? Validated methods and instruments from the original study will be adapted and employed. The research is unique in providing evidence around two critical aspects of MOOCs that are not well understood: the skills and dispositions necessary for self-regulated learning in MOOC environments, and how MOOCs can be designed to encourage the development and emergence of SRL behaviours

Professional regulation - The challenges

This panel discussion offered attendees an insight into experiences of statutory regulation from a psychotherapist, a social worker, a Maori viewpoint and a different experience of non-statutory regulation from the UK

The 'Good' Teacher? Constructing Teacher Identities for Lifelong Learning

The symposium will focus on trans-national constructions of the 'good' teacher through popular culture, through professional development orthodoxies and through professional practices such as professional growth plans, inspection and teacher regulation

Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues

Executive pay regulation is widely discussed as a measure to reduce financial mismanagement in corporations. We show that the professional team sports industry, the only industry with substantial experience in the regulation of compensation arrangements, provides valuable insights for the regulation of executive pay. Based on the experience from professional sports leagues, we develop implications for the corporate sector regarding the establishment and enforcement of executive pay regulation as well as the level, structure, and rigidity of such regulatory measures.Salary Caps, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, Financial Crisis, Financial Regulation