Incentive Regulation of Electricity Distribution Networks: Lessons of Experience from Britain

This paper reviews the recent experience of the UK electricity distribution sector under incentive regulation. The UK has a significant and transparent history in implementing incentive regulation in the period since 1990. We demonstrate the successes of this period in reducing costs, prices and energy losses while maintaining quality of service. We also draw out the lessons for other countries in implementing distribution sector reform. We conclude by discussing the place of incentive regulation of networks within the wider reform context, the required legislative framework, the need for appropriate unbundling, the importance of quality of service incentives, the regulatory information requirements and the role of sector rationalisation

Reference Models and Incentive Regulation of Electricity Distribution Networks: An Evaluation of Sweden’s Network Performance Assessment Model (NPAM)

The world-wide electricity sector reforms have led to a search for alternative and innovative approaches to regulation to promote efficiency improvement in the natural monopoly electricity networks. A number of countries have used incentive regulation models based on efficiency benchmarking of the electricity network utilities. While most regulators have opted adopted parametric and non-parametric frontier-based methods of benchmarking some have used engineering designed ‘reference firm’ or ‘norm’ models for the purpose. This paper examines the incentive properties and other related aspects of the norm model NPAM used in regulation of distribution networks in Sweden and compares these with those of frontier-based benchmarking methods. We identify a number of important differences between the two approaches to regulation benchmarking that are not readily apparent and discuss their ramifications for the regulatory objectives and process

Incentive Regulation of Electricity Distribution Networks: Lessons of Experience from Britain

This paper reviews the recent experience of the UK electricity distribution sector under incentive regulation. The UK has a significant and transparent history in implementing incentive regulation in the period since 1990. We demonstrate the successes of this period in reducing costs, prices and energy losses while maintaining quality of service. We also draw out the lessons for other countries in implementing distribution sector reform. We conclude by discussing the place of incentive regulation of networks within the wider reform context, the required legislative framework, the need for appropriate unbundling, the importance of quality of service incentives, the regulatory information requirements and the role of sector rationalisation.Electricity, liberalisation, regulation, benchmarking

Quality of Service, Efficiency and Scale in Network Industries: An analysis of European electricity distribution

Quality of service is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure industries but is generally not reflected in efficiency analysis. In this paper we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution networks using a sample of about 500 electricity distribution utilities from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method on multi-output translog input distance function models to estimate cost and scale efficiency with and without incorporating quality of service. We show that introducing the quality dimension into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly. In contrast to previous research, smaller utilities seem to indicate lower technical efficiency when incorporating quality. We also show that incorporating quality of service does not alter scale economy measures. Quality of service should be an integrated part of efficiency analysis and incentive regulation regimes, as well as in the economic review of market concentration in regulated natural monopolies

Dynamic Efficiency and Incentive Regulation: An Application to Electricity Distribution Networks

Efficiency and productivity analysis is a central concept in incentive-based regulation of network utilities. However, the efficiency measures obtained from benchmarking predominantly reflect short term performance and hence, provide only a snapshot of the firm's path towards its long run equilibrium. On the other hand, the factors affecting the short run behaviour of firms may not be adjusted instantaneously when firms undertake investment. In these instances, short run inefficiency caused by investments will be transmitted to subsequent periods. This effect, which arises from costs associated with the adjustment of capital stock or production capacity, is problematic under incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of capital expenditure. This is because it adversely affects the firms' short term efficiency and, consequently, regulated revenue. This paper analyses the dynamic behaviour of inefficiency for a balanced panel of 128 Norwegian electricity distribution companies from 2004 to 2010. We show that, in a given period, inefficiency is a combination of period-specific effects (shocks) plus a carry-over component from previous periods due to adjustment costs. Also, we estimate these two components of inefficiency along with the rate of inefficiency transmission between periods

Incentive Regulation, Productivity Growth and Environmental Effects: The Case of Electricity Networks in Great Britain

We analyse the productivity growth of electricity transmission and distribution networks in Great Britain and how changes in incentive mechanism have influenced the measured total factor productivity (TFP). In doing so we are also concerned to examine the effects of quality of service and environmental targets on measured productivity growth. It is increasingly important that productivity measures adjust for the increasing regulatory pressure to reduce the wider societal impacts of the electricity sector and improve quality of service. Failure to do so, may mean that productivity growth may look slower than it actually is. We employ a DEA technique which considers the underlying data without a stochastic element. Our findings show that productivity growth is consistently low for the period we examine, in the region of 1% p.a. over the 29 years from 1990/1991-2018/2019. For both electricity transmission and electricity distribution we try to monetise a wider range of quality and emissions variables in order to show the difference their inclusion makes to measured productivity growth. We show that it can make a difference both positively and negatively, though often this difference is small (e.g. 0.1% p.a.). However, the impact can be much larger (c. 1% p.a.), especially with respect to improvements in quality of service in the distribution network. In the context of generally slow productivity growth, we therefore show the importance of appropriate measurement

Benchmarking and incentive regulation of quality of service: an application to the UK electricity distribution utilities

Quality of service has emerged as an important issue in post-reform regulation of electricity distribution networks. Regulators have employed partial incentive schemes to promote cost saving, investment efficiency, and service quality. This paper presents a quality-incorporated benchmarking study of the electricity distribution utilities in the UK between 1991/92 and 1998/99. We calculate technical efficiency of the utilities using Data Envelopment Analysis technique and productivity change over time using quality-incorporated Malmquist indices. We find that cost efficient firms do not necessarily exhibit high service quality and that efficiency scores of cost-only models do not show high correlation with those of quality-based models. The results also show that improvements in service quality have made a significant contribution to the sector’s total productivity change. In addition, we show that integrating quality of service in regulatory benchmarking is preferable to cost-only approaches.quality of service, benchmarking, incentive regulation, data envelopment analysis, electricity

Liberalisation of European energy markets: challenges and policy options

The European electricity and gas markets have been going through a process of liberalisation since the early 1990s. This process has changed the sector from a regulated structure of, predominantly, publicly owned monopolists controlling the entire supply chain, into a market where private and public generators and retailers compete on a regulated and unbundled system of transport infrastructure. This report assesses the evidence of the effects of liberalisation on efficiency, security of energy supply and environmental sustainability.

Investment and Efficiency under Incentive Regulation: The Case of the Norwegian Electricity Distribution Networks

Following the liberalisation of the electricity industry since the early 1990s, many sector regulators have recognised the potential for cost efficiency improvement in the networks through incentive regulation aided by benchmarking and productivity analysis. This approach has often resulted in cost efficiency and quality of service improvement. However, there remains a growing concern as to whether the utilities invest sufficiently and efficiently in maintaining and modernising the networks to ensure long term reliability and also to meet future challenges of the grid. This paper analyses the relationship between investments and cost efficiency in the context of incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investments using a panel dataset of 126 Norwegian distribution companies from 2004 to 2010. We introduce the concept of 'no impact efficiency' as a revenue-neutral efficiency effect of investment under incentive regulation which makes a firm 'investment efficient' in cost benchmarking practice. Also, we estimate the observed efficiency effect of investments in order to compare with no impact efficiency and discuss the implication of cost benchmarking for investment behaviour of network companies

Benchmarking and Regulation of Electricity Transmission and Distribution Utilities: Lessons from International Experience

Since the early 1980's, many countries have implemented electricity sector reform, many of which have bundled generation, transmission, distribution and supply activities, and have introduced competition in generation and supply. An increasing number of countries are also adopting incentive regulation to promote efficiency improvement in the natural monopoly activities - transmission and distribution. Incentive regulation almost invariably involves benchmarking or comparison of actual vs. some reference performance. This paper reviews the main approaches to incentive regulation and discusses various benchmarking methods. We also present the finding of a survey of the use of benchmarking methods in the OECD and few other countries. Our survey finds a variety of methods used by the electricity regulators although with a notable preference for the non-parametric methods. We then draw conclusions based on the finding of the survey highlighting the main outstanding issues and lessons for best practice implementation of benchmarking in electricity regulation