An Experimental Examination of Competitor-Based Price Matching Guarantees

We use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. Our findings establish that when costs are symmetric, price-matching guarantees significantly increase market prices. In markets with cost asymmetries, guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees, but the overall ability of price guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device becomes contingent on the relative cost difference. Lesser use of guarantees, combined with lower average prices and slower convergence to the collusive level, suggest that the mere presence of cost asymmetries may curtail collusive behavior.Price Matching; Price Guarantees; Laboratory; Collusion

O-Ring Production on U.S. Hog Farms: Joint Choices of Farm Size, Technology, and Compensation

� We hypothesize that hog production can be characterized by complementarities between new technologies, worker skills and farms size.� Such production processes are consistent with Kremer’s (1993) O-ring production theory in which a single mistake in any one of several complementary tasks in a firm’s production process can lead to catastrophic failure of the product’s value.� In hog production, mistakes that introduce disease or pathogens into the production facility can cause a total loss of the herd.� Consistent with predictions derived from the O-ring theory, we provide evidence that the most skilled workers concentrate in the largest and most technologically advanced farms and are paid more than comparable workers on smaller farms.� These findings suggest that worker skills, new technologies and farm size are complements in production.� The complementarities create returns to scale to large hog confinements, consistent with the dramatic increase in market share of very large farms over the past 20 years.complementarity; human capital; sorting; technology; farm size; Wages; hogs; O-ring; unobserved skill

Do product market regulations in upstream sectors curb productivity growth? Panel data evidence for OECD countries

The paper focuses on the influence of upstream competition for productivity outcomes in downstream sectors. This relation is illustrated with a neo-Schumpeterian theoretical model of innovation (Aghion et al., 1997) with market imperfections in the production of intermediate goods. In this context, upstream market imperfections create barriers to competition in downstream markets and upstream producers use their market power to share innovation rents sought by downstream firms. Thus, lack of competition in upstream markets curbs incentives to improve productivity downstream, negatively affecting productivity outcomes. We test this prediction by estimating an error correction model that differentiates the potential downstream effects of lack of upstream competition in situations close and far from the global technological frontier. We measure competition upstream with regulatory burden indicators derived from OECD data on sectoral product market regulation and the industry-level efficiency improvement and the distance to frontier variables by means of a multifactor productivity (MFP) index. Panel regressions are run for 15 OECD countries and 20 sectors over the 1985-2007 period with country, sector and year fixed effects. We find clear evidence that anticompetitive regulations in upstream sectors have curbed MFP growth downstream over the past 15 years. These effects tend to be strongest for observations (i.e. country/sector/period triads) that are close to the global technological frontier. Our results suggest that, measured at the average distance to frontier and average level of anticompetitive regulations, the marginal effect of increasing competition by easing such regulations is to increase MFP growth by between 1 and 1.5 per cent per year in the OECD countries covered by our sample. Our results are robust to changes in the way MFP and the regulatory burden indicators are constructed, as well as to variations in the sample of countries and/or sectors.Productivity, Growth, Regulations, Competition, Catch-up.

The diffusion of innovations: The influence of supply-side factors

Technological Change;microeconomics

Strategic delegation in experimental duopolies with endogenous incentive contracts

Often, deviations of firm behavior from profit maximization are the result of managerial incentive contracts. We study the endogenous emergence of incentive contracts used by firm owners to delegate the strategic decisions of the firm. These contracts are linear combinations either of own firm's profits and revenues, or own and rival firms' profits. A two- and three-stage game are studied depending on whether owners commit or not to a certain contract type before setting the managerial incentives and the level of output to produce in the market. We report experimental results which confirm some of the predictions of the model, especially those concerning owners' preference for relative performance incentives over profit-revenue contracts. Neglected behavioral aspects are proposed as possible explanation of some divergence between the theory and the experimental evidence, more specifically the relation between contract terms and managers' output choicesExperimental economics; Oligopoly theory; Managerial delegation; Endogenous contracts.

The growth report and new structural economics

Despite its heavy human, financial, and economic cost, the recent global recession provides a unique opportunity to reflect on the knowledge from several decades of growth research, draw policy lessons from the experience of successful countries, and explore new approaches going forward. In an increasingly globalized world where fighting poverty is not only a moral responsibility but also a strategy for confronting some of the major problems (diseases, malnutrition, insecurity and violence) that ignore boundaries and contribute to global insecurity, thinking about new ways of generating and sustaining growth is a crucial task for economists. This paper reassesses the evolution of knowledge on growth and suggests a new structural approach to the analysis. It offers a brief, critical review of lessons learned from growth research and examines the remaining challenges -- especially from the policy standpoint. It highlights how the 2008 Growth Commission Report identifies the stylized facts associated with sustained and inclusive growth. And it explains how the new structural economics provides a consistent framework for understanding the key findings of the Report.Economic Theory&Research,Achieving Shared Growth,Economic Growth,Political Economy,Inequality