4 research outputs found

    Building Regular Registers with Rational Malicious Servers and Anonymous Clients

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    The paper addresses the problem of emulating a regular register in a synchronous distributed system where clients invoking read()\mathsf{read}() and write()\mathsf{write}() operations are anonymous while server processes maintaining the state of the register may be compromised by rational adversaries (i.e., a server might behave as rational malicious Byzantine process). We first model our problem as a Bayesian game between a client and a rational malicious server where the equilibrium depends on the decisions of the malicious server (behave correctly and not be detected by clients vs returning a wrong register value to clients with the risk of being detected and then excluded by the computation). We prove such equilibrium exists and finally we design a protocol implementing the regular register that forces the rational malicious server to behave correctly

    FairBlock: Preventing Blockchain Front-running with Minimal Overheads

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    While blockchain systems are quickly gaining popularity, front-running remains a major obstacle to fair exchange. Front-running is a family of strategies in which a malicious party manipulates the order of transactions such that a transaction tx_2 which is broadcasted in time t_2 executes before the transaction of victim tx_1 which is broadcasted earlier in time t_1 (t_1 < t_2). In this thesis, we show how to apply Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) to prevent front-running with minimal bandwidth overheads. In our approach, to decrypt a block of N transactions, the number of messages sent across the network only grows linearly with the size of decrypting committees, S. That is, to decrypt a set of N transactions sequenced at a specific block, a committee only needs to exchange S decryption shares (independent of N). In comparison, previous solutions are based on threshold decryption schemes, where each transaction in a block must be decrypted separately by the committee, resulting in bandwidth overhead of N*S. Along the way, we present a model for fair block processing, explore technical challenges, and build prototype implementations. We show that on a sample of 1000 messages with 1000 validators our work saves 42.53 MB of bandwidth which is 99.6% less compared with the standard threshold decryption paradigm

    Communication-Efficient Proactive MPC for Dynamic Groups with Dishonest Majorities

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    International audienceSecure multiparty computation (MPC) has recently been increasingly adopted to secure cryptographic keys in enterprises, cloud infrastructure, and cryptocurrency and blockchain-related settings such as wallets and exchanges. Using MPC in blockchains and other distributed systems highlights the need to consider dynamic settings. In such dynamic settings, parties, and potentially even parameters of underlying secret sharing and corruption tolerance thresholds of sub-protocols, may change over the lifetime of the protocol. In particular, stronger threat models-in which mobile adversaries control a changing set of parties (up to t out of n involved parties at any instant), and may eventually corrupt all n parties over the course of a protocol's execution-are becoming increasingly important for such real world deployments; secure protocols designed for such models are known as Proactive MPC (PMPC). In this work, we construct the first efficient PMPC protocol for dynamic groups (where the set of parties changes over time) secure against a dishonest majority of parties. Our PMPC protocol only requires O(n 2) (amortized) communication per secret, compared to existing PMPC protocols that require O(n 4) and only consider static groups with dishonest majorities. At the core of our PMPC protocol is a new efficient technique to perform multiplication of secret shared data (shared using a bivariate scheme) with O(n √ n) communication with security against a dishonest majority without requiring pre-computation. We also develop a new efficient bivariate batched proactive secret sharing (PSS) protocol for dishonest majorities, which may be of independent interest. This protocol enables multiple dealers to contribute different secrets that are efficiently shared together in one batch; previous batched PSS schemes required all secrets to come from a single dealer
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