Social Costs of Mass Privatization

According to leading economic theorists, creating capitalism out of communism requires rapid privatization. In this article we empirically test the welfare implications of privatization policies in Post-Soviet countries by using cross-national panel mortality data as an indicator of social costs. We find that rapid privatization ñ whether measured by a novel measure of mass privatization program implementation or Enterprise Bank for Reconstruction and Development privatization outcome scores ñ is a critical determinant of life expectancy losses, and that when privatization policies are reversed, life expectancy improves. Using selection models, we show that endogeneity understates the social costs of rapid privatization.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64393/1/wp890.pd

Privatisation Methods and Economic Growth in Transition Economies

In low-income countries privatization, if implemented appropriately, may play an important role in generating growth. Using data recently available from Central and Eastern Europe, we therefore investigate the impact of alternative methods of privatization on economic growth. Our analysis suggests that the use of conventional privatization methods to match owners with firms can be inefficient in economies with underdeveloped capital markets, particularly if wealth is poorly correlated with managerial and entrepreneurial ability. In these circumstances mass privatization, with firms being given away or sold at a nominal price, may be the appropriate policy choice

On the dynamics of privatization

In this paper, we answer two questions about how privatization should proceed. First, we assume an exogenously given time span of privatization and study how the rate of privatization is related to the initial total state capital, the adjustment cost of privatization, the efficiency difference between the private sector and the state sector. the income discount rate and the exogenous terminal time fur privatization. Second, from the perspective of income maximization and adjustment cost minimization, we endogenize the choice of the time span of privatization and offer a solution to the optimal terminal time for the completion of the privatization process.

Privatization and policy competition for FDI

In this paper, we provide an explanation of why privatization may attract foreign investors interested in entering a regional market. Privatization turns the formerly-public firm into a less aggressive competitor since profit- maximizing output is lower than the welfare-maximizing one. The drawback is that social welfare generally decreases. We also investigate tax/subsidy competition for FDI before and after privatization. We show that policy competition is irrelevant in the presence of a public firm serving just its domestic market. By contrast, following privatization, it endows the big country with an instrument which can be used either to reduce the negative impact on welfare of an FDI-attracting privatization or to protect the domestic industry from foreign competitors

Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Lessons from Experiences to Date

Privatization became a central element of economic reforms in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s. Yet, empirical evidence regarding the impact of privatization remains scarce. Since the seminal work of CAMPBELL-WHITE & BHATIA [1998], covering transactions on the African continent until 1996, no comprehensive assessment has been conducted. At a time when public opposition to further privatization is growing, this paper aims at giving a broad overview of the impact of privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1991 to 2002 in the light of recent developments, and to derive some general trends and conclusions from the body of empirical evidence available to date. During this period, about 2300 privatization transactions have taken place, generating a total sales value estimated at US$ 9 billion. The main findings on the impact of privatization are as follows: first, privatization has had a minimal one-off impact on the budget; second, firm turnover and profitability have generally increased immediately following privatization but the evidence is mixed regarding the sustainability of the initial post-privatization upswing; third, employment has been adversely affected by privatization, although the latter has not resulted in massive layoffs in absolute terms; fourth, FDI and stock markets have played a limited role in privatization transactions despite some showcase transactions; fifth, regulation and competition have often been overlooked in the privatization process, and even where they have been dealt with, enforcement problems have greatly limited their effectiveness; sixth, privatization has created new political patronage opportunities, leading to numerous corruption scandals which have damaged the credibility of the privatization process; finally, social aspects of privatizations have generally been overlooked, reflecting the tendency to focus on privatization transactions, rather than on sector reorganization at large including wider social objectives.Africa, competition, governance, privatization, regulation

The Life Cycle of Government Ownership

Government ownership may dominate private ownership under government failure. Such dom- inance disappears as product markets grow mature, giving rise to the need for privatization. Buyers' limited wealth imposes a constraint on how and when privatization takes place. In particular, ¯rms may be underpriced during privatization, and privatization may take place at a sub-optimal timing which results in ¯rm performances to deteriorate in the short run, and to improve only in the long run. Partial privatization may alleviate the constraint in some cases but exacerbates the e±ciency loss in others. When the government is lesser an interventionist or when the product market grows mature very rapidly, privatization is likely to take place at a sub-optimal timing. The analysis is applied to the dynamics of the Chinese non-state sector.government rent seeking, government ownership, privatization

Political Selection of Firms into Privatization Programs - Evidence from Romanian Comprehensive Data

Exploiting a unique institutional feature of the early Romanian privatization setup, when a group of firms was explicitly barred from any privatization, we test how politicians select firms into privatization programs. Using a comprehensive dataset that includes all firms inherited from socialism, we estimate the relation between pre-privatization firm characteristics (the information known to politicians at the time of decision making) and the effect of privatization on employment, efficiency and wages. We argue that other objectives, such as revenue maximization or bribe collection were of secondary importance in the early Romanian privatization. Using the estimated coefficients, we simulate the effect of privatization on non-privatizable and privatizable firms, including in the latter group both privatized and not privatized enterprises. The simulations show that politicians expected the reduction of employment by 5.2 percent of the non-privatizable group, as a consequence of privatization. Contrary to this expectation, employment in the privatizable group was likely to grow by the same proportion. We do not find such discrepancies in the expected change in firm efficiency, as the simulated efficiency effect of privatization is large and positive for both groups of firms, and it is around 40 percent. The analysis does not support the hypothesis that wages played an important role in privatization decisions. These results do not change qualitatively if the privatizable group is disaggregated into privatized and not privatized groups. Our study suggests that employment concerns played the key role in selecting firms for privatization, even if efficiency gains had to be sacrificed.Privatization, Government objectives, Firm behavior, Romania

Privatization: Selling America To the Lowest Bidder

[Excerpt] Elected officials and citizens are now learning in hundreds of communities that privatization is not the way to improve the quality and efficiency of public services. Cities such as New York and Phoenix, where privatization proliferated in the early 1980s, are now bringing work back in-house. And in the federal government, despite a massive privatization campaign waged by the Reagan Administration, resistance by agency directors has resulted in a job loss of only 0.7% of all nondefense federal jobs. (The job loss rises to 2.1% if civilian defease department jobs are included.) A recent report by the U.S. Government Accounting Office concludes that privatization of federal employees\u27 jobs is neither cheaper nor better

Privatization and Efficiency: from Principals and Agents to Political Economy

We survey the theoretical literature on privatization and efficiency by tracing its evolution from the applications of agency theory to recent contributions in the field of political economy. The first ones extend the theory of regulation with incomplete information to address privatization issues, comparing State Owned Entreprises (SOEs) with private regulated firms. The benefits of privatization may either derive from the constraints it places on malevolent agents or to the impossibility of commitment by a benevolent government because of incomplete contracts. Contributions dealing with political economy issues separate privatization from restructuring decisions. They either explore bargaining between managers and politicians or analyze the impact of privatization shaped by political preferences on efficiency. The theoretical results regarding the relation between privatization and efficiency do not lead to any definitive conclusion. Privatization may increase productive efficiency when restructuring takes place whereas its effects on allocative efficiency still remain uncertain.Regulation, Imperfect Information, Political Preferences

Partial privatization in price-setting mixed duopoly

This paper investigates a price-setting mixed model involving a private firm and a public firm to reassess the welfare effect of partial privatization. First, the government chooses the level of privatization to maximize social welfare. Second, observing the level of privatization, the firms non-cooperatively choose prices. The paper then demonstrates that partial privatization is not an optimal choice for the government.Price-setting duopoly, Partial privatization, Mixed model