371 research outputs found
Private Intersection-Sum Protocol with Applications to Attributing Aggregate Ad Conversions
In this work, we consider the Intersection-Sum problem: two parties hold datasets containing user identifiers, and the second party additionally has an integer value associated with each user identifier. The parties want to learn the number of users they have in common, and the sum of the associated integer values, but “nothing more”. We present a novel protocol tackling this problem using Diffie-Hellman style Private Set Intersection techniques together with Paillier homomorphic encryption. We prove security of our protocol in the honest-but-curious model. We also discuss applications for the protocol for attributing aggregate ad conversions. Finally, we present a variant of the protocol, which allows aborting if the intersection is too small, in which case neither party learns the intersection-sum
Conclave: secure multi-party computation on big data (extended TR)
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) allows mutually distrusting parties to
run joint computations without revealing private data. Current MPC algorithms
scale poorly with data size, which makes MPC on "big data" prohibitively slow
and inhibits its practical use.
Many relational analytics queries can maintain MPC's end-to-end security
guarantee without using cryptographic MPC techniques for all operations.
Conclave is a query compiler that accelerates such queries by transforming them
into a combination of data-parallel, local cleartext processing and small MPC
steps. When parties trust others with specific subsets of the data, Conclave
applies new hybrid MPC-cleartext protocols to run additional steps outside of
MPC and improve scalability further.
Our Conclave prototype generates code for cleartext processing in Python and
Spark, and for secure MPC using the Sharemind and Obliv-C frameworks. Conclave
scales to data sets between three and six orders of magnitude larger than
state-of-the-art MPC frameworks support on their own. Thanks to its hybrid
protocols, Conclave also substantially outperforms SMCQL, the most similar
existing system.Comment: Extended technical report for EuroSys 2019 pape
Improved Secure Efficient Delegated Private Set Intersection
Private Set Intersection (PSI) is a vital cryptographic technique used for
securely computing common data of different sets. In PSI protocols, often two
parties hope to find their common set elements without needing to disclose
their uncommon ones. In recent years, the cloud has been playing an influential
role in PSI protocols which often need huge computational tasks. In 2017, Abadi
et al. introduced a scheme named EO-PSI which uses a cloud to pass on the main
computations to it and does not include any public-key operations. In EO-PSI,
parties need to set up secure channels beforehand; otherwise, an attacker can
easily eavesdrop on communications between honest parties and find private
information. This paper presents an improved EO-PSI scheme which has the edge
on the previous scheme in terms of privacy and complexity. By providing
possible attacks on the prior scheme, we show the necessity of using secure
channels between parties. Also, our proposed protocol is secure against passive
attacks without having to have any secure channels. We measure the protocol's
overhead and show that computational complexity is considerably reduced and
also is fairer compared to the previous scheme.Comment: 6 pages, presented in proceedings of the 28th Iranian Conference on
Electrical Engineering (ICEE 2020). Final version of the paper has been adde
Secret-Shared Joins with Multiplicity from Aggregation Trees
We present novel protocols to compute SQL-like join operations on secret shared database tables with non-unique join keys. Previous approaches to the problem had the restriction that the join keys of both the input tables must be unique or had quadratic overhead. Our work lifts this restriction, allowing one or both of the secret shared input tables to have an unknown and unbounded number of repeating join keys while achieving efficient asymptotic communication/computation and rounds of interaction, independent of the multiplicity of the keys.
We present two join protocols, \ProtoUni and \ProtoDup. The first, \ProtoUni is optimized for the case where one table has a unique primary key while the second, \ProtoDup is for the more general setting where both tables contain duplicate keys. Both protocols require time and rounds to join two tables of size . Our framework for computing joins requires an efficient sorting protocol and generic secure computation for circuits. We concretely instantiate our protocols in the honest majority three-party setting.
Our join protocols are built around an efficient method to compute structured aggregations over a secret shared input vector \V\in \mathbb{D}^n. If the parties have another secret-shared vector of control bits \B \in \{0, 1\}^n to partition \V into sub-vectors (that semantically relates to the join operations). A structured aggregation computes a secret shared vector \V\u27\in \mathbb{D}^n where every sub-vector (\V_b,...,\V_e) (defined by the control bits) is aggregated as \V_i\u27=\V_b\op...\op \V_i for according to some user-defined operator \op. Critically, the indices that partition the vector are secret. It\u27s trivial to compute aggregations by sequentially processing the input vector and control bits. This would require rounds and would be very slow due to network latency.
We introduce Aggregation Trees as a general technique to compute aggregations in rounds. For our purpose of computing joins, we instantiate \op \in \textsf{\{copy previous value, add\}}, but we believe that this technique is quite powerful and can find applications in other useful settings
Combining Private Set-Intersection with Secure Two-Party Computation
Private Set-Intersection (PSI) is one of the most popular and practically relevant secure two-party computation (2PC) tasks. Therefore, designing special-purpose PSI protocols (which are more efficient than generic 2PC solutions) is a very active line of research. In particular, a recent line of work has proposed PSI protocols based on oblivious transfer (OT) which, thanks to recent advances in OT-extension techniques, is nowadays a very cheap cryptographic building block.
Unfortunately, these protocols cannot be plugged into larger 2PC applications since in these protocols one party (by design) learns the output of the intersection. Therefore, it is not possible to perform secure post-processing of the output of the PSI protocol.
In this paper we propose a novel and efficient OT-based PSI protocol that produces an encrypted output that can therefore be later used as an input to other 2PC protocols. In particular, the protocol can be used in combination with all common approaches to 2PC including garbled circuits, secret sharing and homomorphic encryption. Thus, our protocol can be combined with the right 2PC techniques to achieve more efficient protocols for computations of the form for arbitrary functions
Maliciously Secure Multi-Party PSI with Lower Bandwidth and Faster Computation
Private Set Intersection (PSI) allows a set of mutually distrustful parties, each holds a private data set, to compute the intersection of all sets, such that no information is revealed except for the intersection. The state-of-the-art PSI protocol (Garimella et al., CRYPTO\u2721) in the multi-party setting tolerating any number of malicious corruptions requires the communication bandwidth of bits for the central party due to the star architecture, where is the number of parties, is the size of each set and is the size of an exponentially large field . When and are large, this forms an efficiency bottleneck (especially for networks with restricted bandwidthes). In this paper, we present a new multi-party PSI protocol in dishonest-majority malicious setting, which reduces the communication bandwidth of the central party from bits to bits using a tree architecture. Furthermore, our PSI protocol reduces the expensive LPN encoding operations performed by by a factor of as well as the computational cost by hash operations in total. Additionally, while the multi-party PSI protocol (Garimella et al., CRYPTO\u2721) with a single output is secure, we present a simple attack against its multi-output extension, which allows an adversary to learn more information on the sets of honest parties beyond the intersection of all sets
PSI from ring-OLE
Private set intersection (PSI) is one of the most extensively studied instances of secure computation. PSI allows two parties to compute the intersection of their input sets without revealing anything else. Other useful variants include PSI-Payload, where the output includes payloads associated with members of the intersection, and PSI-Sum, where the output includes the sum of the payloads instead of individual ones.
In this work, we make two related contributions. First, we construct simple and efficient protocols for PSI and PSI-Payload from a ring version of oblivious linear function evaluation (ring-OLE) that can be efficiently realized using recent ring-LPN based protocols. A standard OLE over a field F allows a sender with to deliver to a receiver who holds . Ring-OLE generalizes this to a ring , in particular, a polynomial ring over . Our second contribution is an efficient general reduction of a variant of PSI-Sum to PSI-Payload and secure inner product.
Our protocols have better communication cost than state-of-the-art PSI protocols, especially when requiring security against malicious parties and when allowing input-independent preprocessing. Compared to previous maliciously secure PSI protocols that have a similar com- putational cost, our online communication is 2x better for small sets (28 − 212 elements) and 20% better for large sets (220 − 224). Our protocol is also simpler to describe and implement. We obtain even bigger improvements over the state of the art (4-5x better running time) for our variant of PSI-Sum
Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC)
Protocols for secure multiparty computation (MPC) enable a set of parties to interact and compute a joint function of their private inputs while revealing nothing but the output. The potential applications for MPC are huge: privacy-preserving auctions, private DNA comparisons, private machine learning, threshold cryptography, and more. Due to this, MPC has been an intensive topic of research in academia ever since it was introduced in the 1980s by Yao for the two-party case (FOCS 1986), and by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson for the multiparty case (STOC 1987). Recently, MPC has become efficient enough to be used in practice, and has made the transition from an object of theoretical study to a technology being used in industry. In this article, we will review what MPC is, what problems it solves, and how it is being currently used.
We note that the examples and references brought in this review article are far from comprehensive, and due to the lack of space many highly relevant works are not cited
Two-party Private Set Intersection with an Untrusted Third Party
We construct new protocols for two parties to securely compute on the items in their intersection. Our protocols make use of an untrusted third party that has no input. The use of this party allows us to construct highly efficient protocols that are secure against a single malicious corruption
Function Secret Sharing for PSI-CA: With Applications to Private Contact Tracing
In this work we describe a token-based solution to Contact Tracing via Distributed Point Functions (DPF) and, more generally, Function Secret Sharing (FSS). The key idea behind the solution is that FSS natively supports secure keyword search on raw sets of keywords without a need for processing the keyword sets via a data structure for set membership. Furthermore, the FSS functionality enables adding up numerical payloads associated with multiple matches without additional interaction. These features make FSS an attractive tool for lightweight privacy-preserving searching on a database of tokens belonging to infected individuals
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