Privacy-Preserving Trust Management Mechanisms from Private Matching Schemes

Cryptographic primitives are essential for constructing privacy-preserving communication mechanisms. There are situations in which two parties that do not know each other need to exchange sensitive information on the Internet. Trust management mechanisms make use of digital credentials and certificates in order to establish trust among these strangers. We address the problem of choosing which credentials are exchanged. During this process, each party should learn no information about the preferences of the other party other than strictly required for trust establishment. We present a method to reach an agreement on the credentials to be exchanged that preserves the privacy of the parties. Our method is based on secure two-party computation protocols for set intersection. Namely, it is constructed from private matching schemes.Comment: The material in this paper will be presented in part at the 8th DPM International Workshop on Data Privacy Management (DPM 2013

Confidentiality-Preserving Publish/Subscribe: A Survey

Publish/subscribe (pub/sub) is an attractive communication paradigm for large-scale distributed applications running across multiple administrative domains. Pub/sub allows event-based information dissemination based on constraints on the nature of the data rather than on pre-established communication channels. It is a natural fit for deployment in untrusted environments such as public clouds linking applications across multiple sites. However, pub/sub in untrusted environments lead to major confidentiality concerns stemming from the content-centric nature of the communications. This survey classifies and analyzes different approaches to confidentiality preservation for pub/sub, from applications of trust and access control models to novel encryption techniques. It provides an overview of the current challenges posed by confidentiality concerns and points to future research directions in this promising field

Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks: A Survey

This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols, user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed, use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed before the chapter is finally concluded.Comment: 62 pages, 12 figures, 6 tables. This chapter is an extension of the author's previous submission in arXiv submission: arXiv:1102.1226. There are some text overlaps with the previous submissio

Sharing Computer Network Logs for Security and Privacy: A Motivation for New Methodologies of Anonymization

Logs are one of the most fundamental resources to any security professional. It is widely recognized by the government and industry that it is both beneficial and desirable to share logs for the purpose of security research. However, the sharing is not happening or not to the degree or magnitude that is desired. Organizations are reluctant to share logs because of the risk of exposing sensitive information to potential attackers. We believe this reluctance remains high because current anonymization techniques are weak and one-size-fits-all--or better put, one size tries to fit all. We must develop standards and make anonymization available at varying levels, striking a balance between privacy and utility. Organizations have different needs and trust other organizations to different degrees. They must be able to map multiple anonymization levels with defined risks to the trust levels they share with (would-be) receivers. It is not until there are industry standards for multiple levels of anonymization that we will be able to move forward and achieve the goal of widespread sharing of logs for security researchers.Comment: 17 pages, 1 figur