Consistency Decision

The consistency formula for set theory can be stated in terms of the free-variables theory of primitive recursive maps. Free-variable p. r. predicates are decidable by set theory, main result here, built on recursive evaluation of p. r. map codes and soundness of that evaluation in set theoretical frame: internal p. r. map code equality is evaluated into set theoretical equality. So the free-variable consistency predicate of set theory is decided by set theory, {\omega}-consistency assumed. By G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem on undecidability of set theory's consistency formula by set theory under assumption of this {\omega}- consistency, classical set theory turns out to be {\omega}-inconsistent.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1312.727

On Hilbert's Tenth Problem

Using an iterated Horner schema for evaluation of diophantine polynomials, we define a partial $\mu$-recursive "decision" algorithm decis as a "race" for a first nullstelle versus a first (internal) proof of non-nullity for such a polynomial -- within a given theory T extending Peano Arithmetique PA. If T is diophantine sound, i.e., if (internal) provability implies truth -- for diophantine formulae --, then the T-map decis gives correct results when applied to the codes of polynomial inequalities $D(x_1,...,x_m) \neq 0$. The additional hypothesis that T be diophantine complete (in the syntactical sense) would guarantee in addition termination of decis on these formula, i.e., decis would constitute a decision algorithm for diophantine formulae in the sense of Hilbert's 10th problem. From Matiyasevich's impossibility for such a decision it follows, that a consistent theory T extending PA cannot be both diophantine sound and diophantine complete. We infer from this the existence of a diophantine formulae which is undecidable by T. Diophantine correctness is inherited by the diophantine completion T~ of T, and within this extension decis terminates on all externally given diophantine polynomials, correctly. Matiyasevich's theorem -- for the strengthening T~ of T -- then shows that T~, and hence T, cannot be diophantine sound. But since the internal consistency formula Con_T for T implies -- within PA -- diophantine soundness of T, we get that PA derives \neg Con_T, in particular PA must derive its own internal inconsistency formula

Arithmetical Foundations - Recursion. Evaluation. Consistency

Primitive recursion, mu-recursion, universal object and universe theories, complexity controlled iteration, code evaluation, soundness, decidability, G\"odel incompleteness theorems, inconsistency provability for set theory, constructive consistency