509 research outputs found

    The Impact of Different Power Structures on The Cross-Boder e-Retail Supply Chain With An O2O Dual- Channel

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    In this paper, considering a cross-border e-retail supply chain composed by a foreign supplier and a cross-border e-retailer, we study the impact of different power structures on the supply chain members’ pricing and profits by establishing foreign supplier Stackelberg (FSS), cross-border e-retailer Stackelberg (CES) and vertical Nash (VN) game model on the basis of discussing O2O dual-channel retail mode and pricing decision. The results show that: i) the cross-border e-retailer prefer to choose the centralized pricing mode and will gain more profit than that in the decentralized pricing mode under the condition of O2O dual-channel retailing. ii) The impact of Stackelberg game on dual channel pricing of the cross-border e-retailer is identical, but the impact of three games on foreign supplier’s pricing is significant, (i.e., the wholesale price of the foreign supplier becomes smaller with the game dominance decreased gradually). iii) The impact of three games on cross-border electronic supply chain members’ profits is significant (i.e., members’ profits become smaller with the game dominance decreased gradually. In addition, the impact of Stackelberg game on supply chain total profits is identical. However, the supply chain total profits under Vertical Nash game are more than Stackelberg game

    Pricing Strategies in Dual-channel for Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers

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    For the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers who are in the weak position in dual-channel marketing, they are often faced with channel price conflict. Therefore, it is necessary for the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers to formulate effective pricing strategies. This paper modeled pricing strategies for two scenarios, which involved the manufacturer and retailer make decisions individually and a retailer Stackelberg game. Then we investigated the impacts of digital attribute of product and power structure on the optimal pricing strategies. Besides, we considered the change both of manufacturer and retailer’s profits when the digital attribute of product is heterogeneous and the power structure is difference using computational studies. Our analyses show that, the non-dominant manufacturer decides online direct price according to the dominant retailer’s pricing strategy is a win-win strategy, both manufacturer and retailer are better off, and the dual-channel’s total profits also improve

    Mixed Channel OEM Supply Chain Pricing and Service Competition Strategy Considering Brand Dealer Penalties

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    The paper constructs a mixed channel OEM supply chain model consisting of brand dealer and manufacturer, with brand dealer acting as the main parties of Stackelberg and manufacturer as the subordinate. This paper compares the profit changes of the supply chain in three situations: single brand channel, the mixed dual channel after the manufacturer opens the direct channel and dual channels where brand dealer penalize manufacturer for direct sales channels. The research results prove that the introduction of direct sales channels by manufacturer can enhance the advantages of the game and gain more profits. Under certain conditions, brand dealer would also benefit from the introduction of direct sales channels, so as to achieve a win-win result. When brand dealers’ profits are infringed, brand dealer can reduce the losses caused by direct sales channels by punishing direct sales channels. What’s more, the better the direct channel acceptance, the better the effect of the method. The total profit of the supply chain is reduced with the increase of the direct channel acceptance

    The impacts of online direct channel on pricing strategy and profits: a conceptual application to container shipping company

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    Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches

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    Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac

    Pricing Strategies in Dual-online Channels Based on Consumers’ Shopping Choice

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    AbstractBesides an official website mall (OWM), retail stores on the third party e-commerce platform(3PEP) is an another important online channel that manufacturers adopt to sell online. How to properly price products in these two channels simultaneously is a tough problem to firms and gains much attention by researchers. In this paper, we analyze their channel choice, and give demand functions of the two channels based on the consumers’ segmentation and preference. Then we design a sale model including two online channels: OWM and a retail store on 3PEP. According the Stackelberg game theory, we calculate and discuss the optimal pricing strategies of the manufacturer and retailer in three feasible regions. The result shows that manufacturers emphasizing channel sales prefer to choose pricing strategies that helps two online channels share the online market. But some manufacturers think adjusting the OWM's price and the wholesale price to control the retailer's pricing strategies is reasonable and necessary, even if nobody will prefer the OWM

    Optimization of a Dual-Channel Retailing System with Customer Returns

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    A plethora of retailers have begun to embrace a dual-channel retailing strategy wherein items are provided to consumers through both an online store and a physical store. As a result of standards and competitive measures, many retailers provide buyers who are unhappy with their purchases with the ability to achieve a full refund. In a dualchannel retailing system, full reimbursements can be done through what is called a crosschannel return, when a buyer purchases a product from an online store and returns it to a physical store. They can also be done through what is called a same-channel return, when a buyer purchases a product from a physical store and returns it back to the physical store, or purchases a product from an online store and returns it back to the online store. No existing research has examined all common types of customer returns in the context of a dual-channel retailing system. Be notified that the practice of cross-returning an item purchased from the physical store back to the online store is not common. Thus, it is not considered in this dissertation. We first study the optimal pricing policies for a centralized and decentralized dual-channel retailer (DCR) with same- and cross-channel returns. We consider two factors: the dual-channel retailer’s performance under centralization with unified and differential pricing schemes, and the dual-channel retailer’s performance under decentralization with the Stackelberg and Nash games. How dual-channel pricing behaviour is impacted by customer preference and rates of customer returns is discussed. In this study, a channel’s sales requests is a linear function of a channel’s own pricing strategy and a cross-channel’s pricing strategy. The second problem is an extension of the first problem. The optimal pricing policies and online channel’s responsiveness level for a centralized and decentralized dual-channel retailer with same- and cross-channel returns are studied. Indeed, the online store is normally the distribution centre of the enterprise and is not limited to the customers in its neighbourhood. Also, the online store experiences a much higher return rate compared to the physical store. Thus, it has the capability and the need to optimize its responsiveness to customer returns along with its pricing strategy. A channel’s sales requests, in the second problem, is a linear function of a channel’s own price, a crosschannel’s price, and the online store’s responsiveness level. The third problem studies the dilemma of whether or not to allow unsatisfactory online purchases to be cross-returned to the physical store. If not properly considered, those returns may create havoc to the system and a retailer might overestimate or underestimate a channel’s order quantity. Therefore, we study and compare between four vi different strategies, and propose models to determine optimal order quantities for each strategy when a dual-channel retailer offers both same and cross-channel returns. Several decision making insights on choosing between the different cross-channel return strategies and some properties of the optimal solutions are presented. From the retailer’s perspective of outsourcing the e-channel’s management to a third party logistics and service provider, we finally study three different inventory strategies, namely transaction-based fee, flat-based fee, and gain sharing. For each strategy, we find both channels’ optimal inventory policies and expected profits. The performances of the different strategies are compared and the managerial insights are given using analytical and numerical analysis. Methodologies, insights, comparative analysis, and computational results are delivered in this dissertation for the above aforementioned problems

    Blockchain-driven dual-channel green supply chain game model considering government subsidies

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    In order to improve the performance of green supply chain and promote the adoption of blockchain, this paper establishes a dual-channel green supply chain consisting of a green manufacturer and a retailer, and builds Stackelberg game model considering different scenarios. We analyze the impact of blockchain operating costs and consumer uncertainty about the product greenness. Furthermore, we study the government subsidy for manufacturers' green costs and its impact on supply chain performance and blockchain adoption. Findings reveal that without blockchain technology, government subsidy can improve manufacturers' and retailers' profits. However, when blockchain is adopted, the subsidy effect depends on the blockchain operating costs. In case of higher blockchain operating cost, the product prices and greenness decrease as the green cost subsidies increase; In case of lower blockchain operating cost, the increase in green cost subsidies will lead to increased product prices and greenness; Green cost subsidies can raise profits and lower the blockchain adoption threshold

    Coordination mechanism of dual-channel supply chains considering retailer innovation inputs

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    In response to the online channels established by manufacturers, physical retailers are starting to offer innovative services, which will intensify conflicts between manufacturers and retailers. Considering that the conflict will affect the operation efficiency and sustainable development of the supply chain, the coordination mechanism of a dual-channel supply chain has been established. In this study, we construct the Stackelberg game model based on consumer utility theory to analyze the complex mechanism of retailers' innovation input level affecting supply chain operation and design the double coordination mechanism. The results show that: (1) an optimal combination of wholesale prices, retail prices and innovation input levels can optimize the operational efficiency of the supply chain, (2) Noncooperation among channel members affects the retailer's product pricing, decreases the market share of the physical channel and increases the market demand of manufacturers, (3) The dual coordination mechanism can alleviate channel conflicts, which can improve the operational efficiency of the supply chain. This study provides several insights on the theory of organizational coordination and sustainable development in conflicts of dual-channel supply chains
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