Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale

We consider the pricing problem faced by a seller who assigns a price to a good that confers its benefits not only to its buyers, but also to other individuals around them. For example, a snow-blower is potentially useful not only to the household that buys it, but also to others on the same street. Given that the seller is constrained to selling such a (locally) public good via individual private sales, how should he set his prices given the distribution of values held by the agents? We study this problem as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the seller chooses and announces a price for the product. In the second stage, the agents (each having a private value for the good) decide simultaneously whether or not they will buy the product. In the resulting game, which can exhibit a multiplicity of equilibria, agents must strategize about whether they will themselves purchase the good to receive its benefits. In the case of a fully public good (where all agents benefit whenever any agent purchases), we describe a pricing mechanism that is approximately revenue-optimal (up to a constant factor) when values are drawn from a regular distribution. We then study settings in which the good is only "locally" public: agents are arranged in a network and share benefits only with their neighbors. We describe a pricing method that approximately maximizes revenue, in the worst case over equilibria of agent behavior, for any $d$-regular network. Finally, we show that approximately optimal prices can be found for general networks in the special case that private values are drawn from a uniform distribution. We also discuss some barriers to extending these results to general networks and regular distributions.Comment: accepted to EC'1

PRICES AND PRICING POLICIES FOR SMALL ANIMAL AND EQUINE VETERINARY SERVICES: A STUDY OF TEACHING HOSPITALS AND MICHIGAN PRIVATE PRACTICES DURING 2000

Prices are a key determinant of financial performance for virtually any business in either the public or private sector, and the Veterinary Teaching Hospital at Michigan State University (MSU-VTH) offers no exception. To achieve consistent success, it is critical that a business understands the prevailing conditions in the marketplace when setting prices for its goods and services. Important issues to address include: 1. What are the prices of similar goods and services produced by other firms? 2. How important is price as a choice factor when customers select a source of these goods and services? 3. How do staff members view prices at the point-of-sale? 4. How are prices determined? These questions are especially crucial in small businesses such as those typical of the veterinary profession, where the decision-makers tend to be technical experts rather than trained business managers. Without this information, these decision-makers often have very little basis on which to develop a pricing policy.Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession,

Alternative Funding For Public Goods Provision

Finding alternatives in public good financing is one of the most recent issues in the government sector. Tax-financed for pure public good is well known results further problems like externalities and economic inequity. This paper only addresses the qualitative analysis in discussing benefits and costs of the society in applying some alternatives in funding public good provisions, pure and impure one.public goods

Law in Transition and Development: The Case of Russia

The rise of barter and non-cash payments has become a dominant feature of the Russian transition to a market economy. This paper confronts with empirical evidence two approaches to explain barter in Russia: the ’illusion view’ and the ’trust view’ of barter. The ’illusion view’ suggests that barter allows the parties to pretend that the manufacturing sector in Russia is producing value added by enabling this sector to sell its output at a higher price than its market value. The ’trust view’ sees barter as an institution to deal with the absence of trust and liquidity in the Russian economy. We confront the prediction of both explanations with actual data on barter in Ukraine in 1997. The data reject the ’illusion view‘ in favor of the ‘trust view‘ of barter

Privatisation, Regulation, and Competition in South Asia

Privatisation has begun to accelerate in India and Pakistan. However, it is not clear that a change in ownership per se will contribute significantly to a more rapid, efficient, and equitable growth unless policies that ensure competition for these enterprises and remove distortions in factor markets also are undertaken at the same time or prior to privatisation. After a brief discussion of the transition from state-led development to more market-oriented policies and gradual opening to world markets, this paper reviews some of the analytical literature on privatisation and regulation. The translation of these theories into concrete policy suggestions is difficult for countries such as Pakistan and India, where many of the assumptions behind the theories do not hold. However, the results of empirical studies on past privatisations around the world do hold lessons for South Asia. Similarly, theories of regulation offer only broad recommendations, most notably (for South Asia) that regulation is not the best way to redistribute resources. The final section of the paper reviews India’s and Pakistan’s experience with privatisation thus far. Attempted privatisation of electricity in India serves as an example of the need for more attention to regulation, while the transfer of ownership has led to better service at lower cost in the telecommunications sector. Pakistan’s privatisation programme appears to have had similarly mixed results, though it is difficult to come to firm conclusions with the evidence at hand.

Free enterprise and central banking in formerly communist countries

According to this article, if the formerly Communist countries of Eastern Europe are to become free market economies, they will have to define and enforce property rights and allow prices to signal supply and demand conditions. Further, the article suggests that the market economy and integration into the world economy would be enhanced by adopting the currency of a large Western country, thereby eliminating the need for a central bank.Banks and banking, Central

Free enterprise and central banking in formerly communist countries

According to this article, if the formerly Communist countries of Eastern Europe are to become free market economies, they will have to define and enforce property rights and allow prices to signal supply and demand conditions. Further, the article suggests that the market economy and integration into the world economy would be enhanced by adopting the currency of a large Western country, thereby eliminating the need for a central bank.Banks and banking, Central

Pricing to Habits and the Law of One Price

This paper proposes a novel international transmission mechanism based on the assumption of deep habits. The term deep habits stands for a preference specification according to which consumers form habits on a good-by-good basis. Under deep habits, firms face more elastic demand functions in markets where nonhabitual demand is high relative to habitual demand, creating an incentive to price discriminate. We refer to this type of price discrimination as pricing to habits. In the presence of pricing to habits, innovations to domestic aggregate demand induce a decline in markups in the domestic country but not abroad, leading to a departure from the law of one price. In this way, the proposed pricing-to-habit mechanism can explain the observation that prices of the same good across countries, expressed in the same currency, vary over the business cycle. Furthermore, it can account for the empirical fact that in response to a positive domestic demand shock, such as an increase in government spending, the real exchange rate depreciates, domestic consumption expands, and the trade balance deteriorates.