1,380 research outputs found

    Profit Maximization Auction and Data Management in Big Data Markets

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    A big data service is any data-originated resource that is offered over the Internet. The performance of a big data service depends on the data bought from the data collectors. However, the problem of optimal pricing and data allocation in big data services is not well-studied. In this paper, we propose an auction-based big data market model. We first define the data cost and utility based on the impact of data size on the performance of big data analytics, e.g., machine learning algorithms. The big data services are considered as digital goods and uniquely characterized with "unlimited supply" compared to conventional goods which are limited. We therefore propose a Bayesian profit maximization auction which is truthful, rational, and computationally efficient. The optimal service price and data size are obtained by solving the profit maximization auction. Finally, experimental results on a real-world taxi trip dataset show that our big data market model and auction mechanism effectively solve the profit maximization problem of the service provider.Comment: 6 pages, 9 figures. This paper was accepted by IEEE WCNC conference in Dec. 201

    MODELING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN MOBILE WIRELESS NETWORKS

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    We envision that in the near future, just as Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), radios and radio resources in a wireless network can also be provisioned as a service to Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), which we refer to as Radio-as-a-Service (RaaS). In this thesis, we present a novel auction-based model to enable fair pricing and fair resource allocation according to real-time needs of MVNOs for RaaS. Based on the proposed model, we study the auction mechanism design with the objective of maximizing social welfare. We present an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) based auction mechanism for obtaining optimal social welfare. To reduce time complexity, we present a polynomial-time greedy mechanism for the RaaS auction. Both methods have been formally shown to be truthful and individually rational. Meanwhile, wireless networks have become more and more advanced and complicated, which are generating a large amount of runtime system statistics. In this thesis, we also propose to leverage the emerging deep learning techniques for spatiotemporal modeling and prediction in cellular networks, based on big system data. We present a hybrid deep learning model for spatiotemporal prediction, which includes a novel autoencoder-based deep model for spatial modeling and Long Short-Term Memory units (LSTMs) for temporal modeling. The autoencoder-based model consists of a Global Stacked AutoEncoder (GSAE) and multiple Local SAEs (LSAEs), which can offer good representations for input data, reduced model size, and support for parallel and application-aware training. Mobile wireless networks have become an essential part in wireless networking with the prevalence of mobile device usage. Most mobile devices have powerful sensing capabilities. We consider a general-purpose Mobile CrowdSensing(MCS) system, which is a multi-application multi-task system that supports a large variety of sensing applications. In this thesis, we also study the quality of the recruited crowd for MCS, i.e., quality of services/data each individual mobile user and the whole crowd are potentially capable of providing. Moreover, to improve flexibility and effectiveness, we consider fine-grained MCS, in which each sensing task is divided into multiple subtasks and a mobile user may make contributions to multiple subtasks. More specifically, we first introduce mathematical models for characterizing the quality of a recruited crowd for different sensing applications. Based on these models, we present a novel auction formulation for quality-aware and fine- grained MCS, which minimizes the expected expenditure subject to the quality requirement of each subtask. Then we discuss how to achieve the optimal expected expenditure, and present a practical incentive mechanism to solve the auction problem, which is shown to have the desirable properties of truthfulness, individual rationality and computational efficiency. In a MCS system, a sensing task is dispatched to many smartphones for data collections; in the meanwhile, a smartphone undertakes many different sensing tasks that demand data from various sensors. In this thesis, we also consider the problem of scheduling different sensing tasks assigned to a smartphone with the objective of minimizing sensing energy consumption while ensuring Quality of SenSing (QoSS). First, we consider a simple case in which each sensing task only requests data from a single sensor. We formally define the corresponding problem as the Minimum Energy Single-sensor task Scheduling (MESS) problem and present a polynomial-time optimal algorithm to solve it. Furthermore, we address a more general case in which some sensing tasks request multiple sensors to re- port their measurements simultaneously. We present an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) formulation as well as two effective polynomial-time heuristic algorithms, for the corresponding Minimum Energy Multi-sensor task Scheduling (MEMS) problem. Numerical results are presented to confirm the theoretical analysis of our schemes, and to show strong performances of our solutions, compared to several baseline methods

    ICT Update 69: Engaging with communities through crowdsourcing

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    ICT Update is a bimonthly printed and on-line magazine (http://ictupdate.cta.int) and an accompanying e-mail newsletter published by CTA. This issue focuses on crowd sourcing

    Incentive Mechanism Design in Mobile Crowdsensing Systems

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    In the past few years, the popularity of Mobile Crowdsensing Systems (MCSs) has been greatly prompted, in which sensory data can be ubiquitously collected and shared by mobile devices in a distributed fashion. Typically, a MCS consists of a cloud platform, sensing tasks, and mobile users equipped with mobile devices, in which the mobile users carry out sensing tasks and receive monetary rewards as compensation for resource consumption ( e.g., energy, bandwidth, and computation) and risk of privacy leakage ( e.g., location exposure). Compared with traditional mote-class sensor networks, MCSs can reduce the cost of deploying specialized sensing infrastructures and enable many applications that require resources and sensing modalities beyond the current mote-class sensor processes as today’s mobile devices (smartphones (iPhones, Sumsung Galaxy), tablets (iPad) and vehicle-embedded sensing devices (GPS)) integrate more computing, communication, and storage resources than traditional mote-class sensors. The current applications of MCSs include traffic congestion detection, wireless indoor localization, pollution monitoring, etc . There is no doubt that one of the most significant characteristics of MCSs is the active involvement of mobile users to collect and share sensory data. In this dissertation, we study the incentive mechanism design in mobile crowdsensing system with consideration of economic properties. Firstly, we investigate the problem of joining sensing task assignment and scheduling in MCSs with the following three considerations: i) partial fulfillment, ii) attribute diversity, and iii) price diversity. Then, we design a distributed auction framework to allow each task owner to independently process its local auction without collecting global information in a MCS, reducing communication cost. Next, we propose a cost-preferred auction scheme (CPAS) to assign each winning mobile user one or more sub- working time durations and a time schedule-preferred auction scheme (TPAS) to allocate each winning mobile user a continuous working time duration. Secondly, we focus on the design of an incentive mechanism for an MCS to minimize the social cost. The social cost represents the total cost of mobile devices when all tasks published by the MCS are finished. We first present the working process of a MCS, and then build an auction market for the MCS where the MCS platform acts as an auctioneer and users with mobile devices act as bidders. Depending on the different requirements of the MCS platform, we design a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)-based auction mechanism for the continuous working pattern and a suboptimal auction mechanism for the discontinuous working pattern. Both of them can ensure that the bidding of users are processed in a truthful way and the utilities of users are maximized. Through rigorous theoretical analysis and comprehensive simulations, we can prove that these incentive mechanisms satisfy economic properties and can be implemented in reasonable time complexcity. Next, we discuss the importance of fairness and unconsciousness of MCS surveillance applications. Then, we propose offline and online incentive mechanisms with fair task scheduling based on the proportional share allocation rules. Furthermore, to have more sensing tasks done over time dimension, we relax the truthfulness and unconsciousness property requirements and design a (ε, μ)-unconsciousness online incentive mechanism. Real map data are used to validate these proposed incentive mechanisms through extensive simulations. Finally, future research topics are proposed to complete the dissertation

    Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs

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