Household behavior and individual autonomy.

The paper proposes a model of household behavior with both private and public consumption where the spouses independently maximize their utilities, but taking into account, together with their own individual budget constraints, the collective household budget constraint with public goods evaluated at Lindahl prices. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints are used to parameterize the set of equilibria, in addition to the usual parameterization by income shares. The proposed game generalizes both the ‘collective’ model of household behavior and the non-cooperative game with voluntary contributions to public goods.Intra-household allocation, household financial management, degree of autonomy, Lindahl prices, local income pooling, separate spheres.

Household behavior and individual autonomy

intra-household allocation, household financial management, degree of autonomy, Lindahl prices, local income pooling, separate spheres

Household behavior and individual autonomy: A Lindahl approach.

A comprehensive model of economic household decision is presented which incorporates both fully cooperative and fully non-cooperative variants, parameterized by the income distribution, as well as a semi-cooperative variant, parameterized in addition by a vector B, representing the degrees of individual autonomy. In this comprehensive model, the concept of "household B-equilibrium" is introduced through the reformulation of the Lindahl equilibrium in strategic terms. Existence is proved and some generic properties of the household B-equilibrium derived. An example is given to illustrate. Finally a particular decomposition of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix is derived and the testability of the various models discussed.Intra-household allocation, household financial management, degree of autonomy, Lindahl prices, local income pooling, separate spheres.

Cournot Oligopoly, Price Discrimination and Total Output

This paper extends the traditional analysis of the output effect under monopoly (third-degree) price discrimination to a multimarket Cournot oligopoly. Under symmetric Cournot oligopoly (all firms selling in all markets) similar results to those under monopoly are obtained: in order for price discrimination to increase total output the demand and inverse demand of the strong market (the high price market) should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more concave than the demand and inverse demand of the weak market (the low price one). When competitive pressure (measured by the number of firms) varies across markets the effect of price discrimination on total output crucially depends on what market, the strong or the weak, is more competitive

Cournot Oligopoly, Price Discrimination and Total Output

This paper extends the traditional analysis of the output effect under monopoly (third-degree) price discrimination to a multimarket Cournot oligopoly. Under symmetric Cournot oligopoly (all firms selling in all markets) similar results to those under monopoly are obtained: in order for price discrimination to increase total output the demand and inverse demand of the strong market (the high price market) should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more concave than the demand and inverse demand of the weak market (the low price one). When competitive pressure (measured by the number of firms) varies across markets the effect of price discrimination on total output crucially depends on what market, the strong or the weak, is more competitive

Price-quantity competition with varying toughness

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Price-quantity competition with varying toughness

In order to formalize the variety of oligopolistic competition regimes, we adopt an approach (pioneered by Shubik, 1959) where firms behave strategically both in price and quantity. The corresponding concept of oligopolistic equilibriumallo ws for a parameterized continuum of regimes with varying competitive toughness. In particular, the Cournot and the competitive outcomes coincide, respectively, with the softest and the toughest oligopolistic equilibrium outcome. The set of all equilibrium outcomes are compared with those obtained in three alternative approaches, respectively based on pricing-schemes, conjectural variations and supply functions. Finally, we explore the possibility of endogenizing strategically the choice of competitive toughness by the firms

Price-quantity competition with varying toughness

In order to formalize the variety of oligopolistic competition regimes, we adopt an approach (pioneered by Shubik, 1959) where firms behave strategically both in price and quantity. The corresponding concept of oligopolistic equilibrium allows for a parameterized continuum of regimes with varying competitive toughness. In particular, the Cournot and the competitive outcomes coincide, respectively, with the softest and the toughest oligopolistic equilibrium outcome. The set of all equilibrium outcomes are compared with those obtained in three alternative approaches, respectively based on pricing-schemes, conjectural variations and supply functions. Finally, we explore the possibility of endogenizing strategically the choice of competitive toughness by the firms

Price-quantity competition with varying toughness

In order to formalize the variety of oligopolistic competition regimes, we adopt an approach (pioneered by Shubik, 1959) where firms behave strategically both in price and quantity. The corresponding concept of oligopolistic equilibriumallo ws for a parameterized continuum of regimes with varying competitive toughness. In particular, the Cournot and the competitive outcomes coincide, respectively, with the softest and the toughest oligopolistic equilibrium outcome. The set of all equilibrium outcomes are compared with those obtained in three alternative approaches, respectively based on pricing-schemes, conjecturalvariations and supply functions. Finally, we explore the possibility of endogenizing strategically the choice of competitive toughness by the firms.