P3OP^{3}O: Transferring Visual Representations for Reinforcement Learning via Prompting

It is important for deep reinforcement learning (DRL) algorithms to transfer their learned policies to new environments that have different visual inputs. In this paper, we introduce Prompt based Proximal Policy Optimization ($P^{3}O$), a three-stage DRL algorithm that transfers visual representations from a target to a source environment by applying prompting. The process of $P^{3}O$ consists of three stages: pre-training, prompting, and predicting. In particular, we specify a prompt-transformer for representation conversion and propose a two-step training process to train the prompt-transformer for the target environment, while the rest of the DRL pipeline remains unchanged. We implement $P^{3}O$ and evaluate it on the OpenAI CarRacing video game. The experimental results show that $P^{3}O$ outperforms the state-of-the-art visual transferring schemes. In particular, $P^{3}O$ allows the learned policies to perform well in environments with different visual inputs, which is much more effective than retraining the policies in these environments.Comment: This paper has been accepted to be presented at the upcoming IEEE International Conference on Multimedia & Expo (ICME) in 202

Deep learning for video game playing

In this article, we review recent Deep Learning advances in the context of how they have been applied to play different types of video games such as first-person shooters, arcade games, and real-time strategy games. We analyze the unique requirements that different game genres pose to a deep learning system and highlight important open challenges in the context of applying these machine learning methods to video games, such as general game playing, dealing with extremely large decision spaces and sparse rewards

Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice

Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand, people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729