Credit ratings and credit risk

This paper investigates the information in corporate credit ratings. We examine the extent to which firms' credit ratings measure raw probability of default as opposed to systematic risk of default, a firm's tendency to default in bad times. We find that credit ratings are dominated as predictors of corporate failure by a simple model based on publicly available financial information (`failure score'), indicating that ratings are poor measures of raw default probability. However, ratings are strongly related to a straightforward measure of systematic default risk: the sensitivity of firm default probability to its common component (`failure beta'). Furthermore, this systematic risk measure is strongly related to credit default swap risk premia. Our findings can explain otherwise puzzling qualities of ratings.Credit Rating, Credit Risk, Default Probability, Forecast Accuracy, Systematic Default Risk

The informational advantage of specialized monitors: the case of bank examiners

Large commercial banking firms are monitored by specialized private sector monitors and by specialized government examiners. Previous research suggests that bank exams produce little useful information that is not already reflected in market prices. In this article, we apply a new research methodology to a unique data set, and find that government exams of large national banks produce significant new information which financial markets do not fully internalize for several additional months. Our results indicate that specialized government monitors can identify value-relevant information about private firms, even if those firms are already actively followed by investors and their private-sector agents.Bank supervision ; Bank examination

Rating assignments: Lessons from international banks

This paper estimates ordered logit and probit regression models for bank ratings which also include a country index to capture country-specific variation. The empirical findings provide support to the hypothesis that the individual international bank ratings assigned by Fitch Ratings are underpinned by fundamental quantitative financial analyses. Also, there is strong evidence of a country effect. Our model is shown to provide accurate predictions of bank ratings for the period prior to the 2007 – 2008 banking crisis based upon publicly available information. However, our results also suggest that quantitative models are not likely to be able to predict ratings with complete accuracy. Furthermore, we find that both quantitative models and rating agencies are likely to produce highly inaccurate predictions of ratings during periods of financial instability

Macroeconomic Conditions and Capital Raising

Economic theory, as well as commonly-stated views of practitioners, suggests that macroeconomic conditions can affect both the ability and manner in which firms raise external financing. Theory suggests that downturns should be associated with a shift toward less information-sensitive securities, as well as a ‘flight to quality,’ in which firms can issue high-rated securities but not low-rated ones. We evaluate these hypotheses on a large sample of publicly-traded debt issues, seasoned equity offers, and bank loans. We find that worse macroeconomic conditions lead firms to use less information-sensitive securities. In addition, poor market conditions affect the structure of securities offered, shifting them towards shorter maturities and more security. Furthermore, market conditions affect the quality of securities offered, with worsening conditions substantially lowering the number of low-rated debt issues. Overall, these findings suggest that macroeconomic conditions are important factors in firms’ capital raising decisions.Market downturns; Security choice; Maturity; Security

On credit spread slopes and predicting bank risk

The authors examine whether credit-spread curves, engendered by a mandatory subordinated-debt requirement for banks, would help predict bank risk. They extract the credit-spread curves each quarter for each bank in our sample, and analyze the information content of credit-spread slopes. They find that credit-spread slopes are significant predictors of future credit spreads. However, credit-spread slopes do not provide significant additional information on future bank-risk variables, over and above other bank-specific and market-wide information.Bank capital ; Risk

Reputation and competition: evidence from the credit rating industry

The credit rating industry has historically been dominated by just two agencies, Moody’s and S&P, leading to longstanding legislative and regulatory calls for increased competition. The material entry of a third rating agency (Fitch) to the competitive landscape offers a unique experiment to empirically examine how in fact increased competition affects the credit ratings market. Increased competition from Fitch coincides with lower quality ratings from the incumbents: rating levels went up, the correlation between ratings and market-implied yields fell, and the ability of ratings to predict default deteriorated. We offer several possible explanations for these findings that are linked to existing theories.

Accounting for the determinants of banks’ credit ratings

The contribution of the banking industry to the recent financial crisis 2007/8 has raised public concerns about the excessive involvement of banks in risky activities. In addition there have been public concerns about the ability of credit rating agencies to evaluate these risks in advance. In this context, this study uses an ordered logit analysis to examine the determinants of banks’ credit ratings using a sample of US and UK banks’ accounting data from 1994 to 2009. Our intention is to examine to what extent banks’ ratings reflect banks’ risks. Our analysis shows that a small number of accounting variables, namely: bank size, liquidity, efficiency and profitability are able to correctly assign credit rating for approximately 74% to 78% the sample banks. Surprisingly, the association between banks’ credit ratings and each of leverage asset quality and capital is not robust, suggesting that the rating agency’s models did not pick them up despite their importance in the crisis. In addition, the relationship between banks’ credit ratings and liquidity is the reverse of that which an adequate early warning system would require. As banks benefit from higher credit ratings they will have addressed their determinants rather than taking care of systemic factors that affect underlying risk. Policy makers therefore need to intervene to address this market failure.This study was financially supported by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS)

Rating Assignments: Lessons from International Banks

This paper estimates ordered logit and probit regression models for bank ratings which also include a country index to capture country-specific variation. The empirical findings provide support to the hypothesis that the individual international bank ratings assigned by Fitch Ratings are underpinned by fundamental quantitative financial analyses. Also, there is strong evidence of a country effect. Our model is shown to provide accurate predictions of bank ratings for the period prior to the 2007 - 2008 banking crisis based upon publicly available information. However, our results also suggest that quantitative models are not likely to be able to predict ratings with complete accuracy. Furthermore, we find that both quantitative models and rating agencies are likely to produce highly inaccurate predictions of ratings during periods of financial instability.International banks, ratings, ordered choice models, country index

Can bank supervisors rely on market data? A critical assessment from a Swiss perspective

Market data, such as bond spreads or equity price volatility, are a complementary source to bank supervisory information. In Switzerland, meaningful market data are available for a number of banks which constitute a major part of the banking system. Notwithstanding some limitations (biases due to state guarantee for cantonal banks and potential "too-big-to-fail" expectations for big banks) these market data are likely to play a supervisory role in the future. However, once the market expects supervisors to react to market data, these data become endogenous. This may jeopardize the very potential of market data to serve as policy guides.bank-supervision