7 research outputs found
Local public good provisioning in networks: A Nash implementation mechanism
In this paper we study resource allocation in decentralized information local
public good networks. A network is a local public good network if each user's
actions directly affect the utility of an arbitrary subset of network users. We
consider networks where each user knows only that part of the network that
either affects or is affected by it. Furthermore, each user's utility and
action space are its private information, and each user is a self utility
maximizer. This network model is motivated by several applications including
wireless communications and online advertising. For this network model we
formulate a decentralized resource allocation problem and develop a
decentralized resource allocation mechanism (game form) that possesses the
following properties: (i) All Nash equilibria of the game induced by the
mechanism result in allocations that are optimal solutions of the corresponding
centralized resource allocation problem (Nash implementation). (ii) All users
voluntarily participate in the allocation process specified by the mechanism
(individual rationality). (iii) The mechanism results in budget balance at all
Nash equilibria and off equilibrium
Dynamic Decision Problems with Cooperative and Strategic Agents and Asymmetric Information.
There exist many real world situations involving multiple decision makers with asymmetric information, such as communication systems, social networks, economic markets and many others. Through this dissertation, we attempt to enhance the conceptual understanding of such systems and provide analytical tools to characterize the optimum or equilibrium behavior.
Specifically, we study four discrete time, decentralized decision problems in stochastic dynamical systems with cooperative and strategic agents. The first problem we consider is a relay channel where nodes' queue lengths, modeled as conditionally independent Markov chains, are nodes' private information, whereas nodes' actions are publicly observed. This results in non-classical information pattern. Energy-delay tradeoff is studied for this channel through stochastic control techniques for cooperative agents. Extending this model for strategic users, in the second problem we study a general model with strategic players having conditionally independent, Markovian types and publicly observed actions. This results in a dynamic game with asymmetric information. We present a forward/backward sequential decomposition algorithm to find a class of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game. Using this methodology, in the third problem, we study a general two player dynamic LQG game with asymmetric information, where players' types evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur quadratic instantaneous costs. We show that under certain conditions, players' strategies that are linear in their private types, together with Gaussian beliefs, form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game. Finally, we consider two sub problems in decentralized Bayesian learning in dynamic games. In the first part, we consider an ergodic version of a sequential buyers game where strategic users sequentially make a decision to buy or not buy a product. In this problem, we design incentives to align players' individual objectives with the team objective. In the second part, we present a framework to study learning dynamics and especially informational cascades for decentralized dynamic games. We first generalize our methodology to find PBE to the case when players do not perfectly observe their types; rather they make independent, noisy observations. Based on this, we characterize informational cascades for a specific learning model.PhDElectrical Engineering: SystemsUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/133294/1/dvasal_1.pd