105 research outputs found

    On Dialetheic Entailment

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    The entailment connective is introduced by Priest (2006b). It aims to capture, in a dialetheically acceptable way, the informal notion of logical consequence. This connective does not “fall foul” of Curry’s Paradox by invalidating an inference rule called “Absorption” (or “Contraction”) and the classical logical theorem called “Assertion”. In this paper we show that the semantics of entailment, given by Priest in terms of possible worlds, is inadequate. In particular, we will argue that Priest’s counterexamples to Absorption and Assertion use in the metalanguage a dialetheically unacceptable principle. Furthermore, we show that the rejection of Assertion undermines Priest’s claim that the entailment connective expresses the notion of logical consequence

    Coherent Integration of Databases by Abductive Logic Programming

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    We introduce an abductive method for a coherent integration of independent data-sources. The idea is to compute a list of data-facts that should be inserted to the amalgamated database or retracted from it in order to restore its consistency. This method is implemented by an abductive solver, called Asystem, that applies SLDNFA-resolution on a meta-theory that relates different, possibly contradicting, input databases. We also give a pure model-theoretic analysis of the possible ways to `recover' consistent data from an inconsistent database in terms of those models of the database that exhibit as minimal inconsistent information as reasonably possible. This allows us to characterize the `recovered databases' in terms of the `preferred' (i.e., most consistent) models of the theory. The outcome is an abductive-based application that is sound and complete with respect to a corresponding model-based, preferential semantics, and -- to the best of our knowledge -- is more expressive (thus more general) than any other implementation of coherent integration of databases

    Choosing Your Nonmonotonic Logic: A Shopper’s Guide

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    The paper presents an exhaustive menu of nonmonotonic logics. The options are individuated in terms of the principles they reject. I locate, e.g., cumulative logics and relevance logics on this menu. I highlight some frequently neglected options, and I argue that these neglected options are particularly attractive for inferentialists

    Probabilities with Gaps and Gluts

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    Belnap-Dunn logic (BD), sometimes also known as First Degree Entailment, is a four-valued propositional logic that complements the classical truth values of True and False with two non-classical truth values Neither and Both. The latter two are to account for the possibility of the available information being incomplete or providing contradictory evidence. In this paper, we present a probabilistic extension of BD that permits agents to have probabilistic beliefs about the truth and falsity of a proposition. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for the framework defined and also identify policies for conditionalization and aggregation. Concretely, we introduce four-valued equivalents of Bayes' and Jeffrey updating and also suggest mechanisms for aggregating information from different sources

    Computational Complexity of Strong Admissibility for Abstract Dialectical Frameworks

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    Abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) have been introduced as a formalism for modeling and evaluating argumentation allowing general logical satisfaction conditions. Different criteria used to settle the acceptance of arguments arecalled semantics. Semantics of ADFs have so far mainly been defined based on the concept of admissibility. Recently, the notion of strong admissibility has been introduced for ADFs. In the current work we study the computational complexityof the following reasoning tasks under strong admissibility semantics. We address 1. the credulous/skeptical decision problem; 2. the verification problem; 3. the strong justification problem; and 4. the problem of finding a smallest witness of strong justification of a queried argument

    From Logic Programming to Human Reasoning:: How to be Artificially Human

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    Results of psychological experiments have shown that humans make assumptions, which are not necessarily valid, that they are influenced by their background knowledge and that they reason non-monotonically. These observations show that classical logic does not seem to be adequate for modeling human reasoning. Instead of assuming that humans do not reason logically at all, we take the view that humans do not reason classical logically. Our goal is to model episodes of human reasoning and for this purpose we investigate the so-called Weak Completion Semantics. The Weak Completion Semantics is a Logic Programming approach and considers the least model of the weak completion of logic programs under the three-valued Ɓukasiewicz logic. As the Weak Completion Semantics is relatively new and has not yet been extensively investigated, we first motivate why this approach is interesting for modeling human reasoning. After that, we show the formal correspondence to the already established Stable Model Semantics and Well-founded Semantics. Next, we present an extension with an additional context operator, that allows us to express negation as failure. Finally, we propose a contextual abductive reasoning approach, in which the context of observations is relevant. Some properties do not hold anymore under this extension. Besides discussing the well-known psychological experiments Byrne’s suppression task and Wason’s selection task, we investigate an experiment in spatial reasoning, an experiment in syllogistic reasoning and an experiment that examines the belief-bias effect. We show that the results of these experiments can be adequately modeled under the Weak Completion Semantics. A result which stands out here, is the outcome of modeling the syllogistic reasoning experiment, as we have a higher prediction match with the participants’ answers than any of twelve current cognitive theories. We present an abstract evaluation system for conditionals and discuss well-known examples from the literature. We show that in this system, conditionals can be evaluated in various ways and we put up the hypothesis that humans use a particular evaluation strategy, namely that they prefer abduction to revision. We also discuss how relevance plays a role in the evaluation process of conditionals. For this purpose we propose a semantic definition of relevance and justify why this is preferable to a exclusively syntactic definition. Finally, we show that our system is more general than another system, which has recently been presented in the literature. Altogether, this thesis shows one possible path on bridging the gap between Cognitive Science and Computational Logic. We investigated findings from psychological experiments and modeled their results within one formal approach, the Weak Completion Semantics. Furthermore, we proposed a general evaluation system for conditionals, for which we suggest a specific evaluation strategy. Yet, the outcome cannot be seen as the ultimate solution but delivers a starting point for new open questions in both areas

    Belief Change in Reasoning Agents: Axiomatizations, Semantics and Computations

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    The capability of changing beliefs upon new information in a rational and efficient way is crucial for an intelligent agent. Belief change therefore is one of the central research fields in Artificial Intelligence (AI) for over two decades. In the AI literature, two different kinds of belief change operations have been intensively investigated: belief update, which deal with situations where the new information describes changes of the world; and belief revision, which assumes the world is static. As another important research area in AI, reasoning about actions mainly studies the problem of representing and reasoning about effects of actions. These two research fields are closely related and apply a common underlying principle, that is, an agent should change its beliefs (knowledge) as little as possible whenever an adjustment is necessary. This lays down the possibility of reusing the ideas and results of one field in the other, and vice verse. This thesis aims to develop a general framework and devise computational models that are applicable in reasoning about actions. Firstly, I shall propose a new framework for iterated belief revision by introducing a new postulate to the existing AGM/DP postulates, which provides general criteria for the design of iterated revision operators. Secondly, based on the new framework, a concrete iterated revision operator is devised. The semantic model of the operator gives nice intuitions and helps to show its satisfiability of desirable postulates. I also show that the computational model of the operator is almost optimal in time and space-complexity. In order to deal with the belief change problem in multi-agent systems, I introduce a concept of mutual belief revision which is concerned with information exchange among agents. A concrete mutual revision operator is devised by generalizing the iterated revision operator. Likewise, a semantic model is used to show the intuition and many nice properties of the mutual revision operator, and the complexity of its computational model is formally analyzed. Finally, I present a belief update operator, which takes into account two important problems of reasoning about action, i.e., disjunctive updates and domain constraints. Again, the updated operator is presented with both a semantic model and a computational model
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