Internal goods to legal practice: reclaiming fuller with macintyre

Lon Fuller rejected legal positivism because he believed that the ‘procedural morality of law’ established a necessary connection between law and morals. Underpinning his argument is a claim that law is a purposive activity grounded by a relationship of political reciprocity between lawgivers and legal subjects. This paper argues that his reliance on political reciprocity implicates a necessary connection between his procedural morality and an unarticulated ‘substantive morality of law’: it presupposes that law is properly understood by reference to the political task of achieving a common good. To establish this necessary connection, I propose we look to Alasdair MacIntyre. Understanding law as a ‘social practice’, on MacIntyre’s terms, can provide the necessary socio-political context to explain why and how legal practice is conditioned by political reciprocity. If we apply MacIntyre’s distinction between the internal and external goods of a social practice, legal positivism can be understood as confusing law as a co-operative social practice with the instrumentalisation of that practice by legal officials

Uncivil Disobedience: Political Commitment and Violence

Standard accounts of civil disobedience include nonviolence as a necessary condition. Here I argue that such accounts are mistaken and that civil disobedience can include violence in many aspects, primarily excepting violence directed at other persons. I base this argument on a novel understanding of civil disobedience: the special character of the practice comes from its combination of condemnation of a political practice with an expressed commitment to the political. The commitment to the political is a commitment to engaging with others as co-members in the on-going political project of living together. I show how such an understanding of civil disobedience is superior to the Rawlsian strain of thought, which focuses on fidelity to law. Rawls was concerned with civil disobedience solely in the context of overriding political obligation. The project of characterizing a contestatory political practice that can be distinguished and used in a wider variety of contexts than Rawls is concerned with, including under illegitimate regimes, beyond the nation-state, or on behalf of anarchism, requires a different understanding of civil disobedience

Capitalizing On Infinitesimal Calculus In Political Marketing

The calculus, known to be a branch of mathematics dealing with differentiation and integration of variable quantities, is used to solve many mathematical problems. This paper explores these problem-solving qualities of calculus to determine how they enhance the practice of political marketing in our rapidly democratizing world. More importantly, science and technology are known to be providing appreciable impetus in every sphere of human endeavour and political marketing is no exception. Another objective of this paper therefore, is to interrogate the nature and dimension of this impetus within the context of electoral politics with specific reference to political marketing practice

Speaking Crisis in the Eurozone Debt Crisis: Exploring the Potential and Limits of Transformational Agonistic Conflict

Agonism as a political theory emphasizes the ontological aspect of conflict in human political interaction. This article aims to shed light on the political practice of agonism – and in doing so on its limits – by viewing 'crisis discourse' as an agonistic political practice. As my analysis of the Dutch Socialist Party and the Freedom Party’s speech in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis shows, crisis discourse aimed to (re)create a ‘people’ and to justify radical change in economic and social structures. Crisis discourse is employed to construct an 'other' that can be based on ethnic and nationalist terms and to justify retroactive application of the law and the stripping of Dutch citizens of their rights. This attention to crisis discourse as an agonistic political practice highlights an unease within agonism itself: where must the agonist accepts limits to the conflict and contestation she so values? The article starts with Chantal Mouffe's answer to this question - her insistence that legitimate conflict must always recognize the shared values of equality and liberty - and proceeds to show that Mouffe's view unnecessarily relies on a deliberative democratic desire for consensus. Other than Mouffe, I draw on Honig’s emphasis of perpetual contestation to propose that the issue of limits can be best answered by reference to the core of agonistic thought: the preservation of the struggle over political norms and processes. It is not shared values or even a shared political space that matters, but that the political space of the ‘people’ – however contested membership therein might be – remains a place that the 'other' can re-ente

Freedom and the Strong State : On German Ordoliberalism

Ordoliberalism is the theory behind the German social market economy. Its theoretical stance developed in the context of the economic crisis and political turmoil of the Weimar Republic in the late 1920s. It is premised on the strong state as the locus of liberal governance, and holds that economic freedom derives from political authority. In the context of the crisis of neoliberal political economy and austerity, and debates about the resurgence of the state vis-à-vis the economy, the article introduces the ordoliberal argument that the free economy presupposes the exercise of strong state authority, and that economic liberty is a practice of liberal governance. This practice is fundamentally one of social policy to secure the sociological and ethical preconditions of free markets. The study of ordoliberalism brings to the fore a tradition of a state-centric neoliberalism, one that says that economic freedom is ordered freedom, one that argues that the strong state is the political form of free markets, and one that conceives of competition and enterprise as a political task

Moral Law

What is the moral law and what role does it and should it play in political theory and political practice? In this entry we will try to answer these important questions by first examining what the moral law is, before investigating the different ways in which the relationship between morality and politics can be conceptualize

The political dimension of dance : Mouffe’s theory of agonism and choreography

In order to support this argument, I will first turn to the quasi-transcendental philosophical trajectory developed by the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, before then turning to examine post-foundational politico-philosophical thought, which emphasises the indispensable moment of exclusion in the construction of any social practice, and the dimension of the impossibility of absolute foundation or grounding. This is of particular relevance to Mouffe’s agonistic model of democratic politics which proposes the disarticulation and transformation of dominant socio-political discourses around we/they relations. For Mouffe, democratic politics begins by acknowledging—rather than suppressing—antagonistic relations within the practice of hegemony. Insight into Mouffe’s political theory provides the basis for grasping the political dimension of art and, moreover, will permit an understanding of it in terms of counter-hegemonic struggle. In the final section, I envisage dance practice from these philosophical and political standpoints with the aim of defining choreography in relation to the sphere of contestation such that it may be understood to contribute to the transformation of democracy and society as a whole. In this regard, what I will be calling agonistic encounters and agonistic objectifications in dance performances will be the articulation of partial and contesting systems of relations allowing different realities to be materialised in the same space

Social rights constitutionalism: an antagonistic endorsement

The article discusses how we might understand solidarity as the organizing concept behind the institutionalization of social rights. I argue that writing solidarity into social rights constitutionalism carries productive tension into constitutional thinking because it disturbs the smooth passage from civil to political and finally to social rights. Marshall's influential argument that social rights are continuous to civil and political rights has become both the grounding assumption in constitutional theory and at the same time the most obvious lie in the constitutional practice of advanced capitalist democracies, clearly belied in EU constitutional practice under austerity. I explore the various attempts to accommodate the continuity of civil, political, and social rights in the face of the contradictory articulation of social democracy and capitalism before undertaking something of a defence of the antinomic significance of social rights constitutionalism, and probing what mileage might be left in ‘exploiting’ the contradiction between capitalist interests and social rights