25,212 research outputs found
An Objection to Naturalism and Atheism from Logic
I proffer a success argument for classical logical consequence. I articulate in what sense that notion of consequence should be regarded as the privileged notion for metaphysical inquiry aimed at uncovering the fundamental nature of the world. Classical logic breeds necessitism. I use necessitism to produce problems for both ontological naturalism and atheism
Buying Logical Principles with Ontological Coin: The Metaphysical Lessons of Adding epsilon to Intuitionistic Logic
We discuss the philosophical implications of formal results showing the con-
sequences of adding the epsilon operator to intuitionistic predicate logic. These
results are related to Diaconescuâs theorem, a result originating in topos theory
that, translated to constructive set theory, says that the axiom of choice (an
âexistence principleâ) implies the law of excluded middle (which purports to be
a logical principle). As a logical choice principle, epsilon allows us to translate
that result to a logical setting, where one can get an analogue of Diaconescuâs
result, but also can disentangle the roles of certain other assumptions that are
hidden in mathematical presentations. It is our view that these results have not
received the attention they deserve: logicians are unlikely to read a discussion
because the results considered are âalready well known,â while the results are
simultaneously unknown to philosophers who do not specialize in what most
philosophers will regard as esoteric logics. This is a problem, since these results
have important implications for and promise signif i cant illumination of contem-
porary debates in metaphysics. The point of this paper is to make the nature
of the results clear in a way accessible to philosophers who do not specialize in
logic, and in a way that makes clear their implications for contemporary philo-
sophical discussions. To make the latter point, we will focus on Dummettian discussions of realism and anti-realism.
Keywords: epsilon, axiom of choice, metaphysics, intuitionistic logic, Dummett,
realism, antirealis
Changing a semantics: opportunism or courage?
The generalized models for higher-order logics introduced by Leon Henkin, and
their multiple offspring over the years, have become a standard tool in many
areas of logic. Even so, discussion has persisted about their technical status,
and perhaps even their conceptual legitimacy. This paper gives a systematic
view of generalized model techniques, discusses what they mean in mathematical
and philosophical terms, and presents a few technical themes and results about
their role in algebraic representation, calibrating provability, lowering
complexity, understanding fixed-point logics, and achieving set-theoretic
absoluteness. We also show how thinking about Henkin's approach to semantics of
logical systems in this generality can yield new results, dispelling the
impression of adhocness. This paper is dedicated to Leon Henkin, a deep
logician who has changed the way we all work, while also being an always open,
modest, and encouraging colleague and friend.Comment: 27 pages. To appear in: The life and work of Leon Henkin: Essays on
his contributions (Studies in Universal Logic) eds: Manzano, M., Sain, I. and
Alonso, E., 201
Reasoning about Knowledge in Linear Logic: Modalities and Complexity
In a recent paper, Jean-Yves Girard commented that âit has been a long time since philosophy has stopped intereacting with logicâ[17]. Actually, it has no
The prospects for mathematical logic in the twenty-first century
The four authors present their speculations about the future developments of
mathematical logic in the twenty-first century. The areas of recursion theory,
proof theory and logic for computer science, model theory, and set theory are
discussed independently.Comment: Association for Symbolic Logi
Carnapâs Principle of Tolerance and logical pluralism
Logical pluralism is the claim that there is more than one adequate logic. Many authors consider Carnap as one of the forerunners of logical pluralism. More than that, they claim that Carnapâs Principle of Tolerance consists in one of the first explicit formulations a logical pluralism. Nonetheless, there is little detailed investigation to evaluate if the Principle of Tolerance necessarily implies a logical pluralism, and if so, of which kind. The aim of this paper is to analyze the Principle of Tolerance, as well as its context, and to investigate the relation between such principle and logical pluralism
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