Science Quality and the Value of Inventions

Despite decades of research, the relationship between the quality of science and the value of inventions has remained unclear. We present the result of a large-scale matching exercise between 4.8 million patent families and 43 million publication records. We find a strong positive relationship between quality of scientific contributions referenced in patents and the value of the respective inventions. We rank patents by the quality of the science they are linked to. Strikingly, high-rank patents are twice as valuable as low-rank patents, which in turn are about as valuable as patents without direct science link. We show this core result for various science quality and patent value measures. The effect of science quality on patent value remains relevant even when science is linked indirectly through other patents. Our findings imply that what is considered "excellent" within the science sector also leads to outstanding outcomes in the technological or commercial realm.Comment: 44 page

How redeployable are patent assets? Evidence from failed startups

Entrepreneurial firms are important sources of patented inventions. Yet little is known about what happens to patents "released" to the market when startups fail. This study provides a first look at the frequency and speed with which patents originating from failed startups are redeployed to new owners, and whether the value of patents is tied to the original venture and team. The evidence is based on 1,766 U.S. patents issued to 285 venture capital-backed startups that disband between 1988 and 2008 in three innovation-intensive sectors: medical devices, semiconductors, and software. At odds with the view that the resale market for patented inventions is illiquid, we find that most patents from these startups are sold, are sold quickly, and remain "alive" through renewal fee payment long after the startups are shuttered. The patents tend to be purchased by other operating companies in the same sector, and retain value beyond the original venture and team. We do find, however, that the patents and people sometimes move jointly to a new organization following the dissolution of the original venture, and explore the conditions under which such co-movement is more likely. The study provides new evidence on a phenomenon-of active markets for buying and selling patents-underexplored in the strategy literature and consequential for both entrepreneurial and established firms.Accepted manuscrip

Post-Issue Patent "Quality Control": A Comparative Study of US Patent Re-examinations and European Patent Oppositions

We report the results of the first comparative study of the determinants and effects of patent oppositions in Europe and of re- examinations on corresponding patents issued in the United States. The analysis is based on a dataset consisting of matched EPO and US patents. Our analysis focuses on two broad technology categories - biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors and computer software. Within these fields, we collect data on all EPO patents for which oppositions were filed at the EPO. We also construct a random sample of EPO patents with no opposition in these technologies. We match these EPO patents with the “equivalent” US patents covering the same invention in the United States. Using the matched sample of USPTO and EPO patents, we compare the determinants of opposition and of reexamination. Our results indicate that valuable patents are more likely to be challenged in both jurisdictions. But the rate of opposition at the EPO is more than thirty times higher than the rate of reexamination at the USPTO.

DNA as Patentable Subject Matter and a Narrow Framework for Addressing the Perceived Problems Caused by Gene Patents

Concerns about the alleged harmful effects of gene patents— including hindered research and innovation and impeded patient access to high-quality genetic diagnostic tests—have resulted in overreactions from the public and throughout the legal profession. These overreactions are exemplified by Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, a 2010 case in the Southern District of New York that held that isolated DNA is unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The problem with these responses is that they fail to adequately consider the role that gene patents and patents on similar biomolecules play in facilitating investment in the costly and risky developmental processes required to transform the underlying inventions into marketable products. Accordingly, a more precisely refined solution is advisable. This Note proposes a narrowly tailored set of solutions to address the concerns about gene patents without destroying the incentives for companies to create and commercialize inventions derived from these and similar patents

Renewal of Patents and Government Financing

I apply a survival model to a detailed dataset of Swedish patents to estimate how different factors affect the likelihood of patent renewal. Since the owners know more about the patents than potential external financiers, there is a problem of asymmetric information. To overcome this, Sweden has for a long time relied on government support rather than private venture capital. The empirical results show that patents which have received soft government financing in the R&D-phase have a higher probability of expiring than patents without such financing. But patents that have received more market-oriented government loans during the commercialization phase are renewed for as long as other commercialized patents. This finding indicates that it is the financing terms rather than bad choices of projects that explain the low renewal of patents with government financing.Patents; Renewal; Government Financing; Survival Model

Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment

Many believe the root cause of the patent system’s dysfunction is that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO or Agency) is issuing too many invalid patents that unnecessarily drain consumer welfare. Concerns regarding the Agency’s overgranting tendencies have recently spurred the Supreme Court to take a renewed interest in substantive patent law and have driven Congress to enact the first major patent reform act in over sixty years. Policymakers, however, have been modifying the system in an effort to increase patent quality in the dark. As there exists little to no compelling empirical evidence the PTO is actually overgranting patents, lawmakers are left trying to fix the patent system without even understanding the root causes of the system’s shortcomings. This Article begins to rectify this deficiency, advancing the conversation along two dimensions. First, it provides a novel theoretical source for a granting bias on the part of the Agency, positing that the inability of the PTO to finally reject a patent application may create an incentive for the resource-constrained Agency to allow additional patents. Second, this Article attempts to explore, through a sophisticated natural experiment framework, whether the Agency is in fact acting on this incentive and overgranting patents. Our findings suggest that the PTO is biased toward allowing patents. Moreover, our results suggest the PTO is targeting its overgranting tendencies toward those patents it stands to benefit from the most—that is, those patent applications directed toward technologies that have historically had high repeat-filing rates, such as information, computer, and health-related technologies. Our findings provide policymakers with much-needed evidence that the PTO is indeed overgranting patents. Our results also suggest that the literature has overlooked a substantial source of Agency bias; hence, recent fixes to improve patent quality will not achieve their desired outcome of extinguishing the PTO’s overgranting proclivities

Patent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation

We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We study the equilibrium innovation activity under three regimes: patents, no-patents and patent pools. Patent pools increase the probability of innovation with respect to patents, but we also find that: (1) their outcome can be replicated by a licensing scheme in which innovators sell complete patent rights, and (2) they are dynamically unstable. We find that none of the above regimes can reach the first or second best. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length.Sequential Innovation, Patent Pools, Anticommons

Financial Patenting in Europe

We take a first look at financial patents at the European Patent Office (EPO). As is the case at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the number of financial patents in Europe has increased significantly in parallel with significant changes in payment and financial systems. Scholars have argued that financial patents, like other business methods patents, have low value and are owned for strategic reasons rather than for protecting real inventions. We find that established firms in non-financial sectors with diversified patent portfolios own a large share of financial patents at the EPO. However, new specialized technology providers in the financial area also hold a number of such patents. Decisions on the financial patent applications take longer and they are more likely to be refused by the patent office, suggesting greater uncertainty over validity than for other patents. They are also more likely to be opposed, which is consistent with the fact that their other economic value indicators are higher.market valuation, intangible assets, patents, software, Europe

Venture Capital and Innovation in Europe

This paper examines the direction of causality between Venture Capital (VC) and innovation (proxied by patents) in Europe. We test whether causality runs from patents to VC by estimating a linear dynamic panel model and causality from VC to patents by estimating a panel count model. Evidence from a European sample indicates that causality runs from patents to VC suggesting that, in Europe, innovation seems to create a demand for VC and not VC a supply of innovation. In this sense, innovative ideas seem to lack more than funds in EuropeVenture Capital; Dynamic Panel Data; Innovation; Patents

The market value of blocking patent citations.

There is a growing literature that aims at assessing the private value of knowledge assets and patents. It has been shown that patents and their quality as measured by citations received by future patents contribute significantly to the market value of firms beyond their R&D stocks. This paper goes one step further and distinguishes between different types of forward citations patents can receive at the European Patent Office. While a patent can be cited as non-infringing state of the art, it can also be cited because it threatens the novelty of patent applications (“blocking citations”). Empirical results from a market value model for a sample of large, R&D-intensive U.S., European and Japanese firms show that patents frequently cited as blocking references have a higher economic value for their owners than patents cited for nonblocking reasons. This finding adds to the patent value literature by showing that different types of patent citations carry different information on the economic value of patents. The result further suggests that the total number of forward citations can be an imprecise measure of patent value.market value; patents; citations; patent value;