1 research outputs found
Passive network evolution promotes group welfare in complex networks
The Parrondo's paradox is a counterintuitive phenomenon in which individually
losing strategies, canonically termed game A and game B, are combined to
produce winning outcomes. In this paper, a co-evolution of game dynamics and
network structure is adopted to study adaptability and survivability in
multi-agent dynamics. The model includes action A, representing a rewiring
process on the network, and a two-branch game B, representing redistributive
interactions between agents. Simulation results indicate that stochastically
mixing action A and game B can produce enhanced, and even winning outcomes,
despite gameB being individually losing. In other words, a Parrondo-type
paradox can be achieved, but unlike canonical variants, the source of agitation
is provided by passive network evolution instead of an active second game. The
underlying paradoxical mechanism is analyzed, revealing that the rewiring
process drives a topology shift from initial regular lattices towards
scale-free characteristics, and enables exploitative behavior that grants
enhanced access to the favourable branch of game B.Comment: 15 pages, 9 figure