960 research outputs found
Automated Website Fingerprinting through Deep Learning
Several studies have shown that the network traffic that is generated by a
visit to a website over Tor reveals information specific to the website through
the timing and sizes of network packets. By capturing traffic traces between
users and their Tor entry guard, a network eavesdropper can leverage this
meta-data to reveal which website Tor users are visiting. The success of such
attacks heavily depends on the particular set of traffic features that are used
to construct the fingerprint. Typically, these features are manually engineered
and, as such, any change introduced to the Tor network can render these
carefully constructed features ineffective. In this paper, we show that an
adversary can automate the feature engineering process, and thus automatically
deanonymize Tor traffic by applying our novel method based on deep learning. We
collect a dataset comprised of more than three million network traces, which is
the largest dataset of web traffic ever used for website fingerprinting, and
find that the performance achieved by our deep learning approaches is
comparable to known methods which include various research efforts spanning
over multiple years. The obtained success rate exceeds 96% for a closed world
of 100 websites and 94% for our biggest closed world of 900 classes. In our
open world evaluation, the most performant deep learning model is 2% more
accurate than the state-of-the-art attack. Furthermore, we show that the
implicit features automatically learned by our approach are far more resilient
to dynamic changes of web content over time. We conclude that the ability to
automatically construct the most relevant traffic features and perform accurate
traffic recognition makes our deep learning based approach an efficient,
flexible and robust technique for website fingerprinting.Comment: To appear in the 25th Symposium on Network and Distributed System
Security (NDSS 2018
TOWARDS VIDEO FINGERPRINTING ATTACKS OVER TOR
As web users resort to adopting encrypted networks like Tor to protect their anonymity online, adversaries find new ways to collect their private information. Since videos over the internet are a major source of recruitment, training, incitement to commit acts of terrorism, and more, this project envisions developing a machine learning algorithm that can help the Department of Defense find terrorists who take advantage of the dark web to help promote extremist ideology. This thesis describes the steps for training a machine learning classifier in a closed-world scenario to predict YouTube video patterns over an encrypted network like Tor. Our results suggest an adversary may predict the video that a user downloads over Tor with up to 92% accuracy, or may predict the length of a video with error as low as 5.3s. Similar to known website fingerprinting attacks, we show that Tor is susceptible to video fingerprinting, suggesting that Tor does not provide the level of anonymity as previously thought.Lieutenant Commander, United States NavyApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited
Information Leakage Attacks and Countermeasures
The scientific community has been consistently working on the pervasive problem of information leakage, uncovering numerous attack vectors, and proposing various countermeasures. Despite these efforts, leakage incidents remain prevalent, as the complexity of systems and protocols increases, and sophisticated modeling methods become more accessible to adversaries. This work studies how information leakages manifest in and impact interconnected systems and their users. We first focus on online communications and investigate leakages in the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS). Using modern machine learning models, we show that an eavesdropping adversary can efficiently exploit meta-information (e.g., packet size) not protected by the TLS’ encryption to launch fingerprinting attacks at an unprecedented scale even under non-optimal conditions. We then turn our attention to ultrasonic communications, and discuss their security shortcomings and how adversaries could exploit them to compromise anonymity network users (even though they aim to offer a greater level of privacy compared to TLS). Following up on these, we delve into physical layer leakages that concern a wide array of (networked) systems such as servers, embedded nodes, Tor relays, and hardware cryptocurrency wallets. We revisit location-based side-channel attacks and develop an exploitation neural network. Our model demonstrates the capabilities of a modern adversary but also presents an inexpensive tool to be used by auditors for detecting such leakages early on during the development cycle. Subsequently, we investigate techniques that further minimize the impact of leakages found in production components. Our proposed system design distributes both the custody of secrets and the cryptographic operation execution across several components, thus making the exploitation of leaks difficult
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