Supersymmetric quantum mechanics living on topologically nontrivial Riemann surfaces

Supersymmetric quantum mechanics is constructed in a new non-Hermitian representation. Firstly, the map between the partner operators $H^{(\pm)}$ is chosen antilinear. Secondly, both these components of a super-Hamiltonian ${\cal H}$ are defined along certain topologically nontrivial complex curves $r^{(\pm)}(x)$ which spread over several Riemann sheets of the wave function. The non-uniqueness of our choice of the map ${\cal T}$ between "tobogganic" partner curves $r^{(+)}(x)$ and $r^{(-)}(x)$ is emphasized.Comment: 14p

Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities

This study investigates the choice between complementary and parallel alliances in a market with vertical and horizontal externalities. One composite goods firm competes with two components producers, each providing a complementary component of a differentiated com- posite good. Although the joint profits from a parallel alliance between the composite goods firm and a components producer are always larger than those from a complementary alliance between components producers, through Nash bargaining, a components producer prefers the complementary (parallel) alliance when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large (small). Combined with the result that a complementary alliance is socially preferable, our findings provide meaningful implications for antitrust policy.Complementary alliance; Parallel alliance; Nash bargaining; Antitrust policy

Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners

This article extends the traditional iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) with round-robin partner matching by permitting players to choose and refuse partners in each iteration on the basis of continually updated expected payoffs. Comparative computer experiments are reported that indicate the introduction of partner choice and refusal accelerates the emergence of mutual cooperation in the IPD relative to round-robin partner matching. Moreover, in contrast to findings for round-robin partner matching (in which the average payoffs of the players tend to be either clustered around the mutual cooperation payoff or widely scattered), the average payoff scores of the players with choice and refusal of partners tend to cluster into two or more distinct narrow bands. Preliminary analytical and computational sensitivity studies are also reported for several key parameters. Related work can be accessed here: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/tnghome.htmiterated prisoner's dilemma; preferential partner selection; evolutionary game theory

A Joint Econometric Model of Marriage and Partner Choice

OLS estimates of partner choice equations are biased when the unobservables determining partner choice are correlated with the unobservables determining the likelihood of marriage. This paper presents an example. A theoretical model generates a two-equation empirical model in which unobserverables are correlated a priori. Estimates of the model using data from the PSID indicate that men and women select positively into marriage. OLS estimates of the effects of education and race (black relative to white) on partner's education are biased downward.

Alliance or acquisition? A mechanisms‐based, policy‐capturing analysis

Research summary: While alliance researchers view prior partner‐specific alliance experience as influencing firms' subsequent alliance or acquisition decisions, empirical evidence on the alliance versus acquisition decision is surprisingly mixed. We offer a reconciliation by proposing and testing an analytical framework that recognizes prior partner‐specific experiences as heterogeneous along three fundamental dimensions: partner‐specific trust, routines, and value certainty. This allows us to use a policy‐capturing methodology to rigorously operationalize and test our mechanism‐level predictions. We find that all three mechanisms can increase the likelihood of a subsequent alliance or acquisition, and in terms of the comparative choice between alliances versus acquisitions, partner‐specific trust pulls towards alliances, and value certainty pulls towards acquisitions. We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and empirical implications of our approach and method. Managerial summary: This study focuses on an important corporate decision: When a firm has had an alliance with another firm, how would that experience affect the likelihood of a future alliance or acquisition with that same firm? We first suggest that it will depend on three factors: the level of trust that existed in that prior alliance, the extent to which specific work routines were developed, and the degree to which the firm was able to confidently assess the value of the partner firm's resources. We then find that trust is a particularly strong predictor of future alliances, while confidence regarding value more strongly predicts future acquisitions. In this way, we demonstrate more precisely how past corporate choices can affect (consciously or unconsciously) future ones

General sGoldstino Inflation

We prove that all inflationary models, including those with dark energy after the end of inflation, can be embedded in minimal supergravity with a single chiral superfield. Moreover, the amount of supersymmetry breaking is independently tunable due to a degeneracy in the choice for the superpotential. The inflaton is a scalar partner of the Goldstino in this set-up. We illustrate our general procedure with two examples that are favoured by the Planck data.Comment: 6 pages, 6 figures; v2: refs added, published versio