Aggregate party identification in Germany: the effects of consumer confidence and government approval.

Partisanship has been the object of extensive scholarly attention. Because individual partisanship seemed relatively stable and insensitive to short term forces, aggregate partisanship was long thought to display no meaningful variation. This view was challenged by MacKuen et al. (1989), who found that aggregate partisanship in the United States is a¤ected by consumer con…dence and presidential approval. This paper studies aggregate party identi…cation in Germany, and how it has evolved in the past thirty years. Speci…cally, we analyze the impact of consumer con…dence and government approval on party identi…cation. We conclude that rises in consumer con…dence and government approval do indeed lead to increases in identi…cation with the main governing parties.

Partisanship at the Origins of Modern Capitalist Institutions

Analyses that gauge the relationship of partisanship to economic outcomes nearly always focus on the level of partisanship, and changes to it, at a time concurrent to the outcomes. However, partisanship at the time an institution was established may correspond more strongly to modern economic outcomes than contemporary partisanship measures. To test this argument, I develop a measure of partisanship at the time that modern capitalist institutions were created. Tests reveal that this measure correlates more strongly to many modern economic outcomes than more contemporary measures of partisanship, suggesting that other economic outcomes may be usefully reexamined in light of the partisanship that existed when the initial institutional bargains were struck.political economy; financial institutions; economic history; capitalism

Micro-bias and macro-performance

We use agent-based modeling to investigate the effect of conservatism and partisanship on the efficiency with which large populations solve the density classification task--a paradigmatic problem for information aggregation and consensus building. We find that conservative agents enhance the populations' ability to efficiently solve the density classification task despite large levels of noise in the system. In contrast, we find that the presence of even a small fraction of partisans holding the minority position will result in deadlock or a consensus on an incorrect answer. Our results provide a possible explanation for the emergence of conservatism and suggest that even low levels of partisanship can lead to significant social costs.Comment: 11 pages, 5 figure

Litigating State Interests: Attorneys General as Amici

An important strain of federalism scholarship locates the primary value of federalism in how it carves up the political landscape, allowing groups that are out of power at the national level to flourish—and, significantly, to govern—in the states. On that account, partisanship, rather than a commitment to state authority as such, motivates state actors to act as checks on federal power. Our study examines partisan motivation in one area where state actors can, and do, advocate on behalf of state power: the Supreme Court. We compiled data on state amicus filings in Supreme Court cases from the 1979–2013 Terms and linked it up with data on the partisanship of state attorneys general (AGs). Focusing only on merits-stage briefs, we looked at each AG’s partisan affiliation and the partisanship of the AGs who either joined, or explicitly opposed, her briefs. If partisanship drives amicus activity, then we should see a strong negative relationship between the partisanship of AGs opposing each other and a strong positive relationship between those who cosign briefs. What we found was somewhat surprising. States agreed far more often than they disagreed, and—until recently—most multistate briefs represented bipartisan, not partisan, coalitions of AGs. Indeed, for the first twenty years of our study, the cosigners of these briefs were generally indistinguishable from a random sampling of AGs then in office. The picture changes after 2000, when the coalitions of cosigners become decidedly more partisan, particularly among Republican AGs. The partisanship picture is also different for the 6% of cases in which different states square off in opposing briefs. In those cases, AGs do tend to join together in partisan clusters. Here, too, the appearance of partisanship becomes stronger after the mid-1990s

Merton and the Hot Tub: Scientific Conventions and Expert Evidence in Australian Civil Procedure

Recently in Australia, common-law judges began to modify the way expert evidence is prepared and presented. Judges from a range of civil jurisdictions have conscientiously sought to reduce expert partisanship and the extent of expert disagreement in an attempt to enhance procedural efficiency and improve access to justice. One of these reforms, concurrent evidence, enables expert witnesses to participate in a joint session with considerable testimonial latitude. This represents a shift away from an adversarial approach and a conscientious attempt to foster scientific values and norms. Here, Edmond describes how changes to Australian civil procedure, motivated by judicial concerns about the prevalence of partisanship among expert witnesses, may have been enfeebled because they were based upon enduring scientific conventions such as the ethos of science

Partisan Divide: Favorability of NH Congressional Delegation 2/16/17

Favorability of New Hampshire\u27s Congressional delegation remains closely tied to partisanship. Jeanne Shaheen remains the most popular elected official in the state while Granite Staters\u27 opinion of her newly-elected Senate colleague Maggie Hassan remains divided after her narrow victory last November

What’s the Difference Between a Donkey and an Elephant? Using Panel Data from US States to Estimate the Impact of Partisanship on Policy Settings and Economic Outcomes

Using panel data from US states, I measure the impact of partisanship on a wide range of different policy settings and economic outcomes. Across 32 measures, there are surprisingly few differences in policy settings, social outcomes and economic outcomes under Democrats and Republicans. In terms of policies, Democratic Governors tend to prefer slightly higher minimum wages and more redistributive taxes. Under Republican Governors, incarceration rates are higher, while welfare caseloads are higher under Democratic Governors. In terms of social and economic outcomes, Democratic Governors tend to preside over higher median post-tax income, lower post-tax inequality, and lower unemployment rates. However, for 25 of the 32 dependent variables, gubernatorial partisanship does not have a statistically significant impact on policy outcomes and social welfare. I find no evidence of gubernatorial partisan differences in welfare generosity, the number of government employees or their salaries, state revenue, incarceration rates, execution rates, pre-tax incomes and inequality, crime rates, suicide rates, and test scores. These results are robust to the use of regression discontinuity estimation, to take account of the possibility of reverse causality. Overall, it seems that Governors behave in a fairly non-ideological manner.median voter theorem, partisanship, state government, taxation, expenditure, welfare, crime, growth

Concentrated burdens: how self-interest and partisanship shape opinion on opioid treatment policy

When does self-interest influence public opinion on contentious public policies? The bulk of theory in political science suggests that self-interest is only a minor force in public opinion. Using nationally representative survey data, we show how financial and spatial self-interest and partisanship all shape public opinion on opioid treatment policy. We find that a majority of respondents support a redistributive funding model for treatment programs, while treatment funded by taxation based on a community’s overdose rate is less popular. Moreover, financial self-interest cross-pressures lower-income Republicans, closing the partisan gap in support by more than half. We also experimentally test how the spatial burden of siting treatment clinics alters policy preferences. People across the political spectrum are less supportive when construction of a clinic is proposed closer to their home. These results highlight how partisanship and self-interest interact in shaping preferences on public policy with concentrated burdens.Accepted manuscrip