Analyzing the incentives of the voluntary development of Open Source Softwares : An approach from the theory of public good provision

研究成果の概要 (和文) : オープン・ソース・ソフトウェア(OSS)は、公共財であるにも関わらず、その開発には、多くの技術者が自発的に参加し、高い品質で供給が行われている。本研究の目的は、公共財であるOSSの供給に、なぜ、多くの技術者が自発的に参加するのかを、公共財供給モデルを用いて明らかにすることである。多くのOSSに共通する性質として、(1)コンピューター(私的財)とOSS(公共財)の間の機能面での補完性、(2)OSSに付加可能な機能の多様性、の二点に注目して、これらの性質がただ乗りインセンティブを打ち消す程に十分な自発的な公共財供給インセンティブを与える可能性について検証した。研究成果の概要 (英文) : In the real world, there are many voluntary projects to develop Open Source Softwares (OSS) in which many software developers participate and by the voluntary development activities, many high-quality OSS are provided. However, since OSS satisfy the properties of nonrivalry and nonexcludability of consumption, they are public goods. According to the standard theory of public goods, public good provision suffers from the free-rider problem and public goods are under-provided. The standard theory seemingly cannot explain the phenomena of OSS development. We address why many high-quality OSS are provided although they are public goods through the public good provision theory. We show that, to some extent, the strong complementarity between OSS and its applications and multifunctionality of OSS have a role to intensify the incentive of voluntary contribution to OSS

Undertaking nonharmful or harmful public projects through unit-by-unit contribution : Coordination and Pareto efficiency

We examine in detail the implementation of a project that is nonharmful for all agents as well as a project that is harmful for some agents through a unit-by-unit contribution mechanism. For a project that is nonharmful for all agents, effient implementation is supported at one regular Nash equilibrium and several refined Nash equilibria that are stable against coalition deviations. In this sense, this mechanism works well. On the other hand, when the project is harmful for some agents, this mechanism may not have a Nash equilibrium with effient implementation of the project. Even when such a Nash equilibrium exists, it may not be selected by any of the refned Nash equilibria. Thus, in this case, this mechanism does not work. Our result shows that the merit of the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism reported in the literature is partially extensible to the implementation of a public project

Undertaking nonharmful or harmful public projects through unit-by-unit contribution : Coordination and Pareto efficiency

We examine in detail the implementation of a project that is nonharmful for all agents as well as a project that is harmful for some agents through a unit-by-unit contribution mechanism. For a project that is nonharmful for all agents, efficient implementation is supported at one regular Nash equilibrium and several refined Nash equilibria that are stable against coalition deviations. In this sense, this mechanism works well. On the other hand, when the project is harmful for some agents, this mechanism may not have a Nash equilibrium with efficient implementation of the project. Even when such a Nash equilibrium exists, it may not be selected by any of the refined Nash equilibria. Thus, in this case, this mechanism does not work. Our result shows that the merit of the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism reported in the literature is partially extensible to the implementation of a public project