140,657 research outputs found

    Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction

    Get PDF
    This essay is the introduction for a collection of papers by the two of us on "Robust Mechanism Design" to be published by World Scientific Publishing. The appendix of this essay lists the chapters of the book. The objective of this introductory essay is to provide the reader with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers. The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, the single unit auction with interdependent values. In addition, we include an extended discussion about the role of alternative assumptions about type spaces in our work and the literature, in order to explain the common logic of the informational robustness approach that unifies the work in this volume.Mechanism design, Robust mechanism design, Common knowledge, Universal type space, Interim equilibrium, Ex post equilibrium, Dominant strategies, Rationalizability, Partial implementation, Full implementation, Robust implementation

    Strategy Logic with Imperfect Information

    Full text link
    We introduce an extension of Strategy Logic for the imperfect-information setting, called SLii, and study its model-checking problem. As this logic naturally captures multi-player games with imperfect information, the problem turns out to be undecidable. We introduce a syntactical class of "hierarchical instances" for which, intuitively, as one goes down the syntactic tree of the formula, strategy quantifications are concerned with finer observations of the model. We prove that model-checking SLii restricted to hierarchical instances is decidable. This result, because it allows for complex patterns of existential and universal quantification on strategies, greatly generalises previous ones, such as decidability of multi-player games with imperfect information and hierarchical observations, and decidability of distributed synthesis for hierarchical systems. To establish the decidability result, we introduce and study QCTL*ii, an extension of QCTL* (itself an extension of CTL* with second-order quantification over atomic propositions) by parameterising its quantifiers with observations. The simple syntax of QCTL* ii allows us to provide a conceptually neat reduction of SLii to QCTL*ii that separates concerns, allowing one to forget about strategies and players and focus solely on second-order quantification. While the model-checking problem of QCTL*ii is, in general, undecidable, we identify a syntactic fragment of hierarchical formulas and prove, using an automata-theoretic approach, that it is decidable. The decidability result for SLii follows since the reduction maps hierarchical instances of SLii to hierarchical formulas of QCTL*ii

    Variations on the Theme of Conning in Mathematical Economics

    Get PDF
    The mathematization of economics is almost exclusively in terms of the mathematics of real analysis which, in turn, is founded on set theory (and the axiom of choice) and orthodox mathematical logic. In this paper I try to point out that this kind of mathematization is replete with economic infelicities. The attempt to extract these infelicities is in terms of three main examples: dynamics, policy and rational expectations and learning. The focus is on the role and reliance on standard xed point theorems in orthodox mathematical economics

    When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives?

    Get PDF
    Citizens use the initiative process to make new laws. Many winning initiatives, however, are altered or ignored after Election Day. We examine why this is, paying particular attention to several widely-ignored properties of the post-election phase of the initiative process. One such property is the fact that initiative implementation can require numerous governmental actors to comply with an initiative’s policy instructions. Knowing such properties, the question then becomes: When do governmental actors comply with winning initiatives? We clarify when compliance is full, partial, or not at all. Our findings provide a template for scholars and observers to better distinguish cases where governmental actors\u27 policy preferences replace initiative content as a determinant of a winning initiative\u27s policy impact from cases where an initiative’s content affects policy despite powerful opponents’ objections. Our work implies that the consequences of this form of democracy are more predictable, but less direct, than often presumed

    The game semantics of game theory

    Get PDF
    We use a reformulation of compositional game theory to reunite game theory with game semantics, by viewing an open game as the System and its choice of contexts as the Environment. Specifically, the system is jointly controlled by n0n \geq 0 noncooperative players, each independently optimising a real-valued payoff. The goal of the system is to play a Nash equilibrium, and the goal of the environment is to prevent it. The key to this is the realisation that lenses (from functional programming) form a dialectica category, which have an existing game-semantic interpretation. In the second half of this paper, we apply these ideas to build a compact closed category of `computable open games' by replacing the underlying dialectica category with a wave-style geometry of interaction category, specifically the Int-construction applied to the cartesian monoidal category of directed-complete partial orders
    corecore