The Choice of Institutions

Verfassung, Wahlsystem, Politische Partei, Constitution, Electoral system , Political party

Storable Votes: Giving Voice to Minority Preferences without Sacrificing Efficiency

Wahlverhalten, Wahlsystem, Minderheit, Politische Partei, Voting behaviour, Electoral system, Minority, Political party

An Economic Theory of Constitutional Choice

Verfassung, Wahlsystem, Politische Partei, Einkommensverteilung, Constitution, Electoral system, Political party, Income distribution

Party cues and yardstick voting

Politicians within any given party generally exhibit a degree similarity in terms of (political) viewpoints. Moreover, they are often constrained to follow general party lines on certain policy issues. Finally, they may be more likely to mimic one another than politicians from another party. Hence, parties provide important cues on how politicians will act once elected. The present paper assesses the implications of such party cues for the traditional model of yardstick voting (where voters use what they observe in neighbouring jurisdictions to judge the performance of their incumbent). It is shown that the information content of what happens in neighbouring jurisdictions differs depending on whether or not the same party governs this jurisdiction. More specifically, we find that voters might still take neighbouring jurisdictions into account, but should distinguish between jurisdictions where the same or a different party is in power. The results of the model are in line with recent empirical observations in Sweden and the United States. -- Politiker einer beliebigen Partei zeigen gewöhnlich Ähnlichkeiten bezüglich (politischer) Ansichten. Zudem sind sie in bestimmten Politikfeldern oft abhängig von Grundsätzen ihrer Partei. Letztlich übernehmen sie Standpunkte eher untereinander als von Politikern anderer Parteien. Daher liefern Parteien wichtige Hinweise wie Politiker nach ihrer Wahl handeln werden. Das vorliegende Papier beurteilt die Auswirkungen solcher Informationen über die Partei auf das bekannte „Yardstick Voting“ Modell (Wähler nutzen ihre Beobachtungen aus benachbarten Regionen zur Beurteilung ihrer eigenen Regierung). Es wird gezeigt, dass der Informationsgehalt der Ereignisse in Nachbarregionen stark davon abhängt, ob dieselbe Partei die Regierung stellt. Genauer gesagt, Wähler können andere Regionen bei ihren Entscheidungen berücksichtigen, jedoch sollten sie zwischen solchen mit derselben und mit einer anderen Partei in der Regierungsverantwortung differenzieren. Die Ergebnisse des Modells decken sich mit jüngsten Beobachtungen in Schweden und den Vereinigten Staaten.Yardstick voting,spatial interaction,party labels,party cues

Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics

This paper examines the effect of inefficient redistribution in Myerson’s (1993) model of redistributive politics. Regardless of the absolute levels of the efficiency of political parties’ transfers to different voter segments, parties have incentive to (stochastically) shift resources away from voter segments with large relative efficiency gaps between the two parties’ transfers towards voter segments with smaller relative efficiency gaps. Because of this dependence on relative, and not absolute, levels of efficiency, the parties’ optimal strategies may lead to large discrepancies between the sum of the budgetary transfers and the sum of the effective transfers. At the extreme, in the spirit of Magee, Brock, and Young (1989), we obtain „black hole” inefficiency. When the model is extended to allow for loyal voter segments and loyalty to a party is positively related to the efficiency of that party’s transfers to the segment, the incentives leading to black hole inefficiency become even stronger. -- Diese Arbeit untersucht die Auswirkung von ineffizienter Umverteilungspolitk im Rahmen des Modells von Myerson (1993). Parteien versuchen, Wählersegmente für sich zu gewinnen, indem sie ihnen Transferzahlungen zusagen. Einzelne Wählersegmente unterscheiden sich in der Effizienz, mit der sich die Transferzahlungen einer bestimmten Partei in einen resultierenden Nutzengewinn für den Wähler übersetzen. Für die Parteien entsteht ein Anreiz, (stochastisch) Ressourcen hin zu Wählersegmenten zu verlagern, bei denen die Transfers von zwei verschiedenen Parteien einen relativ kleinen Unterschied in ihrem Effizienzniveau aufweisen, ungeachtet des absoluten Effizienzniveaus der Transferzahlung. Aufgrund dieser Abhängigkeit von relativen und nicht absoluten Effizienzniveaus können die Gleichgewichtsstrategien der Parteien zu großen Unterschieden zwischen der Summe der getätigten Transfers und der Summe der effektiv erhaltenen Transfers führen. Im Extremfall erhalten wir „black hole“-Ineffizienz wie in Magee, Brock und Young (1989). Eine Erweiterung des Modells um loyale Wählersegmente, bei der Loyalität zu einer Partei in positivem Bezug zur Effizienz der von dieser Partei erhaltenen Transfers steht, verstärkt die Anreize, die zu „black hole“-Ineffizienz führen.Redistributive politics,redistribution,inefficiency

The Alternative for Germany’s radicalization in historical-comparative perspective

This article chronicles the AfD’s rightward repositioning and compares it with the programmatic development of three postwar German parties on the ideological wings. By highlighting factors that tilt the balance of power away from moderate reformers towards hardliners, this comparative analysis sheds light on the conditions that lead a relatively successful party on the ideological wings, such as the AfD, to radicalize its programme. Four variables stand out: whether party hardliners take the blame for the recent election loss; whether they offer a convincing programmatic and strategic alternative to the reformers; whether changes in party composition strengthen hardliners; and whether external factors enhance their weight within the party. The essay concludes that the AfD’s radicalization was unusual, but not exceptional. It is however too early to conclude that the Federal Republic’s distinctive institutions and political culture no longer impose significant costs on parties that shift their programmes away from the centre

The new face of digital populism

Populist parties and movements are now a force to be reckoned with in many Western European countries. These groups are known for their opposition to immigration, their ‘anti-establishment’ views and their concern for protecting national culture. Their rise in popularity has gone hand-in-hand with the advent of social media, and they are adept at using new technology to amplify their message, recruit and organise. The online social media following for many of these parties dwarfs the formal membership, consisting of tens of thousands of sympathisers and supporters. This mélange of virtual and real political activity is the way millions of people — especially young people — relate to politics in the 21st century. This is the first quantitative investigation into these digital populists, based on over 10,000 survey responses from 12 countries. It includes data on who they are, what they think and what motivates them to shift from virtual to real-world activism. It also provides new insight into how populism — and politics and political engagement more generally — is changing as a result of social media. The New Face of Digital Populism calls on mainstream politicians to respond and address concerns over immigration and cultural identity without succumbing to xenophobic solutions. People must be encouraged to become actively involved in political and civic life, whatever their political persuasion — it is important to engage and debate forcefully with these parties and their supporters, not shut them out as beyond the pale

Neue Führung, alte Probleme –der Generationswechsel an Chinas politischer Spitze/New management, old problems - Generational change in China. Asia Policy Brief 2012/03, December 2012

Mit dem Ende des 18. Parteitags der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas (KPCh) Mitte November kam auch die erste Phase des chinesische Führungswechsels zum Abschluss. Die wichtigste Aufgabe der Partei während dieser Phase war es, den ständigen Ausschuss des Politbüros, also das oberste beschlussfassende Organ der Partei, zu wählen. Zusätzlich zur Ernennung von sieben Spitzenpolitikern umfasst der Wechsel auch die Wahl eines neuen Politbüros und des Zentralkomitees als Vertretung der 83 Millionen Parteimitglieder

The PDS tests the West: the party of Democratic Socialism's campaign to become a Pan-German socialist party

Since German reunification the post-communist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) has been widely regarded as the articulator of eastern German interests within the political system of the Federal Republic. However, the party's leadership does not want it to be merely a regional interest party, but a 'modern socialist party' with nationwide support. It faces difficulties in this, however, associated with its perceived identity as an 'eastern', leftist party, and its ability to attract largely idealist leftist supporters in the west. The reunited city of western Berlin provides the PDS with a testing-ground for its strategies for western expansion in general. However, the party is unlikely to achieve a breakthrough in the west of Germany unless it abandons its self-proclaimed special responsibility to serve eastern interests. Furthermore, an east-west conflict prevails within the PDS which has both cultural and ideological dimensions, and this could prove divisive in such a heterogeneous party