3,060 research outputs found
A duopoly model with heterogeneous congestion-sensitive customers
This paper analyzes a model with multiple firms (providers), and two classes of customers. These customers classes are characterized by their attitude towards `congestion' (caused by other customers using the same resources); a firm is selected on the basis of both the prices charged by the firms, and the `congestion levels'. The model can be represented by a two-stage game: in the first providers set their prices, whereas in the second the customers choose the provider (or to not use any service at all) for given prices. We explicitly allow the providers to split their resources, in order to serve more than just one market segment. This enables us to further analyze the Paris metro pricing ({\sc Pmp}) proposal for service differentiation in the Internet. \u
On Optimal Service Differentiation in Congested Network Markets
As Internet applications have become more diverse in recent years, users
having heavy demand for online video services are more willing to pay higher
prices for better services than light users that mainly use e-mails and instant
messages. This encourages the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to explore
service differentiations so as to optimize their profits and allocation of
network resources. Much prior work has focused on the viability of network
service differentiation by comparing with the case of a single-class service.
However, the optimal service differentiation for an ISP subject to resource
constraints has remained unsolved. In this work, we establish an optimal
control framework to derive the analytical solution to an ISP's optimal service
differentiation, i.e. the optimal service qualities and associated prices. By
analyzing the structures of the solution, we reveal how an ISP should adjust
the service qualities and prices in order to meet varying capacity constraints
and users' characteristics. We also obtain the conditions under which ISPs have
strong incentives to implement service differentiation and whether regulators
should encourage such practices
Market driven network neutrality and the fallacies of internet traffic quality regulation
In the U.S. paying for priority arrangements between Internet access service providers and Internet application providers to favor some traffic over other traffic is considered unreasonable discrimination. In Europe the focus is on minimum traffic quality requirements. It can be shown that neither market power nor universal service arguments can justify traffic quality regulation. In particular, heterogeneous demand for traffic quality for delay sensitive versus delay insensitive applications requires traffic quality differentiation, priority pricing and evolutionary development of minimal traffic qualities.
Market driven network neutrality and the fallacies of Internet traffic quality regulation
In the U.S. paying for priority arrangements between Internet access service providers and Internet application providers to favor some traffic over other traf-fic is considered unreasonable discrimination. In Europe the focus is on mini-mum traffic quality requirements. It can be shown that neither market power nor universal service arguments can justify traffic quality regulation. In particular, heterogeneous demand for traffic quality for delay sensitive versus delay insen-sitive applications requires traffic quality differentiation, priority pricing and evolutionary development of minimal traffic qualities. --
Pricing differentiated brokered internet services
Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as the intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players at each level, compete in a Bertrand game, while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providers' level. Numerical examples demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.http://www.cs.bu.edu/fac/matta/Papers/sdp2016.pdfAccepted manuscrip
The effect of competition among brokers on the quality and price of differentiated internet services
Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in (virtualized) service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as the intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players, i.e. providers and brokers, at each level compete in a Bertrand game while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providers' level. Numerical simulations demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.This work has been partly supported by National Science Foundation awards: CNS-0963974, CNS-1346688, CNS-1536090 and CNS-1647084
Power-Law Distributions in a Two-sided Market and Net Neutrality
"Net neutrality" often refers to the policy dictating that an Internet
service provider (ISP) cannot charge content providers (CPs) for delivering
their content to consumers. Many past quantitative models designed to determine
whether net neutrality is a good idea have been rather equivocal in their
conclusions. Here we propose a very simple two-sided market model, in which the
types of the consumers and the CPs are {\em power-law distributed} --- a kind
of distribution known to often arise precisely in connection with
Internet-related phenomena. We derive mostly analytical, closed-form results
for several regimes: (a) Net neutrality, (b) social optimum, (c) maximum
revenue by the ISP, or (d) maximum ISP revenue under quality differentiation.
One unexpected conclusion is that (a) and (b) will differ significantly, unless
average CP productivity is very high
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