Handling Inconsistency in Knowledge Bases

Real-world automated reasoning systems, based on classical logic, face logically inconsistent information, and they must cope with it. It is onerous to develop such systems because classical logic is explosive. Recently, progress has been made towards semantics that deal with logical inconsistency. However, such semantics was never analyzed in the aspect of inconsistency tolerant relational model. In our research work, we use an inconsistency and incompleteness tolerant relational model called Paraconsistent Relational Model. The paraconsistent relational model is an extension of the ordinary relational model that can store, not only positive information but also negative information. Therefore, a piece of information in the paraconsistent relational model has four truth values: true, false, both, and unknown. However, the paraconsistent relational model cannot represent disjunctive information (disjunctive tuples). We then introduce an extended paraconsistent relational model called disjunctive paraconsistent relational model. By using both the models, we handle inconsistency - similar to the notion of quasi-classic logic or four-valued logic -- in deductive databases (logic programs with no functional symbols). In addition to handling inconsistencies in extended databases, we also apply inconsistent tolerant reasoning technique in semantic web knowledge bases. Specifically, we handle inconsistency assosciated with closed predicates in semantic web. We use again the paraconsistent approach to handle inconsistency. We further extend the same idea to description logic programs (combination of semantic web and logic programs) and introduce dl-relation to represent inconsistency associated with description logic programs

On formal aspects of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency

This paper reviews the central points and presents some recent developments of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency in terms of the preservation of evidence. Two formal systems are surveyed, the basic logic of evidence (BLE) and the logic of evidence and truth (LET J ), designed to deal, respectively, with evidence and with evidence and truth. While BLE is equivalent to Nelson’s logic N4, it has been conceived for a different purpose. Adequate valuation semantics that provide decidability are given for both BLE and LET J . The meanings of the connectives of BLE and LET J , from the point of view of preservation of evidence, is explained with the aid of an inferential semantics. A formalization of the notion of evidence for BLE as proposed by M. Fitting is also reviewed here. As a novel result, the paper shows that LET J is semantically characterized through the so-called Fidel structures. Some opportunities for further research are also discussed

Relevant Logics Obeying Component Homogeneity

This paper discusses three relevant logics that obey Component Homogeneity - a principle that Goddard and Routley introduce in their project of a logic of significance. The paper establishes two main results. First, it establishes a general characterization result for two families of logic that obey Component Homogeneity - that is, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their consequence relations. From this, we derive characterization results for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Second, the paper establishes complete sequent calculi for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Among the other accomplishments of the paper, we generalize the semantics from Bochvar, Hallden, Deutsch and Daniels, we provide a general recipe to define containment logics, we explore the single-premise/single-conclusion fragment of S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fdeand the connections between crossS*fde and the logic Eq of equality by Epstein. Also, we present S*fde as a relevant logic of meaninglessness that follows the main philosophical tenets of Goddard and Routley, and we briefly examine three further systems that are closely related to our main logics. Finally, we discuss Routley's criticism to containment logic in light of our results, and overview some open issues

Reasoning with Inconsistencies in Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases

This article is concerned with the handling of inconsistencies occurring in the combination of description logics and rules, especially in hybrid MKNF knowledge bases. More precisely, we present a paraconsistent semantics for hybrid MKNF knowledge bases (called para-MKNF knowledge bases) based on four-valued logic as proposed by Belnap. We also reduce this paraconsistent semantics to the stable model semantics via a linear transformation operator, which shows the relationship between the two semantics and indicates that the data complexity in our paradigm is not higher than that of classical reasoning. Moreover, we provide fixpoint operators to compute paraconsistent MKNF models, each suitable to different kinds of rules. At last we present the data complexity of instance checking in different para-MKNF knowledge bases

On the Satisfiability of Quasi-Classical Description Logics

Though quasi-classical description logic (QCDL) can tolerate the inconsistency of description logic in reasoning, a knowledge base in QCDL possibly has no model. In this paper, we investigate the satisfiability of QCDL, namely, QC-coherency and QC-consistency and develop a tableau calculus, as a formal proof, to determine whether a knowledge base in QCDL is QC-consistent. To do so, we repair the standard tableau for DL by introducing several new expansion rules and defining a new closeness condition. Finally, we prove that this calculus is sound and complete. Based on this calculus, we implement an OWL paraconsistent reasoner called QC-OWL. Preliminary experiments show that QC-OWL is highly efficient in checking QC-consistency

Theories of truth based on four-valued infectious logics

Infectious logics are systems that have a truth-value that is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. This paper studies four-valued infectious logics as the basis of transparent theories of truth. This take is motivated as a way to treat different pathological sentences differently, namely, by allowing some of them to be truth-value gluts and some others to be truth-value gaps and as a way to treat the semantic pathology suffered by at least some of these sentences as infectious. This leads us to consider four distinct four-valued logics: one where truth-value gaps are infectious, but gluts are not; one where truth-value gluts are infectious, but gaps are not; and two logics where both gluts and gaps are infectious, in some sense. Additionally, we focus on the proof theory of these systems, by offering a discussion of two related topics. On the one hand, we prove some limitations regarding the possibility of providing standard Gentzen sequent calculi for these systems, by dualizing and extending some recent results for infectious logics. On the other hand, we provide sound and complete four-sided sequent calculi, arguing that the most important technical and philosophical features taken into account to usually prefer standard calculi are, indeed, enjoyed by the four-sided systems