397,633 research outputs found

    Talking about Hillsborough: ‘panic’ as discourse in survivors' accounts of the 1989 football stadium disaster

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    Popular representations of crowd behaviour in disasters are often characterised by irrationalist discourses, in particular ‘mass panic’ despite their rejection by current scientific research. This paper reports an analysis of four survivors' accounts of the 1989 Hillsborough disaster to investigate if and how they used the term ‘panic’. Reference to ‘panic’ occurred frequently, but more detailed analysis found that their accounts did not match the classic criteria for ‘mass panic’ (e.g. uncontrolled emotion and selfish behaviour). Indeed, participants referred to ‘orderly’ behaviour, and cooperation, even when they said the threat of death was present. ‘Panic’ was therefore being used as a description of events that was not consistent. A discourse analysis of usage suggests that participants used ‘panic’ not only to convey feelings of fear and distress but also to apportion culpability towards the actions of the police who they considered responsible for the tragedy (as indeed recent independent research has confirmed). It is concluded that the term ‘panic’ is so deeply embedded in popular discourse that people may use it even when they have reason to reject its irrationalist implications. Alternative discourses that emphasise collective resilience in disasters are suggested

    Cognitive behavior therapy in panic disorder and comorbid major depression - A naturalistic study

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    Background: There is a lack of evidence about the effectiveness of cognitive behavior therapies (CBT) in settings of routine clinical care as well as in the treatment of panic and comorbid disorders. Methods: We investigated a group-oriented CBT approach for 80 patients with panic disorder including 35 patients with current comorbid major depression. Assessments took place 6 months before treatment, at the beginning and end of treatment, and 1 year later. Structured interviews and multiple clinical self-rating scales were used. Results: Panic patients with comorbid major depression showed higher anxiety-specific and nonspecific pathology. The most striking benefits were in reducing avoidance behavior, while improvements concerning catastrophic beliefs were smaller, but still significant. For most self-rating scale results, patients with and without comorbid depression improved to a comparable degree. However, the end-state functioning of patients with panic disorder and current comorbid depression at admission is significantly lower than for patients with panic disorder alone, Conclusions: The results point to the necessity to develop and improve treatment approaches for patients with comorbidity of panic disorder and current major depression. Copyright (C) 2000 S.Karger AG, Basel

    Moral panic and social theory: Beyond the heuristic

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    Copyright @ 2011 by International Sociological Association.Critcher has recently conceptualized moral panic as a heuristic device, or 'ideal type'. While he argues that one still has to look beyond the heuristic, despite a few exceptional studies there has been little utilization of recent developments in social theory in order to look 'beyond moral panic'. Explicating two current critical contributions - the first, drawing from the sociologies of governance and risk; the second, from the process/figurational sociology of Norbert Elias - this article highlights the necessity for the continuous theoretical development of the moral panic concept and illustrates how such development is essential to overcome some of the substantial problems with moral panic research: normativity, temporality and (un) intentionality

    Does the Crisis Experience Call for a New Paradigm in Monetary Policy?

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    This paper shows that the monetary policy paradigm that was in place before the financial crisis worked very well and that the crisis occurred only after policy makers deviated from that paradigm. The paper also evaluates monetary policy during the financial crisis by dividing the crisis into three periods: pre-panic, panic and post-panic. It shows that the extraordinary measures did not work well in the pre-panic or the post-panic periods; instead they helped bring on the panic, even though they may have some positive impact during the panic. The implication of the paper is that the crisis does not call for a new paradigm for monetary policy.financial crisis, monetary policy rule, Taylor rule, quantitative easing

    Fuelling the panic: The societal reaction to boy racers

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    This article is part of the Moral Panic Studies Working Paper Series, edited by Amanda Rohloff of Brunel University. The series disseminates the work of a network of international researchers on all areas of moral panic studies.Fuelled by media coverage of reckless, irresponsible and anti-social driving, young (male) motorists are an area of concern for politicians, police and citizens more generally. In media and popular discourses the symbol of the boy racer has come to represent deviance, anti-social behaviour, criminality and risk on the roads. This paper focuses on a local moral panic concerning boy racers in the city of Aberdeen, Scotland. Five elements, which characterise a moral panic, are identified and include: concern, hostility, consensus, disproportion and volatility (Goode and Ben- Yehuda 2009[1994]). Urban regeneration played a key part in this particular moral panic in terms of class, cultural and intergenerational clashes between racers and outside groups. The moral panic was further institutionalised through the use of measures such as anti-social behaviour legislation. Moreover, it was symptomatic of wider societal concern regarding the regulation of young (male) motorists and the related governance of urban space and incivilities. The discussion draws on data collected via participant observation with the drivers, semi-structured interviews with members of the outside groups and content analysis of media reports which focus on the culture

    Semilogarithmic Nonuniform Vector Quantization of Two-Dimensional Laplacean Source for Small Variance Dynamics

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    In this paper high dynamic range nonuniform two-dimensional vector quantization model for Laplacean source was provided. Semilogarithmic A-law compression characteristic was used as radial scalar compression characteristic of two-dimensional vector quantization. Optimal number value of concentric quantization domains (amplitude levels) is expressed in the function of parameter A. Exact distortion analysis with obtained closed form expressions is provided. It has been shown that proposed model provides high SQNR values in wide range of variances, and overachieves quality obtained by scalar A-law quantization at same bit rate, so it can be used in various switching and adaptation implementations for realization of high quality signal compression

    Contagion and Bank Failures During the Great Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic

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    Studies of pre-Depression banking argue that banking panics resulted from depositor confusion about the incidence of shocks, and that interbank cooperation avoided unwarranted failures. This paper uses individual bank data to address the question of whether solvent Chicago banks failed during the panic asthe result of confusion by depositors. Chicago banks are divided" into three groups: panic failures, failures outside the panic window, and survivors. The characteristics of these three groups are compared to determine whether the banks that failed during the panic were similar ex ante" to those that survived the panic or whether they shared characteristics with other banks that failed. Each category of comparison -- the market-to-book value of equity, the estimated probability or failure or duration of survival the composition of debt, the rates of withdrawal of debt during 1931, and the interest rates paid on debt -- leads to the same conclusion: banks that failed during the panic were similar to others that failed and different from survivors. The special attributes of failing banks were distinguishable at least six months before the panic and were reflected in stock prices, failure probabilities, debt composition, and interest rates at least that far in advance. We conclude that failures during the panic reflected relative weakness in the face of common asset value shock rather than contagion. Other evidence points to cooperation among solvent Chicago banks a key factor in avoiding unwarranted bank failures during the panic.
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