Regulating private pension funds’ structure, performance and investments: cross-country evidence

A number of countries have introduced individual, privately managed defined-contribution accounts, where the value of the pension benefit will depend on accumulated contributions and investment returns. These schemes expose workers’ future pension benefits to a number of different risks. To try to mitigate these risks, reforming governments have often strictly regulated the pension fund management industry’s structure, performance, and asset allocation. Structural regulations often force workers to choose only one manager and one fund. So, workers are unable to diversify investments across funds, exposing them to aberrant behaviour by fund managers, and preventing portfolio adjustments according to the individual’s age, household characteristics, career profile and attitude to risk. Strict asset-allocation rules and relative performance criteria mean that pension funds often invest and perform almost identically, removing any substantive choice for workers over the allocation of their pension fund’s assets and the portfolio’s risk and returns. Concentration in the pension fund management industry is found to be higher in the new pension systems of Latin America and Eastern Europe than in most OECD countries. Concentration might be because the new pension markets are smaller than in countries with more established funded pension systems, but it could also be because of restrictions on industry structure. In Latin America, asset allocation and performance is nearly identical across pension funds. So-called ‘herding’ behaviour is almost a defining characteristics of these pension regimes. Again, this reflects, at least in part, asset allocation restrictions and strict performance regulation. There is also evidence that pension funds have often under-performed simple portfolios composed of market indices of stocks and bonds. All the rules imposed in the new systems of Latin American and Eastern Europe seem to be more stringent than in the OECD, with one exception: portfolio limits. Some OECD countries have a tighter investment regime than countries such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Poland. But OECD countries tend to have fewer barriers to entry and impose fewer constraints on performance than Latin American and Eastern European countries

Regulating private pension funds'structure, performance, and investments : cross-country evidence

Because defined-contribution systems expose pensions to a number of risks, reforming governments have often strictly regulated the pension fund industry's structure, performance, and investments. This paper compares the rules in the new systems of Latin America and Eastern Europe with richer OECD countries. The authors argue that the benefits of competing pension funds and individual choice can only be achieved if regulations are loosened in the medium term.Pensions&Retirement Systems,Non Bank Financial Institutions,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies

Thailand's corporate financing and governance structures

The authors assess Thailand's policy options for reducing large corporations'vulnerability to economic shocks and improving their corporate governance - and for providing smaller firms a more stable funding structure. Using data for firms listed on Thailand's stock exchange, they empirically assess the relative importance of various factors determining the cost of capital, the availability of financing, and policies and distortions that affect corporate governance in nonfinancial firms. The empirical findings highlight weaknesses in corporate governance and the inherent risks in Thailand's corporate financing structures. They conclude that the most important task in improving the structure ofcorporate financing and the framework for corporate governance is to change incentives. This will involve: 1) Accelerating legal reform, including reform of bankruptcy and foreclosure laws. 2) Improving bank monitoring of enterprise management and encouraging banks to develop more arm's-length relationships with firms. This will require greater transparency and disclosure of ownership relationships and stricter enforcement of insider and related lending limits, violation of which contributed poor intermediation and the recent crisis. 3) Improving disclosure and accounting practices. Self-regulatory agencies may need to play more of a role, possibly with more legal power to discipline violators. 4) Better enforcement of corporate governance rules. The formal structure for corporate governance is standard but enforcement is weak. 5) Facilitation of equity infusions. Investors - especially minority shareholders - may need to play a more direct role in monitoring and disciplining managers. To attract new infusions of equity, new equity owners may need more-than-proportional representation on the board of directors until other investor protection mechanisms are strengthened. 6) Improving the framework for corporate governance. A broad public discussion of corporate governance, similar to recent discussions in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, may be needed to clarify the distribution of control in the economy's real sector. 7) Strengthening institutions responsible for gathering and analyzing data on firms of all sizes and for monitoring firm performance and behavior.Financial Intermediation,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Banks&Banking Reform,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Financial Intermediation,Banks&Banking Reform,Microfinance,Small Scale Enterprise,Private Participation in Infrastructure

Board Formation and Its Endogeneity: An Empirical Study of Russian Firms

The statistically typical form of the board of directors in a Russian joint-stock corporation can be characterized as an open managerial supervisory body with a balanced membership of executive corporate officers and outsider directors. In reality, however, there are only a very limited number of Russian firms with this "average" type of corporate boards. The vast majority of Russian joint-stock corporations are either governed by a board of directors with an extremely high outsider directorship or completely dominated by insider directors. Behind this polarization in board composition lie heated struggles for supremacy among management, stockholders, and outsider directors. In stark contrast to corporate systems in developed countries, which ensure effective managerial discipline through the spontaneous systemization of a well-balanced corporate governance structure, those in Russia, which are entrenched by deep-seated mutual distrust between insiders and outsiders, tend to cause excessively time- and energy-consuming conflicts. In this sense, the distinctive adaptability of the bargaining model in transitional Russia reflects the underdevelopment of its social and economic system.Russia, board formation, endogeneity, agency theory, bargaining model

Limited Liability and the Known Unknown

Limited liability is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, limited lia-bility may help overcome investors’ risk aversion and facilitate capital formation and economic growth. On the other hand, limited liability is widely believed to contribute to excessive risk-taking and externaliza-tion of losses to the public. The externalization problem can be mitigated imperfectly through existing mechanisms such as regulation, mandatory insurance, and minimum capital requirements. These mechanisms would be more effective if information asymmetries between industry and poli-cymakers were reduced. Private businesses typically have better infor-mation about industry-specific risks than policymakers. A charge for limited liability entities—resembling a corporate income tax but calibrated to risk levels—could have two salutary effects. First, a well-calibrated limited liability tax could help compensate the public fisc for risks and reduce externalization. Second, a limited liability tax could force private industry actors to reveal information to policymakers and regulators, thereby dynamically improving the public response to externalization risk. Charging firms for limited liability at initially similar rates will lead relatively low-risk firms to forgo limited liability, while relatively high-risk firms will pay for limited liability. Policymakers will then be able to focus on the industries whose firms have self-identified as high risk, and thus develop more finely tailored regulatory responses. Because the ben-efits of making the proper election are fully internalized by individual firms, whereas the costs of future regulation or limited liability tax changes will be borne collectively by industries, firms will be unlikely to strategically mislead policymakers in electing limited or unlimited lia-bility. By helping to reveal private information and focus regulators’ at-tention, a limited liability tax could accelerate the pace at which poli-cymakers learn, and therefore, the pace at which regulations improve

Regulating private pension funds’ structure, performance and investments: cross-country evidence

A number of countries have introduced individual, privately managed defined-contribution accounts, where the value of the pension benefit will depend on accumulated contributions and investment returns. These schemes expose workers’ future pension benefits to a number of different risks. To try to mitigate these risks, reforming governments have often strictly regulated the pension fund management industry’s structure, performance, and asset allocation. Structural regulations often force workers to choose only one manager and one fund. So, workers are unable to diversify investments across funds, exposing them to aberrant behaviour by fund managers, and preventing portfolio adjustments according to the individual’s age, household characteristics, career profile and attitude to risk. Strict asset-allocation rules and relative performance criteria mean that pension funds often invest and perform almost identically, removing any substantive choice for workers over the allocation of their pension fund’s assets and the portfolio’s risk and returns. Concentration in the pension fund management industry is found to be higher in the new pension systems of Latin America and Eastern Europe than in most OECD countries. Concentration might be because the new pension markets are smaller than in countries with more established funded pension systems, but it could also be because of restrictions on industry structure. In Latin America, asset allocation and performance is nearly identical across pension funds. So-called ‘herding’ behaviour is almost a defining characteristics of these pension regimes. Again, this reflects, at least in part, asset allocation restrictions and strict performance regulation. There is also evidence that pension funds have often under-performed simple portfolios composed of market indices of stocks and bonds. All the rules imposed in the new systems of Latin American and Eastern Europe seem to be more stringent than in the OECD, with one exception: portfolio limits. Some OECD countries have a tighter investment regime than countries such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Poland. But OECD countries tend to have fewer barriers to entry and impose fewer constraints on performance than Latin American and Eastern European countries.pensions; portfolios; investments

Business groups and the boundaries of the firm

This paper aims to show that the business group – i.e. the set of firms under common ownership and control – is the most appropriate unit to study the behavior and organization of firms and define their boundaries. Particular emphasis is given to notions such as unitary direction – i.e. the influence over strategic decisions – and administrative co-ordination which allow owners to exercise supervision and authority over the controlled companies.business group; boundary of the firm; unitary direction

Path dependence or convergence? The evolution of corporate ownership around the world

We offer a theory that sheds light on the current debate over whether the form of corporate ownership converges to the Berle-Means image. Our analytical results are threefold. First, legal rules and firm-specific protective arrangements are complementary. Secondly, corporate ownership patterns can be convergent or path dependent depending on the relative importance of these protective arrangements. We predict, for example, diffuse stock ownership in countries that impose legal limits on blockholders’ power to expropriate minority investor rights. Thirdly, we find that convergence toward diffuse share ownership is a movement towards the social optimum. Our empirical results suggest a case for the co-existence of path dependence and functional convergence (convergence to the diffuse form of share ownership through cross-listings on U.S. stock exchanges that impose more stringent disclosure and listing requirements). These results have implications for the design of executive compensation, the case for institutional investor activism and the proposal to increase shareholder power

The"IPO-Plus": a new approach to privatization

Every approach to privatization entails tradeoffs. The chief advantage of case-by-case privatization -including sales for cash or initial public offerings (IPOs)- is efficiency. Case-by-case privatization generates revenues, gives shareholders control over managers, and provides access to capital and skills. But it is slow and does not promote widespread public participation. Voucher-based mass privatization programs, by contrast, are designed to promote equity in the distribution of wealth, through widespread participation. But they do not ensure efficiency because they may not generate revenues, bring in new capital or skills, or give shareholders control over managers. To promote equity and efficiency, the authors propose a new form of privatization -IPO-Plus- that incorporates key features of both case-by-case privatization and mass privatization. IPO-Plus promotes equity through widespread (but not mass) participation in privatization. It promotes efficiency by making privatization transparent, by fostering capital market development, and by creating independent financial institutions that would press companies to improve their financial performance. It relies not on vouchers but on the sale of low-priced public shares. It allows deferred payment for company shares as an incentive to purchase them as well as downwardly flexible share prices. Because the quality of the enterprises chosen for privatization is essential to the success of the IPO-Plus program, it is important that few enterprises targeted for IPO-Plus be published before the program is launched. This will motivate potential investors to join the program by setting up management companies, establishing public investment funds, and buying shares in them. IPO-Plus is more likely than mass privatization to create real owners. Investors in IPO-Plus are given a subsidy, but only in proportion to what they themselves choose to pay. The individual determines (up to a ceiling) how much to invest in the program. IPO-Plus is particularly appropriate where the objective is to encourage outside ownership rather than significant employee ownership. It encourages the emergence of market intermediaries and ensures the concentration of enterprise shares in investment funds. Outside ownership and concentration of share voting rights provide the basis for enterprise restructuring and economic growth.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism