Opting-out

Bruyelle Pierre. Tunnel sous la Manche, systèmes de relations en Europe du Nord-Ouest et développement régional. Introduction générale. In: Hommes et Terres du Nord, 1988/1-2. Tunnel sous la manche et développement régional en Europe du Nord-Ouest. pp. 1-2

Opting out and opting in : understanding the complexities of women's career transitions.

Purpose This study aims to explore the reasons why women are leaving the workplace. Are they opting out of the workforce to stay at home with their children as current media reports suggest, or are the reasons more complex as the Kaleidoscope Career Model (KCM) suggests? A second objective is to examine whether or not women’s primary career motives change over time as predicted by the KCM. Lastly, the potential barriers or boundaries faced by women pursuing boundaryless careers will be identified. Design/methodology/approach A survey was sent to 2,000 randomly selected women graduates of an international business school located in the USA. The response rate was 25 percent, or 497 women. Findings The results revealed that 47 percent of the women surveyed had stopped working at some point in their career. Numerous reasons were cited for leaving. Only 35 percent of the women who stopped working cited rearing children as their sole reason for opting out. Sixty two percent of the women reported that their career focus had changed. In line with the KCM predictions, mid career women were most interested in finding balance in their lives and the desire for authenticity increased across the lifespan. Finally, 70 percent of the women who left eventually returned to work, debunking the myth that women opt out and do not return to the workforce. Our findings show that there are barriers that make it difficult to move across organizations, especially if time is taken off between jobs. Research limitations/implications All of the respondents in this study have a graduate degree in international business; thus, the results may have limited generalizability to other populations. Nonetheless, this study provides valuable data that helps us to better understand the complexities of women’s career paths. Originality/value This study makes contributions to two different areas of career theory. First, it provides one of the first empirical tests of the KCM. In addition to showing that women are leaving companies for more complex reasons than for family reasons alone, it also shows that women’s primary career motives shift over time in the manner predicted by the KCM. Second, the study contributes to the literature on boundaryless careers by showing that there are in fact barriers or boundaries faced by women attempting to pursue careers across organizationsWomen workers; Careers;

Are Women Opting Out? Debunking the Myth

This report refutes the widespread notion that women are increasingly likely to stop working when they have kids.

Parliamentary voting rules and strategic candidacy

In this paper we study the vulnerability of parliamentary voting procedures to strategic candidacy. Candidates involved in an election are susceptible to influence the outcome by opting out or opting in. In the context of three-alternative elections and under the impartial anonymous culture assumption, we evaluate the frequencies of such strategic candidacy opportunities.strategic candidacy, parliamentary voting procedures, opting out, opting in, impartial anonymous culture.

Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority

In a scheduling problem where agents can opt out, we show that the familiar Random Priority (RP) a rule can be improved upon by another mechanism dubbed Probabilistic Serial (PS). Both mechanisms are nonmanipulable in a strong sense, but the latter is Pareto superior to the former and serves a larger (expected number of agents. The PS equilibrium outcome is easier to compute than the RP outcome; on the other hand RP is easier to implement than PS. We show that the improvement of PS over RP is significant but small: at most a couple of percentage points in the relative welfare gain and the relative difference in quantity served. We conjecture that the latter never exceeds 8.33 %. Both gains vanish when the number of agents is large.

Opting-out in profit-sharing regulation

To avoid the extremely high profit levels found in recent experiences with price cap regulation, some regulators have proposed a profit- sharing mechanism that revises prices to the benefit of consumers. This paper investigates the conditions under which a regulator can implement such a profit-sharing scheme, having the option to revoke the contract if the firm's profits are excessive. When this option is included in the regulator's objective function and the cost of exercising it is not too high, a long-term equilibrium arises with a state-contingent sharing rule that guarantees and appropriate level of profits. The model determines both the level of profits that triggers the profit-sharing mechanism and the consequent price adjustment endogenously. There is an endogenous regulatory lag initially characterized by a price cap regulation, followed by a period of profit-sharing regime where the firm is motivated to cut prices to avoid revocation.public utilities, price cap regulation, profit-sharing, stochastic games

Opting Out: Procedural Fair Use

This article explores the advantages of opt-out plans, and identifies a critical shortcoming in Copyright’s doctrine of Fair Use. The discussion is fueled by a current controversy: In December of 2004, Google, Inc. announced its plan to digitally scan thousands of copyrighted books as part of a massive new digital indexing service. Hedging against possible litigation, Google provided a free and easy opt-out procedure for authors who didn’t want their books scanned. Despite this measure, two major authors’ groups have sued Google, claiming the opt-out plan imposes an unfair burden. This article explores the fairness of established opt-outs in contract law, privacy law, and class action rules. Further, the discussion explores how Copyright already places similar burdens upon authors. Ultimately, these lessons are applied to the Google Book Search problem, and an important new Fair Use consideration is identified

Opting-out in profit-sharing regulation

To avoid the extremely high profit levels found in recent experiences with price cap regulation, some regulators have proposed a profit-sharing mechanism that revises prices to the benefit of consumers. This paper investigates the conditions under which a regulator can implement such a profit-sharing scheme, having the option to revoke the contract if the firm's profits are excessive. When this option is included in the regulator's objective function and the cost of exercising it is not too high, a long-term equilibrium arises with a state-contingent sharing rule that guarantees and appropriate level of profits. The model determines both the level of profits that triggers the profit- sharing mechanism and the consequent price adjustment endogenously. There is an endogenous regulatory lag initially characterized by a price cap regulation, followed by a period of profit-sharing regime where the firm is motivated to cut prices to avoid revocation.Public utilities, Price cap regulation, profit-sharing, stochastic games