Game-theoretic analysis to examine how government subsidy policies affect a closed-loop supply chain decision

The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively. This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally and economically viable outcome

A systematic review of decision-making in remanufacturing

Potential benefits have made remanufacturing attractive over the last decade. Nevertheless, the complexity and uncertainties associated with the process of managing returned products make remanufacturing challenging. Since this process involves enormous decision-making practices, various methods/techniques have been developed. This review is to specify the current challenges and opportunities for decision-making in remanufacturing. To achieve this, we perform a systematic review over decision-making in remanufacturing by classifying decisions into different managerial levels and areas. Adopting a systematic approach which provides a repeatable, transparent and scientific process, 241 key articles have been identified following a multi-stage review process. Our review indicates that most studies focuses on strategic-level(48%) and tactical-level (34%)with only 5% focusing on operational-level and the rest on two levels(13%). Regarding decision-making methods, most studies propose mathematical models (60%) followed by analytical models (31%). Furthermore, only 36% of the studies address uncertainties in which stochastic approach is mostly applied. A total of 21 knowledge gaps are highlighted to direct future research work

Optimal Policies on Managing Drug Supply and Patient Access to Drugs

Health care decision-makers face several uncertainties regarding pharmaceutical products. For new and expensive drugs, the performance outside of clinical trials could be uncertain. For old and low-profit pharmaceutical products, the supply could be uncertain, causing drug shortages. In three essays, I study mitigating strategies to deal with different types of uncertainties associated with pharmaceutical products. In the first essay, I compare two types of pharmaceutical reimbursement contracts to mitigate the uncertainties associated with new and expensive drugs. I construct a game-theoretic model to analyze the interactions between a pharmaceutical manufacturer and a payer. The payer’s reimbursement of a drug is either related to the cost-effectiveness or the sales volume of the drug in the two contracts, respectively. I find key factors that determine the two parties’ preferences for the two contracts. I also find conditions under which each type is preferred by both parties and can achieve a Pareto improvement. In the second essay, I study mitigating strategies for drug shortage, which has become a serious problem in many countries in recent years. I construct a multi-period supply chain model to analyze the interactions between a representative hospital and an unreliable pharmaceutical manufacturer. The hospital owns an in-house manufacturer and can procure the drug from the two manufacturing facilities. I also assume that the hospital can make emergency production. I study the two parties’ procurement and production decisions and examine the impacts of the hospital’s optimal decisions on the external manufacturer’s profit. In the third essay, I study mitigating strategies for drug shortages from the governments’ perspective. I construct a game-theoretic model consisting of a pharmaceutical manufacturer, a wholesaler, and a government. I compare two types of mitigating strategies that the government can implement: providing subsidies to the wholesaler, or using a government-owned manufacturer. I identify key factors for the government’s preference over the two strategies and examine the impact on the private sector. The three essays have theoretical contributions to game theory and supply chain risk management literature and have policy implications for policymakers to manage drug supply and patient access to drugs