Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources

A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this paper, we study an abstract negotiation framework where agents can agree on multilateral deals to exchange bundles of indivisible resources. We then analyse how these deals affect social welfare for different instances of the basic framework and different interpretations of the concept of social welfare itself. In particular, we show how certain classes of deals are both sufficient and necessary to guarantee that a socially optimal allocation of resources will be reached eventually

Managed competition in health care in the Netherlands and Germany: Theoretical foundation, empirical findings and policy conclusions

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A synthesis of logic and biology in the design of dependable systems

The technologies of model-based design and dependability analysis in the design of dependable systems, including software intensive systems, have advanced in recent years. Much of this development can be attributed to the application of advances in formal logic and its application to fault forecasting and verification of systems. In parallel, work on bio-inspired technologies has shown potential for the evolutionary design of engineering systems via automated exploration of potentially large design spaces. We have not yet seen the emergence of a design paradigm that combines effectively and throughout the design lifecycle these two techniques which are schematically founded on the two pillars of formal logic and biology. Such a design paradigm would apply these techniques synergistically and systematically from the early stages of design to enable optimal refinement of new designs which can be driven effectively by dependability requirements. The paper sketches such a model-centric paradigm for the design of dependable systems that brings these technologies together to realise their combined potential benefits

Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts

This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)), have been offered as solutions to the problem of enforcing an incomplete contract. It is shown that the efficiency of these solutions is very sensitive to the characteristics of the good or service exchanged. In general, neither the repeat purchase mechanism nor efficiency wages is the most efficient in the set of possible relational contracts. In many situations, total output may be increased through the use of performance pay and through increasing the quality of law.contract, law and economics, reputation, repeated games, incomplete contracts, transactions costs, institutional economics, contract enforcement

Search and the Path-Dependency of Trade.

This paper investigates the implications of imperfect information and matching/searching for international trade theory. I develop an illustrative model where firms find such partners by a search through successive matches. The consequences include linking today's import demand patterns to past changes in costs, protection and interest rates. Today's policy decisions will likewise affect future trade. Trade diversion from a preferential trading agreement may well persist as informational diversion well after the preferential agreement has been scrapped. This has important implications for the timing of trade liberalisation.Trade, Protection, Search, Outsourcing.

Public Finance and Low Equilibria in Transition Economies; The Role of Institutions

This paper develops two stylised models of the transitional economy that challenge to some extent, the conventional approach to policy-reforms. In the first model, the absence of market-oriented institutions is responsible for the occurrence of a non-cooperative equilibrium, where the amount of public services provided by the state is too low, which, in turn, adversely affects the global performance of the productive sector. In the second model, the government, which aims to maximise tax receipts, will choose a taxation level that pushes too many firms out of the market; hence the global supply falls below its optimal level. In both models, strain and disruptions specific to transitional systems lead to abnormal responses of the real sector to standard policy measures. Efficient economic policies should explicitly take into account the institutional deficit.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39703/3/wp319.pd

A cross-cultural study of reciprocity, trust and altruism in a gift exchange experiment

experimental design;altruism;social security;gift giving

Beyond Economics in Pay for Performance

This article argues that while much of the intellectual energy has focused on the economics of executive pay, the challenge of executive compensation is as much a challenge of human behavior as it is one of economics. The raison d’etre of pay for performance (PFP) is to motivate executives to make decisions that are in the best interest of their firm and its shareholders. Attention to the relevant individual, situational, cultural, and institutional dynamics (what I term “behavioral dynamics”) that affect how executives are motivated and how they value future rewards is critical for the sustainability of PFP as a model of compensation design.Drawing on salient research in the cognitive science and decision-making literature, the article invites consideration on how relevant behavioral dynamics could affect our assessment of PFP as a motivational tool. The article concludes by suggesting five potential ways to incorporate behavioral dynamics into compensation policy and design