2 research outputs found
Optimal control policies for evolutionary dynamics with environmental feedback
We study a dynamical model of a population of cooperators and defectors whose
actions have long-term consequences on environmental "commons" - what we term
the "resource". Cooperators contribute to restoring the resource whereas
defectors degrade it. The population dynamics evolve according to a replicator
equation coupled with an environmental state. Our goal is to identify methods
of influencing the population with the objective to maximize accumulation of
the resource. In particular, we consider strategies that modify
individual-level incentives. We then extend the model to incorporate a public
opinion state that imperfectly tracks the true environmental state, and study
strategies that influence opinion. We formulate optimal control problems and
solve them using numerical techniques to characterize locally optimal control
policies for three problem formulations: 1) control of incentives, and control
of opinions through 2) propaganda-like strategies and 3) awareness campaigns.
We show numerically that the resulting controllers in all formulations achieve
the objective, albeit with an unintended consequence. The resulting dynamics
include cycles between low and high resource states - a dynamical regime termed
an "oscillating tragedy of the commons". This outcome may have desirable
average properties, but includes risks to resource depletion. Our findings
suggest the need for new approaches to controlling coupled
population-environment dynamics.Comment: Initial submission version to CDC 201
The Impact of Irrational Behaviours in the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma with Game-Environment Feedback
In the optional prisoner's dilemma (OPD), players can choose to cooperate and
defect as usual, but can also abstain as a third possible strategy. This
strategy models the players' participation in the game and is a relevant aspect
in many settings, e.g. social networks or opinion dynamics where abstention is
an option during an election. In this paper, we provide a formulation of the
OPD where we consider irrational behaviours in the population inspired by
prospect theory. Prospect theory has gained increasing popularity in recent
times thanks to its ability to capture aspects such as reference dependence or
loss aversion which are common in human behaviour. This element is original in
our formulation of the game and is incorporated in our framework through
pairwise comparison dynamics. Recently, the impact of the environment has been
studied in the form of feedback on the population dynamics. Another element of
novelty in our work is the extension of the game-environment feedback to the
OPD in two forms of dynamics, the replicator and the pairwise comparison. The
contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we propose a modelling
framework where prospect theory is used to capture irrational behaviours in an
evolutionary game with game-environment feedback. Second, we carry out the
stability analysis of the system equilibria and discuss the oscillating
behaviours arising from the game-environment feedback. Finally, we extend our
previous results to the OPD and we discuss the main differences between the
model resulting from the replicator dynamics and the one resulting from the
pairwise comparison dynamics.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figure