Assessing the Network Neutrality Debate in the United States

Over the last decade in the United States network neutrality has evolved from a primarily technical concern to a national debate about the future of American communications regulation as well as technology and innovation policy in general. In October 2009 the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to codify six principles of network neutrality. This proceeding which is unlikely to be completed before mid-2010 could have profound economic consequences for consumers content and applications providers and network operators.Network neutrality is a shorthand for a series of policy prescriptions that would restrict the ability of broadband internet service providers (ISPs) to manage network traffic. These restrictions include barring network operators from charging content and applications providers (as opposed to end users) for entering into business-to-business transactions for quality-of-service (QoS) enhancements for packet delivery. Although the initial objective for advocates of network neutrality regulation was to secure regulation of wireline networks the debate has expanded since its inception to include wireless networks

Assessing the Network Neutrality Debate in the United States

Over the last decade in the United States network neutrality has evolved from a primarily technical concern to a national debate about the future of American communications regulation as well as technology and innovation policy in general. In October 2009 the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to codify six principles of network neutrality. This proceeding which is unlikely to be completed before mid-2010 could have profound economic consequences for consumers content and applications providers and network operators.Network neutrality is a shorthand for a series of policy prescriptions that would restrict the ability of broadband internet service providers (ISPs) to manage network traffic. These restrictions include barring network operators from charging content and applications providers (as opposed to end users) for entering into business-to-business transactions for quality-of-service (QoS) enhancements for packet delivery. Although the initial objective for advocates of network neutrality regulation was to secure regulation of wireline networks the debate has expanded since its inception to include wireless networks

Robustness: A New US Cyber Deterrence Strategy

The growing trend of computer network attacks provokes the necessity for a comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy to deter aggressors from attacking U.S. critical infrastructure. The current U.S. cyber deterrence strategy based on punishment is ineffective in deterring aggressors as evidenced by the increasing number of computer network attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. Therefore, the U.S. should look towards an alternative strategy based on robustness to deny enemy objectives and absorb attacks. To identify the superior cyber deterrence strategy, this study uses a qualitative assessment based on open-sourced information to evaluate the effectiveness of each strategy. The findings of this study show that a deterrence strategy centered on robustness can be more effective in deterring aggressors. As a result, the United States would be better served to reform its cyber deterrence strategy by establishing a capability to absorb computer network attacks and deny enemy objectives as a deterrent

The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory State

We live in a coordination economy. As one surveys the myriad challenges of modern social and economic life, an ever increasing proportion is defined not by the need to reconcile competing interests, but by the challenge of getting everyone on the same page. Conflict is not absent in these settings. It is not, however, the determinative factor in shaping our behaviors and resulting interactions. That essential ingredient, instead, is coordination. Such coordination is commonly understood as the function of the market. As it turns out, however, optimal coordination will not always emerge, as if led “by an invisible hand.” Even in settings where coordination is essential, it may fail to materialize, may emerge in a form that could have been improved upon, or may not be amenable to displacement despite the world changing around it. There consequently may be a role for regulation in encouraging, fostering, and facilitating efficient coordination in the financial markets, on the Internet, and in technological innovation. It is telling, thus, that optimal outcomes have not always been forthcoming in these areas. Even as the reach of the Internet has extended dramatically, questions about the appropriate scope and nature of its regulation have largely paralyzed public efforts to foster its growth and development. As the pace of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry and other sectors has fallen off, we have likewise struggled with how best to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Policymakers have also sat back as the U.S. electricity grid has fallen out-of-date, and the country has fallen well behind its peers in the construction of high-speed rail lines. Perhaps most striking was the halting — even fumbling — response to the financial crisis at its earliest stages. At first glance, our ambivalence, inertia, and confusion in the regulation of these varied arenas might seem unrelated. At least in part, however, the challenge in each area can be traced to a failure to engage with the role of regulation in facilitating coordination. This Article seeks to address that gap

Electric Co-operatives as Rural Retail Broadband Network Providers: Opportunities and Challenges

Multiple studies have shown that access to high-speed broadband networks significantly improves the economies, education, and lifestyle benefits in rural areas. Consequently, this dissertation seeks to show how electric co-operatives could be an effective means for providing rural and cash-poor communities with this vital access. It analyzes the history of electric co-operatives, the legislative and regulatory status of electric co-operatives, funding processes, and the current energy/telecommunications marketplace. In light of the opportunities presented, challenges regarding how they should be regulated, legislated, and funded are addressed as well

Scenarios and operator business models for management of digital homes

Digitaalisen kodin käsite on levinnyt nopeasti kuluttajien päivittäessä kotien laitteistoja digitaaliselle aikakaudelle. Digitaalisen kodin tunnusmerkkejä ovat kasvava verkkokykyisten laitteiden määrä ja niiden liittäminen sekä toisiinsa että Internetiin. Digitaaliset kodit muuttuvat koko ajan monimutkaisemmiksi ja niiden hallinta yhä haastavammaksi. Tämä työ pureutuu syntyvään hallintaongelmaan. Oletuksena on, että yritysten tarjoamat digitaalisten kotien hallintapalvelut ovat tulevaisuudessa keskeisessä asemassa kotikäyttäjiin suuntautuvassa palveluliiketoiminnassa. Tämä tutkimus esittelee neljä hallintaskenaariota, jotka kehitettiin asiantuntijahaastatteluista ja kirjallisuuslähteistä kerättyjen ideoiden ja tiedon avulla. Skenaariot tarjoavat näkemyksiä mahdollisista tulevaisuuden kehityssuunnista, ja selittävät hallintapalveluiden asemaa muuhun palveluliiketoimintaan nähden. Skenaariot on rakennettu tarkastellen toimialaa operaattorin näkökulmasta käsin. Esimerkit operaattorien liiketoimintamalleista ovat olennainen osa tämä tutkimusta. Ne yhdessä skenaarioiden kanssa osoittavat, että eri palveluiden yhdistäminen kokonaisuuksiksi (kytkykauppa) tulee olemaan tärkeä menestyksen aines. Kuluttajat eivät ole valmiita maksamaan digitaalisen kodin hallinnasta yksinään, vaan hallintapalveluiden kustannukset tulee peittää suurempien palvelukokonaisuuksien sisälle.The digital home is a new concept that has spread rapidly while consumers have been upgrading their electronic devices into the digital age. The increasing number of network-enabled devices, and connecting them with each other and to the Internet are the key characteristics of digital homes. This thesis attacks the problem that arises from the increasing complexity of managing the digital home systems. Management help offered by service providers to home users is assumed to play an important role in the future of digital home service business. With the help of ideas and information gathered from expert interviews and various written sources, four management scenarios were developed in this thesis. The scenarios provide insight into possible directions for future development, and explain the role of management provision in relation to the other domains of digital service business. The scenarios are constructed from the operator point-of-view. This thesis also presents examples of operator business models that together with the scenarios show that effective service aggregation will be an important success factor. The consumers will not be willing to pay for management as such; the cost of management should be hidden within a service bundle

Market Power Without Market Definition

Antitrust law has traditionally required proof of market power in most cases and has analyzed market power through a market definition/market share lens. In recent years, this indirect or structural approach to proving market power has come under attack as misguided in practice and intellectually incoherent. If market definition collapses in the courts and antitrust agencies, as it seems poised to do, this will rupture antitrust analysis and create urgent pressures for an alternative approach to proving market power through direct evidence. None of the leading theoretic approaches—such as the Lerner Index or a search for supracompetitive profits—provides a robust solution. Further, one of the core premises in modern antitrust analysis—that the presence of high entry barriers is necessary to market power—is deeply flawed. Counterintuitively, the higher the entry barriers, the less likely it is that (1) the accused firm engaged in anticompetitive conduct and (2) the market would have been more competitive but for the alleged conduct. A robust approach to market power would require a tight nexus between the challenged conduct and a plausible competitive counterfactual. This Article articulates first principles of market power, diagnoses sources of confusion in the current caselaw, and scrutinizes the recognized methods of proving market power without reliance on market definition and market shares

Market Power Without Market Definition

Antitrust law has traditionally required proof of market power in most cases and has analyzed market power through a market definition/market share lens. In recent years, this indirect or structural approach to proving market power has come under attack as misguided in practice and intellectually incoherent. If market definition collapses in the courts and antitrust agencies, as it seems poised to do, this will rupture antitrust analysis and create urgent pressures for an alternative approach to proving market power through direct evidence. None of the leading theoretic approaches—such as the Lerner Index or a search for supracompetitive profits—provides a robust solution. Further, one of the core premises in modern antitrust analysis—that the presence of high entry barriers is necessary to market power—is deeply flawed. Counterintuitively, the higher the entry barriers, the less likely it is that (1) the accused firm engaged in anticompetitive conduct and (2) the market would have been more competitive but for the alleged conduct. A robust approach to market power would require a tight nexus between the challenged conduct and a plausible competitive counterfactual. This Article articulates first principles of market power, diagnoses sources of confusion in the current caselaw, and scrutinizes the recognized methods of proving market power without reliance on market definition and market shares