3,906 research outputs found
Combining guaranteed and spot markets in display advertising: Selling guaranteed page views with stochastic demand
While page views are often sold instantly through real-time auctions when users visit Web pages, they can also be sold in advance via guaranteed contracts. In this paper, we combine guaranteed and spot markets in display advertising, and present a dynamic programming model to study how a media seller should optimally allocate and price page
views between guaranteed contracts and advertising auctions. This optimisation problem is challenging because the allocation and pricing of guaranteed contracts endogenously affects the expected revenue from advertising auctions in the future. We take into consideration several distinct characteristics regarding the media buyers’ purchasing behaviour, such as risk aversion, stochastic demand arrivals, and devise a scalable and efficient algorithm to solve the optimisation problem. Our work is one of a few studies that investigate the auction-based posted price guaranteed contracts for display advertising. The proposed model is further empirically validated with a display advertising data set from a UK supply-side platform. The results show that the optimal pricing and allocation strategies from our model can significantly increase the media seller’s expected total revenue, and the model suggests different optimal strategies based on the level of competition in advertising auctions
Optimal Real-Time Bidding Strategies
The ad-trading desks of media-buying agencies are increasingly relying on
complex algorithms for purchasing advertising inventory. In particular,
Real-Time Bidding (RTB) algorithms respond to many auctions -- usually Vickrey
auctions -- throughout the day for buying ad-inventory with the aim of
maximizing one or several key performance indicators (KPI). The optimization
problems faced by companies building bidding strategies are new and interesting
for the community of applied mathematicians. In this article, we introduce a
stochastic optimal control model that addresses the question of the optimal
bidding strategy in various realistic contexts: the maximization of the
inventory bought with a given amount of cash in the framework of audience
strategies, the maximization of the number of conversions/acquisitions with a
given amount of cash, etc. In our model, the sequence of auctions is modeled by
a Poisson process and the \textit{price to beat} for each auction is modeled by
a random variable following almost any probability distribution. We show that
the optimal bids are characterized by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, and
that almost-closed form solutions can be found by using a fluid limit.
Numerical examples are also carried out
Real-Time Bidding by Reinforcement Learning in Display Advertising
The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB)
--- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just
being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally,
it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid
an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as
a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression
independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the
bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span
before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by
the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the
rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has
completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy
sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across
all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future
rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a
reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the
auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is
the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition,
we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding
policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding
environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world
auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation
using neural networks.Comment: WSDM 201
A dynamic pricing model for unifying programmatic guarantee and real-time bidding in display advertising
There are two major ways of selling impressions in display advertising. They
are either sold in spot through auction mechanisms or in advance via guaranteed
contracts. The former has achieved a significant automation via real-time
bidding (RTB); however, the latter is still mainly done over the counter
through direct sales. This paper proposes a mathematical model that allocates
and prices the future impressions between real-time auctions and guaranteed
contracts. Under conventional economic assumptions, our model shows that the
two ways can be seamless combined programmatically and the publisher's revenue
can be maximized via price discrimination and optimal allocation. We consider
advertisers are risk-averse, and they would be willing to purchase guaranteed
impressions if the total costs are less than their private values. We also
consider that an advertiser's purchase behavior can be affected by both the
guaranteed price and the time interval between the purchase time and the
impression delivery date. Our solution suggests an optimal percentage of future
impressions to sell in advance and provides an explicit formula to calculate at
what prices to sell. We find that the optimal guaranteed prices are dynamic and
are non-decreasing over time. We evaluate our method with RTB datasets and find
that the model adopts different strategies in allocation and pricing according
to the level of competition. From the experiments we find that, in a less
competitive market, lower prices of the guaranteed contracts will encourage the
purchase in advance and the revenue gain is mainly contributed by the increased
competition in future RTB. In a highly competitive market, advertisers are more
willing to purchase the guaranteed contracts and thus higher prices are
expected. The revenue gain is largely contributed by the guaranteed selling.Comment: Chen, Bowei and Yuan, Shuai and Wang, Jun (2014) A dynamic pricing
model for unifying programmatic guarantee and real-time bidding in display
advertising. In: The Eighth International Workshop on Data Mining for Online
Advertising, 24 - 27 August 2014, New York Cit
Pricing Ad Slots with Consecutive Multi-unit Demand
We consider the optimal pricing problem for a model of the rich media
advertisement market, as well as other related applications. In this market,
there are multiple buyers (advertisers), and items (slots) that are arranged in
a line such as a banner on a website. Each buyer desires a particular number of
{\em consecutive} slots and has a per-unit-quality value (dependent on
the ad only) while each slot has a quality (dependent on the position
only such as click-through rate in position auctions). Hence, the valuation of
the buyer for item is . We want to decide the allocations and
the prices in order to maximize the total revenue of the market maker.
A key difference from the traditional position auction is the advertiser's
requirement of a fixed number of consecutive slots. Consecutive slots may be
needed for a large size rich media ad. We study three major pricing mechanisms,
the Bayesian pricing model, the maximum revenue market equilibrium model and an
envy-free solution model. Under the Bayesian model, we design a polynomial time
computable truthful mechanism which is optimum in revenue. For the market
equilibrium paradigm, we find a polynomial time algorithm to obtain the maximum
revenue market equilibrium solution. In envy-free settings, an optimal solution
is presented when the buyers have the same demand for the number of consecutive
slots. We conduct a simulation that compares the revenues from the above
schemes and gives convincing results.Comment: 27page
Statistical Arbitrage Mining for Display Advertising
We study and formulate arbitrage in display advertising. Real-Time Bidding
(RTB) mimics stock spot exchanges and utilises computers to algorithmically buy
display ads per impression via a real-time auction. Despite the new automation,
the ad markets are still informationally inefficient due to the heavily
fragmented marketplaces. Two display impressions with similar or identical
effectiveness (e.g., measured by conversion or click-through rates for a
targeted audience) may sell for quite different prices at different market
segments or pricing schemes. In this paper, we propose a novel data mining
paradigm called Statistical Arbitrage Mining (SAM) focusing on mining and
exploiting price discrepancies between two pricing schemes. In essence, our
SAMer is a meta-bidder that hedges advertisers' risk between CPA (cost per
action)-based campaigns and CPM (cost per mille impressions)-based ad
inventories; it statistically assesses the potential profit and cost for an
incoming CPM bid request against a portfolio of CPA campaigns based on the
estimated conversion rate, bid landscape and other statistics learned from
historical data. In SAM, (i) functional optimisation is utilised to seek for
optimal bidding to maximise the expected arbitrage net profit, and (ii) a
portfolio-based risk management solution is leveraged to reallocate bid volume
and budget across the set of campaigns to make a risk and return trade-off. We
propose to jointly optimise both components in an EM fashion with high
efficiency to help the meta-bidder successfully catch the transient statistical
arbitrage opportunities in RTB. Both the offline experiments on a real-world
large-scale dataset and online A/B tests on a commercial platform demonstrate
the effectiveness of our proposed solution in exploiting arbitrage in various
model settings and market environments.Comment: In the proceedings of the 21st ACM SIGKDD international conference on
Knowledge discovery and data mining (KDD 2015
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