23 research outputs found
Revenue Loss in Shrinking Markets
We analyze the revenue loss due to market shrinkage. Specifically, consider a
simple market with one item for sale and bidders whose values are drawn
from some joint distribution. Suppose that the market shrinks as a single
bidder retires from the market. Suppose furthermore that the value of this
retiring bidder is fixed and always strictly smaller than the values of the
other players. We show that even this slight decrease in competition might
cause a significant fall of a multiplicative factor of
in the revenue that can be obtained by a dominant
strategy ex-post individually rational mechanism.
In particular, our results imply a solution to an open question that was
posed by Dobzinski, Fu, and Kleinberg [STOC'11]
Optimal Auctions for Correlated Buyers with Sampling
Cr\'emer and McLean [1985] showed that, when buyers' valuations are drawn
from a correlated distribution, an auction with full knowledge on the
distribution can extract the full social surplus. We study whether this
phenomenon persists when the auctioneer has only incomplete knowledge of the
distribution, represented by a finite family of candidate distributions, and
has sample access to the real distribution. We show that the naive approach
which uses samples to distinguish candidate distributions may fail, whereas an
extended version of the Cr\'emer-McLean auction simultaneously extracts full
social surplus under each candidate distribution. With an algebraic argument,
we give a tight bound on the number of samples needed by this auction, which is
the difference between the number of candidate distributions and the dimension
of the linear space they span
Public projects, Boolean functions and the borders of Border's theorem
Border's theorem gives an intuitive linear characterization of the feasible
interim allocation rules of a Bayesian single-item environment, and it has
several applications in economic and algorithmic mechanism design. All known
generalizations of Border's theorem either restrict attention to relatively
simple settings, or resort to approximation. This paper identifies a
complexity-theoretic barrier that indicates, assuming standard complexity class
separations, that Border's theorem cannot be extended significantly beyond the
state-of-the-art. We also identify a surprisingly tight connection between
Myerson's optimal auction theory, when applied to public project settings, and
some fundamental results in the analysis of Boolean functions.Comment: Accepted to ACM EC 201
Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players
We consider the problem of designing incentive-compatible, ex-post
individually rational (IR) mechanisms for covering problems in the Bayesian
setting, where players' types are drawn from an underlying distribution and may
be correlated, and the goal is to minimize the expected total payment made by
the mechanism. We formulate a notion of incentive compatibility (IC) that we
call {\em support-based IC} that is substantially more robust than Bayesian IC,
and develop black-box reductions from support-based-IC mechanism design to
algorithm design. For single-dimensional settings, this black-box reduction
applies even when we only have an LP-relative {\em approximation algorithm} for
the algorithmic problem. Thus, we obtain near-optimal mechanisms for various
covering settings including single-dimensional covering problems, multi-item
procurement auctions, and multidimensional facility location.Comment: Major changes compared to the previous version. Please consult this
versio
Optimal Parametric Auctions
We study the problem of profit maximization in auctions of one good where the buyers' valuations are drawn from independent distributions. When these distributions are known to the seller, Myerson's optimal auction is a well-known mechanism for maximizing revenue. In many cases, however, the seller may not know the buyers' distributions. We propose an alternative model where the seller only knows the mean and the variance of each distribution. We call parametric an auction whose mechanism only uses these parameters. We construct parametric auctions both when the seller only has one copy of the good to sell, and when she has an infinite number of identical copies (i.e., when the good is digital). For a very large class of distributions, including (but not limited to) distributions with a monotone hazard rate, our auctions achieve a constant fraction of the revenue of Myerson's auction. When the seller has absolutely no knowledge about the distributions, it is well known that no auction can achieve a constant fraction of the optimal revenue when the players are not identically distributed. Our parametric model gives the seller a small amount of extra information, allowing her to construct auctions for which (1) no two bidders need to be drawn from identical distributions and (2) the revenue obtained is a constant fraction of the revenue in Myerson's optimal auction
Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions
We investigate the problem of optimal mechanism design, where an auctioneer wants to sell a set of goods to buyers, in order to maximize revenue. In a Bayesian setting the buyers' valuations for the goods are drawn from a prior distribution D, which is often assumed to be known by the seller. In this work, we focus on cases where the seller has no knowledge at all, and "the buyers know each other better than the seller knows them". In our model, D is not necessarily common knowledge. Instead, each buyer individually knows a posterior distribution associated with D. Since the seller relies on the buyers' knowledge to help him set a price, we call these types of auctions crowdsourced Bayesian auctions.
For this crowdsourced Bayesian model and many environments of interest, we show that, for arbitrary valuation distributions D (in particular, correlated ones), it is possible to design mechanisms matching to a significant extent the performance of the optimal dominant-strategy-truthful mechanisms where the seller knows D.
To obtain our results, we use two techniques: (1) proper scoring rules to elicit information from the players; and (2) a reverse version of the classical Bulow-Klemperer inequality. The first lets us build mechanisms with a unique equilibrium and good revenue guarantees, even when the players' second and higher-order beliefs about each other are wrong. The second allows us to upper bound the revenue of an optimal mechanism with n players by an n/n--1 fraction of the revenue of the optimal mechanism with n -- 1 players. We believe that both techniques are new to Bayesian optimal auctions and of independent interest for future work.United States. Office of Naval Research (Grant number N00014-09-1-0597