Search Efficient Binary Network Embedding

Traditional network embedding primarily focuses on learning a dense vector representation for each node, which encodes network structure and/or node content information, such that off-the-shelf machine learning algorithms can be easily applied to the vector-format node representations for network analysis. However, the learned dense vector representations are inefficient for large-scale similarity search, which requires to find the nearest neighbor measured by Euclidean distance in a continuous vector space. In this paper, we propose a search efficient binary network embedding algorithm called BinaryNE to learn a sparse binary code for each node, by simultaneously modeling node context relations and node attribute relations through a three-layer neural network. BinaryNE learns binary node representations efficiently through a stochastic gradient descent based online learning algorithm. The learned binary encoding not only reduces memory usage to represent each node, but also allows fast bit-wise comparisons to support much quicker network node search compared to Euclidean distance or other distance measures. Our experiments and comparisons show that BinaryNE not only delivers more than 23 times faster search speed, but also provides comparable or better search quality than traditional continuous vector based network embedding methods

Minimizing Polarization and Disagreement in Social Networks

The rise of social media and online social networks has been a disruptive force in society. Opinions are increasingly shaped by interactions on online social media, and social phenomena including disagreement and polarization are now tightly woven into everyday life. In this work we initiate the study of the following question: given $n$ agents, each with its own initial opinion that reflects its core value on a topic, and an opinion dynamics model, what is the structure of a social network that minimizes {\em polarization} and {\em disagreement} simultaneously? This question is central to recommender systems: should a recommender system prefer a link suggestion between two online users with similar mindsets in order to keep disagreement low, or between two users with different opinions in order to expose each to the other's viewpoint of the world, and decrease overall levels of polarization? Our contributions include a mathematical formalization of this question as an optimization problem and an exact, time-efficient algorithm. We also prove that there always exists a network with $O(n/\epsilon^2)$ edges that is a $(1+\epsilon)$ approximation to the optimum. For a fixed graph, we additionally show how to optimize our objective function over the agents' innate opinions in polynomial time. We perform an empirical study of our proposed methods on synthetic and real-world data that verify their value as mining tools to better understand the trade-off between of disagreement and polarization. We find that there is a lot of space to reduce both polarization and disagreement in real-world networks; for instance, on a Reddit network where users exchange comments on politics, our methods achieve a $\sim 60\,000$-fold reduction in polarization and disagreement.Comment: 19 pages (accepted, WWW 2018

Playing Stackelberg Opinion Optimization with Randomized Algorithms for Combinatorial Strategies

From a perspective of designing or engineering for opinion formation games in social networks, the "opinion maximization (or minimization)" problem has been studied mainly for designing subset selecting algorithms. We furthermore define a two-player zero-sum Stackelberg game of competitive opinion optimization by letting the player under study as the first-mover minimize the sum of expressed opinions by doing so-called "internal opinion design", knowing that the other adversarial player as the follower is to maximize the same objective by also conducting her own internal opinion design. We propose for the min player to play the "follow-the-perturbed-leader" algorithm in such Stackelberg game, obtaining losses depending on the other adversarial player's play. Since our strategy of subset selection is combinatorial in nature, the probabilities in a distribution over all the strategies would be too many to be enumerated one by one. Thus, we design a randomized algorithm to produce a (randomized) pure strategy. We show that the strategy output by the randomized algorithm for the min player is essentially an approximate equilibrium strategy against the other adversarial player