1,513 research outputs found
Joint strategy fictitious play with inertia for potential games
We consider multi-player repeated games involving a large number of players with large strategy spaces and enmeshed utility structures. In these ldquolarge-scalerdquo games, players are inherently faced with limitations in both their observational and computational capabilities. Accordingly, players in large-scale games need to make their decisions using algorithms that accommodate limitations in information gathering and processing. This disqualifies some of the well known decision making models such as ldquoFictitious Playrdquo (FP), in which each player must monitor the individual actions of every other player and must optimize over a high dimensional probability space. We will show that Joint Strategy Fictitious Play (JSFP), a close variant of FP, alleviates both the informational and computational burden of FP. Furthermore, we introduce JSFP with inertia, i.e., a probabilistic reluctance to change strategies, and establish the convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium in all generalized ordinal potential games in both cases of averaged or exponentially discounted historical data. We illustrate JSFP with inertia on the specific class of congestion games, a subset of generalized ordinal potential games. In particular, we illustrate the main results on a distributed traffic routing problem and derive tolling procedures that can lead to optimized total traffic congestion
The Social Medium Selection Game
We consider in this paper competition of content creators in routing their
content through various media. The routing decisions may correspond to the
selection of a social network (e.g. twitter versus facebook or linkedin) or of
a group within a given social network. The utility for a player to send its
content to some medium is given as the difference between the dissemination
utility at this medium and some transmission cost. We model this game as a
congestion game and compute the pure potential of the game. In contrast to the
continuous case, we show that there may be various equilibria. We show that the
potential is M-concave which allows us to characterize the equilibria and to
propose an algorithm for computing it. We then give a learning mechanism which
allow us to give an efficient algorithm to determine an equilibrium. We finally
determine the asymptotic form of the equilibrium and discuss the implications
on the social medium selection problem
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