Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey

The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In the past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we analyze the spear and shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from three aspects: the vulnerability of CSS to attack, the obstacles in CSS to defense, and the games between attack and defense. Then, we propose a taxonomy of the existing Byzantine attack behaviors and elaborate on the corresponding attack parameters, which determine where, who, how, and when to launch attacks. Next, from the perspectives of homogeneous or heterogeneous scenarios, we classify the existing defense algorithms, and provide an in-depth tutorial on the state-of-the-art Byzantine defense schemes, commonly known as robust or secure CSS in the literature. Furthermore, we highlight the unsolved research challenges and depict the future research directions.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutoiral

Distributed Channel Assignment in Cognitive Radio Networks: Stable Matching and Walrasian Equilibrium

We consider a set of secondary transmitter-receiver pairs in a cognitive radio setting. Based on channel sensing and access performances, we consider the problem of assigning channels orthogonally to secondary users through distributed coordination and cooperation algorithms. Two economic models are applied for this purpose: matching markets and competitive markets. In the matching market model, secondary users and channels build two agent sets. We implement a stable matching algorithm in which each secondary user, based on his achievable rate, proposes to the coordinator to be matched with desirable channels. The coordinator accepts or rejects the proposals based on the channel preferences which depend on interference from the secondary user. The coordination algorithm is of low complexity and can adapt to network dynamics. In the competitive market model, channels are associated with prices and secondary users are endowed with monetary budget. Each secondary user, based on his utility function and current channel prices, demands a set of channels. A Walrasian equilibrium maximizes the sum utility and equates the channel demand to their supply. We prove the existence of Walrasian equilibrium and propose a cooperative mechanism to reach it. The performance and complexity of the proposed solutions are illustrated by numerical simulations.Comment: submitted to IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communicaitons, 13 pages, 10 figures, 4 table