The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions

This paper introduces a class of games designed to study dynamic, endogenous reform of political institutions. Dynamic political games (DPGs) are dynamic games in which institutional choice is both recursive and instrumental. Future political aggregation rules are decided under current ones, and institutional choices do not affect payoffs or technology directly. We examine properties of the Markovian equilibria of DPGs. In any equilibrium, institutional reform occurs if the subsequent political rule is chosen to be different than the present one. Which environments exhibit institutional reform and which tend toward institutional stability? Private (public) sector decisions are said to be inessential if, roughly, they can always be replaced by decisions in the public (private) sector in a social planner's payoff. We show that if the private sector is inessential, then institutional reform never occurs. However, if public sector decisions are inessential, then institutional reform must occur. The result suggests that an ineffective private sector is conducive to institutional stability, while an ineffective public sector is conducive to change. We also address the ``political fixed point problem" that arises in a model of recursive institutional choice. Namely, the current political rule (e.g., majority voting) admits a solution only if all feasible political rules admit solutions in all future dates. If the class of political rules is dynamically consistent then DPGs are shown to admit political fixed points. This result is used to prove two equilibrium existence theorems, one of which implies that all decision rules are smooth functions of the economic stateRecursive, dynamic political games, institutional reform, political fixed points, inessential.

Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules

We consider the endogenous choice of a voting rule, characterized by the majority size needed to elect change over the status quo, by a society who will use the rule to make future decisions. Under simple assumptions on the uncertainty concerning the future alternatives that will be voted upon, voters' have induced preferences over voting rules that are single-peaked and intermediate. We explore the existence of self-stable voting rules, i.e., voting rules such that there is no alternative rule that would beat the given voting rule if the given voting rule is used to choose between the rules. There are situations where self-stable voting rules do not exist. We explore conditions that guarantee existence, as well as issues relating to efficiency and constitutional design.

On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union

We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf. We show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district's vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change. We analyze how the weights relate to the population size of a country and the correlation structure of agents' preferences, and then we compare the voting weights in the Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed Constitution

Theoretical Aspects of Collective Decision Making - Survey of the Economic Literature

The article aims at surveying the economic literature related to collective decision making. In order to do so it proposes a coherent framework allowing for a structured analysis of the factors influencing the works of a committee. These factors are divided into external ( shaped outside of the committee e.g. by law) and internal ones (related to the composition of the committee and interactions between its members). The survey of the general economic literature related to collective decision making presented within the proposed framework yields interesting suggestions for further research, including the consequences for the shape of monetary policy committeesArtykuł ma na celu dokonanie przeglądu literatury ekonomicznej z zakresu kolektywnego podejmowania decyzji. W tym celu zaproponowano ramy pozwalające na ustrukturyzowaną analizę czynników wpływających na pracę organu kolektywnego (rady). Dokonano podziału tych czynników na zewnętrzne (tzn. kształtowane poza samą radą, np. przez wymogi prawne) oraz wewnętrzne (związane ze składem rady oraz interakcjami między jej członkami). Dokonany w ramach zaproponowanej struktury przegląd literatury ogólnoekonomicznej dotyczącej kolektywnego podejmowania decyzji pozwala na zaproponowanie interesujących kierunków dalszych badań, w tym konsekwencji dla kształtu rad polityki pieniężnej

On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model, and compare them to the weights derived from poll data.Majority rule, Voting, Weighted voting, European Union

Élőlények kollektív viselkedésének statisztikus fizikája = Statistical physics of the collective behaviour of organisms

Experiments: We have carried out quantitative experiments on the collective motion of cells as a function of their density. A sharp transition could be observed from the random motility in sparse cultures to the flocking of dense islands of cells. Using ultra light GPS devices developed by us, we have determined the existing hierarchical relations within a flock of 10 homing pigeons. Modelling: From the simulations of our new model of flocking we concluded that the information exchange between particles was maximal at the critical point, in which the interplay of such factors as the level of noise, the tendency to follow the direction and the acceleration of others results in large fluctuations. Analysis: We have proposed a novel link-density based approach to finding overlapping communities in large networks. The algorithm used for the implementation of this technique is very efficient for most real networks, and provides full statistics quickly. Correspondingly, we have developed a by now popular, user-friendly, freely downloadable software for finding overlapping communities. Extending our method to the time-dependent regime, we found that large groups in evolving networks persist for longer if they are capable of dynamically altering their membership, thus, an ability to change the group composition results in better adaptability. We also showed that knowledge of the time commitment of members to a given community can be used for estimating the community's lifetime. Experiments: We have carried out quantitative experiments on the collective motion of cells as a function of their density. A sharp transition could be observed from the random motility in sparse cultures to the flocking of dense islands of cells. Using ultra light GPS devices developed by us, we have determined the existing hierarchical relations within a flock of 10 homing pigeons. Modelling: From the simulations of our new model of flocking we concluded that the information exchange between particles was maximal at the critical point, in which the interplay of such factors as the level of noise, the tendency to follow the direction and the acceleration of others results in large fluctuations. Analysis: We have proposed a novel link-density based approach to finding overlapping communities in large networks. The algorithm used for the implementation of this technique is very efficient for most real networks, and provides full statistics quickly. Correspondingly, we have developed a by now popular, user-friendly, freely downloadable software for finding overlapping communities. Extending our method to the time-dependent regime, we found that large groups in evolving networks persist for longer if they are capable of dynamically altering their membership, thus, an ability to change the group composition results in better adaptability. We also showed that knowledge of the time commitment of members to a given community can be used for estimating the community's lifetime

The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions

This paper formulates a model of dynamic, endogenous reform of political institutions. Specifically, a class of dynamic political games (DPGs) is introduced in which institutional choice is both recursive and instrumental. It is recursive because future political institutions are decided under current ones. The process is instrumental because institutional choices do not affect payoffs or technology directly. DPGs provide a broad framework to address the question: which environments exhibit institutional reform? Which tend toward institutional stability? In any state, private (public) sector decisions are essential if, roughly, they cannot always be replaced by decisions in the public (private) sector. We prove that institutional reform occurs if public sector decisions are not essential. Conversely, private sector decisions are essential if institutional reform occurs. The results suggest that a relatively more effective public sector is conducive to institutional stability, while a more effective private sector is conducive to change. We also show that if the political rules satisfy a dynamic consistency property, then the game admits ``political fixed points" of a recursive map from future (state-contingent) decisions rules to current ones. Since existence of political fixed points is a necessary condition of equilibrium, we apply the result to prove two equilibrium existence theorems, one of which implies that private and public sector decision rules that are smooth functions of the economic state.institutional reform, recursive, instrumental, dynamic political games, political fixed points.