Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretations: Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972

Articles by Ian Mueller, Ronald Zirin, Norman Kretzmann, John Corcoran, John Mulhern, Mary Mulhern,Josiah Gould, and others. Topics: Aristotle's Syllogistic, Stoic Logic, Modern Research in Ancient Logic

Using features for automated problem solving

We motivate and present an architecture for problem solving where an abstraction layer of "features" plays the key role in determining methods to apply. The system is presented in the context of theorem proving with Isabelle, and we demonstrate how this approach to encoding control knowledge is expressively different to other common techniques. We look closely at two areas where the feature layer may offer benefits to theorem proving — semi-automation and learning — and find strong evidence that in these particular domains, the approach shows compelling promise. The system includes a graphical theorem-proving user interface for Eclipse ProofGeneral and is available from the project web page, http://feasch.heneveld.org

Explaining Imagination

Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the simpler parts are other familiar mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, decisions, and intentions. In different combinations and contexts, these states constitute cases of imagining. This reductive approach to imagination is at direct odds with the current orthodoxy, which sees imagination as an irreducible, sui generis mental state or process—one that influences our judgments, beliefs, desires, and so on, without being constituted by them. Explaining Imagination looks closely at the main contexts where imagination is thought to be at work and argues that, in each case, the capacity is best explained by appeal to a person’s beliefs, judgments, desires, intentions, or decisions. The proper conclusion is not that there are no imaginings after all, but that these other states simply constitute the relevant cases of imagining. Contexts explored in depth include: hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning, engaging in pretense, appreciating fictions, and generating creative works. The special role of mental imagery within states like beliefs, desires, and judgments is explained in a way that is compatible with reducing imagination to more basic folk psychological states. A significant upshot is that, in order to create an artificial mind with an imagination, we need only give it these more ordinary mental states

Beyond Logic. Proceedings of the Conference held in Cerisy-la-Salle, 22-27 May 2017

The project "Beyond Logic" is devoted to what hypothetical reasoning is all about when we go beyond the realm of "pure" logic into the world where logic is applied. As such extralogical areas we have chosen philosophy of science as an application within philosophy, informatics as an application within the formal sciences, and law as an application within the field of social interaction. The aim of the conference was to allow philosophers, logicians and computer scientists to present their work in connection with these three areas. The conference took place 22-27 May, 2017 in Cerisy-la-Salle at the Centre Culturel International de Cerisy. The proceedings collect abstracts, slides and papers of the presentations given, as well as a contribution from a speaker who was unable to attend

LIPIcs, Volume 277, GIScience 2023, Complete Volume

LIPIcs, Volume 277, GIScience 2023, Complete Volum

Explaining Imagination

Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the simpler parts are other familiar mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, decisions, and intentions. In different combinations and contexts, these states constitute cases of imagining. This reductive approach to imagination is at direct odds with the current orthodoxy, which sees imagination as an irreducible, sui generis mental state or process—one that influences our judgments, beliefs, desires, and so on, without being constituted by them. Explaining Imagination looks closely at the main contexts where imagination is thought to be at work and argues that, in each case, the capacity is best explained by appeal to a person’s beliefs, judgments, desires, intentions, or decisions. The proper conclusion is not that there are no imaginings after all, but that these other states simply constitute the relevant cases of imagining. Contexts explored in depth include: hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning, engaging in pretense, appreciating fictions, and generating creative works. The special role of mental imagery within states like beliefs, desires, and judgments is explained in a way that is compatible with reducing imagination to more basic folk psychological states. A significant upshot is that, in order to create an artificial mind with an imagination, we need only give it these more ordinary mental states