1 research outputs found
On the Structure of Equilibrium Strategies in Dynamic Gaussian Signaling Games
This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the
well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The
mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a
sender who observes two Gaussian processes, state and bias, and a receiver who
takes an action based on the received message from the sender. The players
incur quadratic instantaneous costs as functions of the state, bias and action
variables. Our particular focus is on the Stackelberg equilibrium, which
corresponds to information disclosure and Bayesian persuasion problems in
economics. Prior work solved the static game, and showed that the Stackelberg
equilibrium is achieved by pure strategies that are linear functions of the
state and the bias variables. The main focus of this work is on the dynamic
(multi-stage) setting, where we show that the existence of a pure strategy
Stackelberg equilibrium, within the set of linear strategies, depends on the
problem parameters. Surprisingly, for most problem parameters, a pure linear
strategy does not achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium which implies the
existence of a trade-off between exploiting and revealing information, which
was also encountered in several other asymmetric information games.Comment: will appear in IEEE Multi-Conference on Systems and Control 201